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Abstract
Non-adherence to medication is a problem of great magnitude as it leads to reduced health 
outcomes and increased health care costs. The impact of the doctor-patient relationship on 
non-adherence has attracted the interest of researchers yet relevant evidence is limited.
The aim of this thesis is twofold. It empirically investigates the relationship between the 
doctor-patient interaction and non-adherence to medication in Greece, on a population and 
a patient level. It also develops a theoretical model of the doctor-patient relationship using 
non-cooperative game theory to explain how supply of information under conflict 
conditions affects non-adherence.
Two empirical studies and a game theoretical model are used. The first study draws on data 
from the European Social Survey to examine beliefs about doctors and attitudes towards 
medication in the general population. The second study analyses a questionnaire survey of 
hypertensive patients in Greece, conducted for this thesis. The game theoretical approach 
investigates how conflicts between patients’ preferences for information and doctors’ effort 
to supply it may lead to non-adherence. It employs concepts from Behavioural Economics, 
which combines elements of both Economics and Psychology.
The findings demonstrate a strong association between what individuals think of doctors 
and their attitudes towards medication. Beliefs about doctors are the strongest predictors of 
non-adherence in both studies. At a population and patient level, Greeks attach a lot of 
weight to their doctors’ opinions and adhere to their recommendations. Finally, the game- 
theoretical framework shows that doctors’ failure to understand patients’ need for 
information may result in patients not adhering.
The findings suggest that interventions to improve adherence rates should be built on the 
basis of a good doctor-patient relationship, where the doctors understand patients’ needs, 
discuss about the treatment and pass on adequate information. The thesis is part of the 
cumulative knowledge in the area and could lead to further empirical and theoretical 
investigations.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Thesis background
Health care presents a contradiction. On the one hand, advances in medicine are 
extending life and improving its quality, thereby providing gains of great importance 
for those who benefit from such advances. On the other hand, available evidence 
shows a great waste of resources and consequent reduction of benefits from 
treatments and poorer health outcomes because patients do not adhere to prescribed 
medication.
Adherence to a medication regimen is generally defined as “the extent to which 
patients take medications as prescribed by their health care providers” (Osterberg 
and Blaschke 2005). The World Health Organization (WHO) (2003) reports that 
adherence to long-term therapy for chronic illnesses in developed countries averages 
50% varying by the type of condition, while in developing countries the rates are 
even lower given the paucity of health resources and inequities in access to health 
services.
Furthermore, a review of empirical studies by Pampallona et al. (2002) on the use of 
medication among patients with depression revealed that adherence rates varied 
between 32 and 82%. Even in conditions where symptoms are more severe, such as 
in rheumatoid arthritis, adherence to medication ranges from 43 to 84% (Brus, Van 
de Laar et al. 1997). Variations in adherence rates may be affected by the different 
methodologies or definitions employed in each study. However, regardless of these 
disparities one thing is certain: use of medication in many conditions, mainly 
chronic illnesses, is far from ideal.
The magnitude and impact of non-adherence to medications in health care is 
striking. Sub-optimal use of appropriate medicines results in reduced health 
outcomes due to relapses and re-hospitalisation. For example, untreated 
hypertension is known to increase the risk of coronary heart disease (Psaty, Koepsell
10
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et al. 1990) and stroke (Marmot and Poulter 1992). As mentioned in the WHO report 
(2003), in the United States the cost of health care related to hypertension, its 
complications and comorbidities was estimated to reach 12.6% of the total health 
care expenditure (Hodgson and Cai 2001). Therefore, employing the cost-benefit 
idea, it has been argued that “increasing the effectiveness of adherence interventions 
may have a far greater impact on the health of the population than any improvement 
in specific medical treatment” (Haynes, McDonald et al. 2002). This is particularly 
true for some conditions, such as hypertension. When treatment is followed 
appropriately it prevents patients from developing more serious and, consequently, 
more costly conditions, such as stroke and heart disease.
In order to suggest appropriate interventions policy makers need first to identify 
what the causes of non-adherence to medication are. A plethora of studies have been 
conducted on the issue, constituting a quite vague, and often unorganised, literature, 
which suggests that among the main determinants that affect patients’ decisions to 
adhere are socio-demographic factors, disease and regimen-related factors, patient 
beliefs and the doctor-patient relationship.
The doctor-patient relationship remains the cornerstone of medical care and its 
importance in the patient’s decision to adhere to medication has attracted increasing 
interest during the last decades. This follows a general tendency to depart from the 
traditional misconception that non-adherence is a patient-driven problem. Theories 
of doctor-patient communication such as paternalism, shared and informed decision 
making as well as the principal-agency theory from the field of Economics have 
been used to explain how this interaction affects patients’ decisions. In addition, 
empirical studies have been looking at specific characteristics of the relationship, 
such as decision making, supply of information, verbal and non-verbal behaviour as 
well as the agendas that the two parties bring to the consultation.
Yet, the doctor-patient relationship is a highly complex and multifaceted issue. 
Many aspects of this relationship remain unknown or unexplored and the impact on 
the patient’s decision needs to be examined further.
11
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1.2 Research focus
The broad objective of this thesis is to examine the issue of non-adherence to 
medication with a particular focus on the effect that the doctor-patient relationship 
has on a patient’s decision to follow medical recommendations or not.
The first aim of the thesis is to empirically examine the impact of the doctor-patient 
relationship on non-adherence to medication in Greece, a country where no previous 
evidence on the issue exists. Two research aims were developed. The first aim was 
to set the issue of non-adherence in the broad country context looking at the general 
population level. Most of the empirical evidence on the topic of non-adherence 
focuses on a specific disease group, as a result of which evidence on the general 
population’s beliefs and attitudes is very limited. Data from the second round of the 
European Social Survey facilitate this aim. The survey allows not only the 
examination of the issue of non-adherence on the general population level in Greece 
but it also permits cross-country comparisons, filling another gap in the literature.
The second part of the empirical investigation tests the impact of the doctor-patient 
relationship on non-adherence to medication among a specific group of Greek 
patients. A questionnaire survey was planned to meet this second aim. Current 
theoretical elements used in the literature, as well as empirical studies in similar 
settings, were partly the basis of this questionnaire survey. Its objective was to 
collect detailed information on Greek patients’ attitudes where no previous 
systematic evidence exists.
As the research evolved, the need for a new formal and more coherent model 
became apparent. A careful review of existing theoretical models and empirical 
literature as well as findings from the two empirical studies of the thesis identified 
theoretical gaps. There is strong empirical evidence suggesting that the doctor and 
the patient go into the consultation with differing agendas and purposes, which often 
lead to sub-optimal results, such as non-adherence to medication. However, all the 
existing theoretical models referred above explain successfully some aspects of the 
relationship, but they fail to capture these conflicts clearly. This gave rise to the need 
for a better theoretical understanding of doctor-patient communication and its
12
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impact on the patient’s decision to non-adhere. For this aim we developed a model 
based on a game theoretical framework.
The aims of the thesis described here, along with the specific research hypotheses 
and questions, will be explained in more detail in Chapter 3.
1.3 Outline of the thesis
This thesis is organised into seven more chapters. Chapter 2 is a review of the 
literature in the area. It begins by clarifying the concepts and definitions used to 
describe a patient’s departure from a doctor’s recommendations. It then presents the 
theoretical models which have been used to explain non-adherence in general as 
well as the main theoretical frameworks of doctor-patient communication that 
explain how this relationship impacts on patients’ decisions. We find that it is more 
convenient to explore the theoretical background before we present the empirical 
evidence. A review of the empirical literature follows, presenting the studies that 
have been conducted to date to identify factors associated with non-adherence to 
medication, paying particular attention to the doctor-patient relationship. Finally, 
given that the focus of the thesis has been the situation in Greece, a brief overview 
of the country’s health profile as well as the organisation of the Greek health system 
is presented.
Having identified the literature gaps and limitations, Chapter 3 states the conceptual 
framework for the thesis followed by the specific research questions and hypotheses. 
A brief section presents the basic methodology used to address these research 
questions, although a more detailed analytic methodology section is included in each 
of the three main parts of the thesis.
Chapter 4 presents the first of the two empirical studies of the thesis. It analyses data 
from the European Social Survey in order to examine the issue of non-adherence to 
medication and the doctor-patient relationship at a population level. Results are 
discussed in two ways. First, the general beliefs that the population in Greece has 
about doctors’ role and their attitudes towards medication are examined and 
compared to those of other Europeans to identify idiosyncratic differences. Then, the
13
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analysis identifies the determinants of the general population’s attitudes towards 
prescribed medication with a specific focus on how the perceptions that people have 
of doctors impact on these attitudes.
In Chapter 5, the thesis examines in depth the issue of non-adherence in a specific 
group of hypertensive patients in Greece. It presents the methodology of the survey, 
explaining the development of the questionnaire and the fieldwork in Greece. The 
study builds upon the existing theoretical elements and empirical studies. It intends 
to identify the factors that affect non-adherence to medication, focusing on the 
perceptions that patients have of the doctors they consult for the treatment of 
hypertension. Results shed light on what Greek patients think of their doctors and 
how this impacts on their decision to take medication as prescribed.
Chapter 6 is the theoretical part of the thesis. We begin with a review of the models 
of the doctor-patient relationship that come both from the field of medical literature 
and the recently evolving field of Behavioural Economics, which combines elements 
from Psychology and Economics. This chapter challenges existing models on the 
grounds that they fail to capture the conflicts which, the medical literature argues, 
exist in the consultation and may lead patients to non-adhere to recommendations. It 
then presents the non-cooperative game theoretical models that focus on the supply 
of information by the doctor. The chapter intends to examine how the doctor’s 
failure to understand differences in patient preferences for information may lead a 
patient to avoid following recommendations. It presents, under specific but 
reasonable assumptions, a complete resolution of the models obtaining results based 
on the doctor’s effort and the patient’s preference for information.
Chapter 7 provides an overall discussion of the results of the thesis and considers the 
policy implications. It brings together the results from the two empirical chapters in 
order to shed light on the issue of the doctor-patient relationship and non-adherence 
in Greece. It then discusses the findings of the game theoretical chapter and connects 
them to the empirical ones of the previous chapters. Policy implications are 
primarily discussed for Greece. However, more general implications are derived 
from the game theoretical model and are discussed with respect to the doctor, the 
patient and administrative support concerning the issue of non-adherence. The
14
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chapter concludes by providing possible directions for future investigations in the 
area, as research is an ongoing process.
Finally, Chapter 8 brings together all the chapters of the thesis and summarises the 
key points.
15
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the existing empirical and theoretical background of the issue 
of non-adherence and the doctor-patient relationship. It begins with a clarification of 
the main concepts and definitions, elucidating the differences in the terms used to 
describe a patient’s departure from the doctor’s recommendations. It continues with 
a critical review of the main theoretical models that are presented here in two 
clusters: models that are used to explain non-adherence, as a health behaviour 
chosen by the individual, and models of doctor-patient relationships that explain 
how this interaction affects a patient’s decision to non-adhere.
The exploration of the theoretical models is followed by a review of the empirical 
studies that have been conducted in this area to identify determinants of non­
adherence. Finally, given that the focus of the empirical surveys of this thesis is 
Greece, a brief review of the health profile and the health system of this country is 
provided at the end o f the chapter.
2.2 Concepts and definitions
This section reviews the terms used in the area and gives appropriate definitions. It 
then discusses different types of adherence that are met in the literature.
2.2.1 Terms and definitions
There is no single, commonly accepted term used to describe a patient’s departure 
from the doctor’s treatment recommendations. The relevant literature uses the terms 
non-compliance, non-adherence and lack of concordance. Although they are often 
used by some authors interchangeably, each of these terms has a different meaning 
and therefore different implications.
16
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Compliance
Early studies in this area used the term compliance. Haynes et al. (1979) give one of 
the first definitions of compliance, which has been widely adopted by many authors, 
that is “the extent to which a person’s behaviour (in terms of taking medication, 
following a diet, modifying habits or attending clinics) coincides with medical or 
health advice”.
This is a general definition that focuses not only on compliance to medication, but 
also goes beyond prescribed pharmaceuticals to other health-related behaviours such 
as exercising, following a diet, etc. However, the term compliance has often been 
conceptualised as obedience; that is, the physician prescribes and the patient obeys 
(Dunbar-Jacob and Serein 2001). This concept implies that the patient is a passive 
participant who executes certain behaviour because s/he is made by the physician to 
do so and not because s/he actively decides to. This potential problem is noted by 
Haynes himself when he comments that “the term compliance is troublesome to 
many people because it conjures up images of patient or client sin or serfdom” 
(Haynes 2001). To avoid the concept of obedience, researchers began using 
alternative terms that give a more active role to the patient in the decision making 
process.
Adherence
The term adherence was one of the first alternatives to compliance and quickly 
became widely accepted by researchers and healthcare providers as a departure from 
the notion of obedience while also removing the implied guilt of the patient. Rand 
(1993) defines adherence as “the extent to which a patient’s behaviour corresponds 
to the physician’s therapeutic recommendations”. This definition is quite similar to 
the definition used by Haynes et al. (1979) but allows patients to correspond to 
doctor’s suggestions. The active role of the patient is more obvious in this definition 
and the final decision requires agreement between the two parties.
The World Health Organization (2003) combines Haynes’ and Rand’s definitions 
and arrives at the following approach: “adherence is the extent to which a person’s
17
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behaviour - taking medication, following a diet, and/or executing lifestyle changes - 
corresponds with agreed recommendations from the health care provider”.
Again, the role of the patient as an active decision maker is increased as the 
definition allows the patient to agree with the healthcare provider’s 
recommendations. The WHO definition replaced an earlier version given at the 
WHO Adherence meeting in June 2001 at which adherence was “the extent to which 
the patient follows medical instructions” (Sabate 2001).
In general, the term adherence clearly gives a more active role to the patient than the 
term compliance does. It allows the patient to be free in choosing the right 
recommendation and it emphasises the need for agreement between the doctor and 
the patient.
Concordance
Another term used in the literature is that of concordance. This newer concept of 
doctor-patient communication began in the UK with a report by the Royal 
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain (henceforth RPSGB) (1997). It was later 
extensively discussed in a review by Cox e al. (2004) of the communication between 
patients and health care professional published by the RPSGB. There is no precise 
definition of concordance and the last RPSGB review refers to it in a descriptive 
way as follows:
“the clinical encounter is concerned with two sets of contrasted but equally 
cogent health beliefs -  that of patient and that of the doctor. The task of the 
patient is to convey her or his health beliefs to the doctor; and of the doctor, to 
enable this to happen. The task of the doctor or other prescriber is to convey his 
or her (professionally informed) health beliefs to the patient; and of the patient, 
to entertain these. The intention is to assist the patient to make as informed a 
choice as possible about the diagnosis and treatment about benefit and risk and 
to take full part in a therapeutic alliance. Although reciprocal, this is an alliance 
in which health care professionals recognise the primacy of the patient’s 
decisions about taking the recommended medications” (Cox, Stevenson et al. 
2004).
18
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Concordance is therefore a concept which suggests frank exchange of information, 
negotiation, and a spirit of cooperation between the patient and doctor (Mullen
1997). Mullen (1997) argues that conditions in Britain, compared to the US, favour 
this approach; since “patients and practitioners are more likely to have known one 
another for longer, dispensing medical care is less impersonal and ancillary 
personnel are available for a follow up”.
Confusion in the use o f terms
There are ongoing discussions on which term (compliance, adherence, concordance) 
is more appropriate. Haynes (2001) in a recent paper argues that perhaps 
‘acceptance’ would be the best term of all; however, it is not widely used. 
‘Compliance’ remains the most widely cited term and produces the greatest yield in 
literature searches, but it is ‘adherence’ that seems to have been more often chosen 
by researchers in recent years.
It is important, however, to make a clear distinction between the terms ‘adherence’, 
‘compliance’ and ‘concordance’, which are often contused and misunderstood. The 
term ‘concordance’ refers to the communication between the patient and the doctor 
during the consultation, while ‘adherence’ and ’compliance’, despite the conceptual 
differences in the way they perceive a patient’s role in the decision making process, 
both refer to the patient’s behaviour. A patient can be non-compliant or non­
adherent, but cannot be non-concordant by definition. Yet, lack of concordance 
during consultation may lead to non-adherence to recommendations. It is, therefore, 
incorrect to use the term ‘concordance’ to describe patient behaviour, and hence it is 
erroneous to use it interchangeably with the terms ‘compliance’ and ‘adherence’.
In this thesis, the term ‘adherence’ is used to describe patient departure from the 
physician’s recommendations because it acknowledges the patient as an active 
participant in the decision-making process and not as a passive individual who 
simply obeys the doctor’s instructions. ‘Concordance’ refers to the process rather 
than the patient’s behaviour and as such it is not the appropriate term for the purpose 
of this thesis. ‘Adherence’ is also the term used by the WHO in the 2003 report on 
long-term conditions (WHO 2003). In addition, a report for the National Co­
ordinating Centre for NHS Service Delivery and Organisation R&D (NCCSDO)
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written by a group of experts in the field and commissioned by the National Institute 
for Clinical Excellence (NICE) also recommends ‘adherence’ as the term of choice 
to describe patients’ behaviour (Home, Weinman et al. 2005). The same report also 
concludes that ‘concordance’ is a more complex and less clearly defined term that 
should not be used to describe patients’ medication-taking behaviour as it relates to 
the process and outcomes of prescribing (rather than patient behaviour).
It is important to mention at this point that in the literature review section of this 
thesis the terms ‘compliance’ and ‘adherence’ will be used interchangeably, 
reflecting simply the authors’ choice of term.
2.2.2 Types of adherence
It is necessary to distinguish between different types of adherence. Schlenk et al. 
(2001) define the following types, varying according to patients’ intention to follow 
recommendations:
■ Erratic non-adherence: In this case, patients come to an agreement with their 
physicians and they know what to do but they end up not following the therapy 
because they find it difficult or complicated or simply because dismptions interfere 
with following the regimen.
■ Unwitting non-adherence: Patients incorrectly follow the prescription because of 
a misunderstanding, incorrect administration technique, language barriers or 
cognitive impairment. A striking point about this type of non-compliance is that 
neither the doctor nor the patient recognises the problem.
■ Intentional non-adherence (or ‘intelligent non-adherence ’): The patient decides 
to change or discontinue the therapy although it may not be wise to do so. This may 
happen because the patient feels better, s/he thinks that the medication is no longer 
needed, the drug has side effects or there is a fear of addiction. Patients usually do 
not report non-compliance in this case because the doctor may judge it negatively.
Another distinction in non-adherence refers to the type of departure from 
recommendations. According to this two types are identified: primary and secondary 
non-adherence.
■ Primary non-adherence refers to the prescription not being dispensed in the first 
place (Beardon, McGilchrist et al. 1993). This type of non-adherence is particularly
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interesting as it is often associated with the costs of the prescriptions. 
Socioeconomic disadvantage may be a factor in explaining patients’ decisions 
(Wamala, Merlo et al. 2007).
■ Secondary non-adherence refers to situations in which the patients dispense the 
prescription but do not follow it as recommended by the health care provider. This 
type of non-adherence can take various forms, including sub-optimal dosing, taking 
the right doses but not at the right time, not taking medication for some periods, 
such as during holidays, or completely stopping the medication.
Different types of non-adherence may have different determinants. However, it is 
not always easy to distinguish between these different types. This thesis is primarily 
examining a patient’s intentional decision to non-adhere to recommendation. 
However, it acknowledges the fact that in some cases the distinction may be blurred. 
This is clearly stated where it occurs.
2.3 Review of the theoretical models
By theoretical models we mean various attempts and constructions to advance 
relevant hypotheses in order to provide a deeper understanding and explanation of 
behaviour. They illuminate particular aspects, they vary in their conception and 
generality with the various authors and they do not always take the form of a formal 
structure.
This section explores the existing theoretical models that have been used in the area 
of the doctor-patient relationship and non-adherence. Review of the theory is 
completed in two stages. The first half of this section considers the theoretical 
models used to explain non-adherence to medication as a behaviour chosen by a 
patient. The second half examiners the models on the doctor-patient relationship 
with a particular interest in how such models attempt to explain a patient’s decision 
to non-adhere.
2.3.1 Theoretical models on adherence
Several theoretical models have been developed to explain how people initiate and 
maintain actions to preserve health status. Leventhal (1993) distinguishes between
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psychological and social theories. Psychological theories suggest there can be a 
match between prescribed standards for health behaviour and actual or observed 
behaviours of the patient. Sociological theories present compliance as a hierarchical 
social system in which the practitioner’s role is to provide diagnosis and a treatment 
regimen and the patient’s role is to listen and follow instructions.
Early studies on compliance were atheoretical and were based on the assumption 
that any departure from the doctor’s instructions was the patient’s fault. They 
attempted to find characteristics that would form a typical non-adherent patient. 
Researchers soon realised that a patient’s personality cannot be seen separately from 
the environment or the treatment s/he follows. As a consequence new models 
included environmental cues that elicit behaviour, such as follow-up phone calls, 
reminders etc. Nevertheless, even these studies failed to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the problem, and under situational changes did not produce the 
same outcomes.
It soon became clear that examining the demographic characteristics of a typical 
non-adherent and creating special environments to control patients’ behaviour was 
not enough to resolve the problem, and as a result researchers started using cognitive 
behavioural models. The most commonly used models attempting to analyse the 
problem of non-adherence to medication in chronic diseases are the social learning 
models, i.e. the model of self-efficacy, and the cognitive models, i.e. the Health 
Belief Model, the Theory of Reasoned Action, the Theory of Planned Behaviour, 
and the more recent Self-regulatory Model. We start with the cognitive models as 
being the first models which have been used to explain adherence.
2.3.1.1 The Health Belief Model
The Health Belief Model (HBM) was developed by Rosenstock (1966; 1974). In its 
general form it consists of two aspects of individuals’ representations of health and 
health behaviour. The first is threat perception, which further consists of two 
aspects: perceived susceptibility to illness and perceived severity of its 
consequences. Perceived susceptibility refers to the subjective risks of contracting a 
condition and varies widely among individuals. The perceived seriousness refers to 
the degree of emotional arousal created by the thought of the disease but also all the
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difficulties a given health problem may create to the individual. The second aspect is 
behavioural evaluation, which also has two components: the benefits of a 
recommended health behaviour, i.e. how beneficial s/he thinks the treatment is, and 
the costs of or barriers to enacting the behaviour, consisting of monetary or 
convenience factors.
In other words, patients seem to adhere more if they believe themselves to be 
susceptible to a particular condition, which they also consider to be serious, and they 
believe that the benefits of the action taken to counteract the health threat outweigh 
the costs (Sheeran and Abraham 1996). Later additions to the model are the cues to 
action, i.e. social influence and health promotion campaigns, as well as an 
individual’s general health motivation (Becker, Haefner et al. 1977). All of the 
above aspects are presented in Figure 2.1.
Action
Cues to action
Perceived barriers
Perceived severity
Perceived susceptibility
Health Motivation
Perceived benefits
DEMOGRAPHIC 
VARIABLES 
Class, gender, age, etc
PSYCHOLOGICAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Personality, peer 
Group pressure, etc
Figure 2.1: The Health Belief Model, (taken from Shreeran and Abraham
(1996)).
The Health Belief Model has received great attention from researchers and has been 
tested in many disease groups to explain adherence to medication. These include 
application of the model in hypertension (Nelson, Stason et al. 1978; Taylor 1979),
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diabetes (Harris and Linn 1985; Bradley, Gamsu et al. 1987) and psychiatric 
disorders (Budd, Hughes et al. 1996).
Despite its popularity the Health Belief Model (HBM) is not without limitations. It 
appears to exclude some important variables which in other models receive greater 
attention, such as intentions to perform an action (Theory of Reasoned Action and 
Theory of Planned Behaviour) or perception of the control over the performance of 
the behaviour (self-efficacy model). Rosenstock (1974) did not really specify how 
different beliefs influence one another. He also gave no operational definitions of the 
variables, and therefore researchers use different methods. For example, perceived 
vulnerability is used by some researchers to measure personal vulnerability to a 
specific health threat and by others general vulnerability to disease relative to other 
people (Rutter and Quine 2002).
Further criticisms of the model include its emphasis on the individual, i.e. it does not 
explain sufficiently the role of the social environment, and the absence of a role for 
emotional factors such as fear and denial (Ogden 1996). Finally, the HBM has been 
criticised for being a static representation of human behaviour in which beliefs are 
described as occurring simultaneously with no space for change or progress 
(Schwarzer 1992). Therefore, there are concerns on whether the model could predict 
non-adherence to medication, the nature of which is more dynamic.
2.3.1.2 Theory o f Reasoned Action and Planned Behaviour
In this section, the Theory of Reasoned Action (henceforth TRA) and the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour (henceforth TPB) are presented together, since the latter is an 
extension of the former. The TRA was originally developed by Ajzen and Fishbein 
(1980) to explain the relationships between attitudes and behaviour and was later 
widely used to predict health behaviour. The central idea is that intention precedes 
and predicts behaviour. Intention is determined by two factors: attitudes towards a 
behaviour and subjective norms.
According to the TRA, attitudes toward a specific behaviour are determined by 
salient beliefs, called behavioural beliefs and the individual’s evaluation of the 
outcomes of this particular behaviour. The evaluation of each outcome contributes to
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the attitude in proportion to the person’s subjective belief that this behaviour will 
produce the result in question. Therefore, multiplying beliefs and outcome 
evaluation and summing up the results give an estimate of the attitude towards 
behaviour. In a similar way, subjective norms are a function of normative beliefs, 
i.e. the individual’s beliefs that others approve or disapprove of his/her behaviour, 
and his/her motivation to comply.
Azjen soon realised that intention alone is not enough to predict behaviour. 
Therefore, a few years later a new component was added to the TRA to formulate 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen 1985). This is the perceived behavioural 
control that describes the extent to which the individual believes that behaving in a 
certain way is something that is under his/her control. The more opportunities 
individuals think they have and the fewer obstacles they anticipate, the greater their 
perceived control over the behaviour (Ajzen 1991). A graphical representation of the 
model of the Theory of Reasoned Action and Planned Behaviour (new components 
are shaded in grey) is provided in Figure 2.2.
Behavi
our
Behavioural
Intention
Perceived
control
Subjective
norm
Attitudes towards 
Behaviour
Normative
Beliefs
Motivation 
x to comply
Beliefs 
Outcomes x Outcomes
Evaluation
Perceived Perceived 
Likelihood x facilitating/ 
of occurrence inhibiting 
Power
Demographic
variables.
Age, sex, 
occupation, 
Socio-economic 
status,
Religion,
education
Personality
traits
Extraversion
Conscientious­
ness
EXTERNAL
VARIABLES
Agreeableness
Neuroticism
Figure 2.2: The Theory of Reasoned Action and Planned Behaviour (taken from  
Conner and Sparks (1996) and Rutter and Quine (2002)).
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The model has been used in a large number of studies predicting health behaviours 
such as smoking initiation, alcohol consumption, sexual behaviours and exercise 
(Rutter and Quine 2002). Some of its components have also been used to predict 
patients’ drug compliance (Hounsa, Godin et al. 1993).
The criticisms of the model focus mainly on its applicability. The TPB, as was the 
case with the HBM, is a model with static character. Ajzen (1985) reports that “since 
the likelihood of unforeseen events will tend to increase as time passes, we would 
expect to find stronger intention-behaviour correlations with short rather than long 
periods of delay”.
In other words, the model could be used to predict short-term adherence to 
medication but is not adequate to give a better understanding of non-adherence in 
chronic diseases. In addition, a great deal of criticism focuses on the fact that the 
model deals with the perception of control and not with the actual control issues 
themselves (Conner and Sparks 1996).
2.3.1.3 The Self-Efficacy Model
A similar concept to the perception of control in the Theory of Planned Behaviour is 
the notion of self-efficacy. It argues that a strong sense of personal efficacy is related 
to better health, higher achievement and more social integration. This concept was 
originally developed within Bandura’s (1977) Social Cognitive Theory. It was based 
on the hypothesis that expectations of personal efficacy determine whether coping 
behaviour will be initiated, how much effort will be expended and how long it will 
be sustained in the face of obstacles and averse experiences.
Four sources of information are associated with the expectations of personal efficacy 
according to the model: performance accomplishments, vicarious experience, verbal 
persuasion and psychological states.
■ Performance accomplishments'. This is based on individuals’ personal 
experiences. Past successes raise expectations while repeated failures lower them.
■ Vicarious experience: People are influenced not only by their own experiences 
but also by those of other people. If they see other people behaving in a particular 
manner they persuade themselves that if others can do it, they should be able to do
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it as well. However, Bandura (1977) argues that vicarious experience is not as 
strong a source of information as performance accomplishments.
■ Verbal persuasion. People are led, through suggestion, into believing that they 
can perform in a particular way, which they could not do in the past. This is a 
popular way of influencing human behaviour because it is simple and easy.
■ Emotional arousal. Some situations, such as stress, which elicit emotional 
arousal, may have informative value concerning personal competency. 
Consequently, emotional arousal is a source of information that may affect 
perceived self-efficacy in coping with threatening situations.
Although the concept of self-efficacy was developed by Bandura, it has meanwhile 
proven to be an essential component in all major models. In the Health Belief Model 
it is presented as ‘barriers’ to action. Ajzen (1991) has extended the Theory of 
Reasoned Action to the Theory of Planned Behaviour by adding ‘the perceived 
behavioural control’. Therefore ‘self-efficacy models’ are no longer distinct from 
other approaches (Schwarzer and Fuchs 1996).
2.3.1.4 The Stages o f Change Model
Thus far, all the models presented deal with the performance of a particular 
behaviour at a specific point of time. Therefore they may be useful for the prediction 
of human behaviour in the short term but they fail to explain long-term behaviour 
such as adherence to chronic illnesses. The Stages of Change Model intends to 
overcome the problem of the static character of the previous models. It suggests that 
health behaviour develops in five progressive stages of change:
■ Pre-contemplation. In this stage the individual has no intention of changing 
behaviour and seems unaware of the benefits of such a change and resistant to 
efforts to modify it.
■ Contemplation. The individual has begun to think about modifying his 
behaviour but has made no commitment to change.
■ Preparation. This is the stage of decision-making; a commitment to change has 
been made. The person has started changing his/her attitude in some ways.
■ Action. Efforts to change occur. The individual makes important changes in 
his/her behaviour but these are not yet fully established.
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■ Maintenance. Individuals try to stabilize their behaviour, change and avoid 
relapse.
The model has been applied in chronic conditions such as smoking (Prochaska and 
DiClemente 1983), as well as applications in adherence to medication intended to 
explain and predict changes in behaviour and also to suggest different intervention 
policies depending on which stage the patient is at (Willey, Redding et al. 2000).
One of the limitations of the model is that there is no clear evidence of how 
motivation to continue with the health behaviour is maintained (Home and Weiman
1998). A great deal of criticism has to do with whether the person passes through 
stages or whether these stages are just points of a continuum. It is also questioned 
whether people have to pass through every stage or if they can miss one, and 
whether all people face the same barriers at every stage. All these questions remain 
open to debate.
2.3.1.5 The Self-regulatory Model
Another dynamic approach is given by Leventhal (1993), who tries to explain the 
dynamic interaction between cognitions and behaviour while taking into 
consideration the notion of motivation. His model, known as Leventhal’s Self- 
Regulatory Model, is based on the idea that the patient is an active problem solver 
and that health behaviour is an effort to fill the gap between current health status and 
a future state. Leventhal argues that previous researchers have placed too much 
emphasis on concepts such as self-efficacy and behavioural skills and little, or no, 
attention to the notion of maintaining motivation for change. His self-regulation 
model is presented in Figure 2.3.
The model suggests that there are three basic stages in the process of adapting a 
behaviour. First, based on internal and external stimuli, the individual generates 
representations of both his/her disease threats, e.g. danger, and emotions, e.g. fear. 
This representation helps the person define his/her goals and cope with the situation 
in a particular way. The third stage is appraisal of the coping outcomes. The 
appraisal depends on the expectations about the effectiveness of the coping response 
and the nature of the representation (e.g. is the symptom a sign of a transient or a 
serious, chronic condition?).
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Figure 2.3: Parallel Processing Model for adaptation to health threats {taken
Appraisals update the representation and change the identity of the problem and its 
controllability. They also change expectations respecting the effectiveness of the 
coping procedure. Not shown but also appraised is the individual’s perception of 
his/her effectiveness in performing these actions, and his/her perceptions of the 
effectiveness of the support system, both expert and non-expert.
The self-regulatory model has achieved a great deal of attention and has been used 
by researchers to explain adherence to medication in chronic illnesses mainly 
because of its dynamic character. Home et al. (1999) have developed their Beliefs 
about Medicines Questionnaire (BMQ) based on this model. The BMQ has been 
used extensively in many empirical studies as it provides useful insights into the 
way patients think in general about medicines and in particular about the medicines 
they are prescribed (Home, Weinman et al. 1999; Svarstad, Chewning et al. 1999). 
These beliefs have been shown to be significant predictors of non-adherence. 
However, the questionnaire focuses on beliefs about medicines and does not take 
into account the impact of the doctor, therefore it was not very useful for the 
purposes of this thesis.
from Leventhal (1993)).
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2.3.1.6 Discussion
There is no model or concept that perfectly explains health behaviour in general and 
non-adherence to medication more specifically. However, despite their limitations 
the models mentioned above provide valuable information to researchers in 
understanding patients’ behaviours. This thesis will use certain concepts that appear 
in some, or sometimes in all, of the models. These concepts are:
■ Self-efficacy and perceived control. This is the patient’s belief that behaving in 
a certain way is under his/her control. These concepts appear in the majority of the 
models.
■ Beliefs about health outcomes. This appears as behavioural evaluation in the 
Health Belief Model (benefits against costs or barriers of taking medication) and it 
is also similar to the idea of the attitudes towards behaviour, i.e. beliefs about 
outcomes and evaluation of the outcomes that is included in the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour.
■ Beliefs about the illness. In the Health Belief Model this is mentioned as threat 
perception (perceived susceptibility to illness and perceived severity of its 
consequences).
■ Motivation. This is mainly mentioned in the Self-regulatory model and gives 
the patient an active role in the issue of non-adherence.
■ Anticipation. A number of the models include the notion of anticipation, 
especially when models refer to evaluation of outcomes for the future. Leventhal’s 
Self-Regulatory Model in particular, as mentioned above, is based on the idea that 
the patient is an active problem solver and that health behaviour is an effort to fill 
the gap between current health status and a future ideal state. Indeed patients very 
often need to decide in the present on whether to take an action for future health 
outcomes.
These theoretical elements will be useful components for the two empirical studies 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. Both the secondary analysis of the 
European Social Survey and the analysis of the questionnaire survey in Greece 
intend to identify the determinants of non-adherence to medication and elements of 
self-efficacy, motivation and beliefs about health outcomes and illness, will be 
further investigated. The game theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 6 also
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uses some of the above elements, placing particular emphasis on the notion of 
anticipatory feelings. Anticipation lies at the heart of the Psychological Expected 
Utility (PEU) theory, developed by Caplin and Leahy (2001), upon which the game 
is built.
Having reviewed the models that have been developed to understand individuals’ 
health decisions in general and non-adherence in particular, it is now important to 
review the models of the doctor-patient relationship and examine how they explain 
the impact that this interaction has on a patient’s decision to follow 
recommendations.
2.3.2 Theories on the doctor-patient relationship
The doctor-patient relationship remains the cornerstone of medical practice. At the 
same time it is one of the most complex interactions in health care, which goes 
beyond consultation and clinical practice and involves aspects that are developed 
outside the encounter. Constructing a theory, therefore, that captures all aspects of 
this interaction is a very difficult task.
However, theorists narrow down the breadth of this relationship by developing 
models on some aspects of it, such as the decision-making process and 
communication at the consultation level. Hence, it is often seen that the terms 
‘relationship’ and ‘communication’ are used interchangeably although the latter term 
mainly refers to the consultation, involving information exchange, verbal and non­
verbal behaviour, while the former is more a general and broad term.
In this section, the main doctor-patient decision-making models are presented, 
followed by a more general model developed by Ong et al. (1995), which aims to 
put the doctor-patient relationship into a broad framework that connects 
communication with background variables and patient outcomes. All these models 
are examined and critiqued on the basis of how they explain non-adherence to 
recommendations.
There is no clear agreement on how to categorise the models used to describe the 
doctor-patient relationship with regard to decision making. In fact, there is 
considerable overlap and the models are often confusing to the reader. Here, they are
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presented according to the respective role that the doctor and the patient take in the 
final selection of treatment, as this will help in examining associations with 
adherence to recommendations. The categorisation by Charles et al. (1999), which 
includes three main models (paternalism, shared and informed decision making) as 
well as a fourth model derived from Health Economics (the principal-agency 
theory), is followed below.
2.3.2.1 Paternalism
This is the traditional model of the doctor-patient relationship, in which the doctor, 
as the expert, diagnoses the patient and decides on the appropriate treatment. In this 
model the patient has a passive role and no active involvement in the decision­
making process. It is this passive role that associates the paternalistic model with 
‘compliance’, where the doctor decides and the patient obeys. Coulter (2002) avoids 
the term ‘paternalistic’ and calls this model ‘professional choice’, arguing that it 
may be appropriate under some circumstances for the doctor to make decisions 
without the patient being actively involved.
2.3.2.2 Shared decision model
This model was developed by Charles et al. (1997), who argue that there should be 
four specific characteristics for shared decision making to be effective:
1. Both the physician and patient are, to some extent, involved in the treatment 
decision-making process.
2. Both parts share information.
3. Both take steps to participate in the decision-making process by expressing 
treatment preferences.
4. A treatment decision is made and both the physician and the patient agree on 
the treatment to be adopted.
In this framework, both the patient and the doctor are active members in the decision 
making process and therefore this model is closer to the concept of ‘concordance’. 
However, in terms of the patient’s behaviour the model allows for active choice, and 
as such it is also compatible with the concept of ‘adherence’. However, a study by
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Stevenson et al. (2000) of 62 consultations in Britain along with interviews with 
patients and general practitioners revealed that there is little evidence that patients 
and doctors both participate in the consultation in this way. The study concluded that 
even the first two of the four components that are necessary for the shared decision 
making to be upheld, i.e. for both parts to be involved and exchange information, 
were not present in the consultations which were studied.
2.3.2.3 Informed decision making model
The informed decision making model is often presented together with the shared 
decision making model (Britten and Weiss 2004) as both indicate a reaction to the 
model of paternalism. However, Charles et al. (1999) argue that the two models 
have essential differences which are mainly concerned with the information 
exchange. In the shared decision model the flow of information is two-sided as both 
the patient and the doctor exchange information, the latter mainly on the medical 
level and the former more on the personal level, such as experience and preferences.
In the informed decision making model the information is mainly one-sided, with 
the doctor supplying the information to the patient, mainly regarding medical 
aspects. Also, in the shared decision model the final decision is a common 
agreement between the two parties while in the informed model it is the patient who 
decides. In that sense, the informed model is closer to the concept of adherence as it 
gives an active role to the patient by allowing the final decision to be taken by the 
patient, who is well informed by the doctor.
A similar concept to that of the informed model is the informed consent decision­
making model (Wirtz, Cribb et al. 2006). In a similar way, the patient has the final 
decision-making role but gives the doctor the authority to do so for him/her. Yet, 
there are two differences between these two models. The first one is that informed 
consent is a form of legal authorisation, and for this to be valid certain criteria need 
to be met, such as the patient’s understanding of the information disclosed and 
freedom from coercion or manipulation by the doctor. Also, informed consent does 
not necessitate the patient to choose from a range of options but usually the doctor 
requires permission relating to one health care intervention, while informing the 
patient about other options.
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The distinctions between the models described above are clear in Figure 2.4 taken 
from Charles at al. (1999). In Figure 2.4, all the models along with their main 
characteristics regarding information exchange, deliberation and decision on 
treatment are presented. As mentioned in this figure, there are also models of the 
doctor-patient relationship that stand between the three models presented but a 
reference is avoided here for the purposes of clarity and simplicity.
Analytical Paternalistic (in between Shared (in between Informed 
Stages approaches) approaches)
Information
exchange
Flow One way 
(largely)
Two way One way 
(largely )
Direction From physician 
to patient
Physician 
to and from 
patient
From 
physician to 
patient
Type Medical Medical
and
personal
Medical
Amount* Minimum, 
legally required
All relevant 
for 
decision­
making
All relevant for 
decision­
making
Deliberation Physician alone 
with other 
physicians
Physician 
and patient 
(plus 
potential 
others)
Patient (plus 
potential 
others)
Deciding on 
treatment to 
implement
Physicians Physician 
and patient
Patient
**Minimum required
Figure 2.4: Models of doctor-patient relationship, {taken from Charles et al.
(1999)).
2.3.2.4 Principal-agent model
In Health Economics the doctor-patient relationship is often perceived as an agency 
one. The principal-agent model stresses the information asymmetry between the 
physician and the patient introduced by Arrow (1963). It states that the doctor acts 
like an agent maximizing the patient’s, i.e. the principal’s, utility. The doctor holds 
more information about the patient’s health status and the available treatments. The 
patient has superior knowledge about how these treatments fit with his lifestyle and
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has specific beliefs about medication and illness. The patient communicates these 
preferences to the doctor, who then acts as an agent for the patient.
In the perfect agency model, a specific case of the principal-agent theory, the doctor 
maximizes the patient’s utility as if it were his own.1 This model is not without 
limitations and criticisms. Empirical evidence has extensively shown that the doctor 
and the patient bring to the consultation different agendas and that the doctor is very 
often unable to understand patient needs (Britten, Stevenson et al. 2000). When 
these needs are not met the outcomes of the consultation are unsatisfactory and 
patients may non-adhere to the doctor’s recommendations. It also seems unrealistic 
for the perfect agency model to work in practice as the doctor, apart from the 
patient’s needs, has other constraints that need to be taken into consideration, such 
as administrative constraints, time issues and personal benefits and costs.
Departing from the perfect-agency model, there is an extensive literature on how 
physicians can act beyond maximising the patient’s utility function only. The review 
by McGuire (2000) of the theory and empirical research on physicians’ motivation 
presents three ways a physician can influence the quantity of medical care the 
patient can buy: non-retradability, which allows quantity setting, choice of non- 
contractible input and the supply-induced demand.
Specifically, the notion of physician-induced demand has been used widely in the 
doctor-patient literature and it has been used to explain why doctors lead the patient 
to consume more than if they had perfect information (Evans 1974). The model 
focuses on the supply-side of medical care and explains how doctors make patients 
consume more or less than if they had perfect information about their treatment. Yet 
it does not explain why patients may fail to follow recommendations.
Scott (2000) reviews the model of GP behaviour, which, as he argues, may be 
generalisable to physicians in general, and notes that there is no single common 
utility function used, but different studies use different arguments in the doctor’s
1 Gafni et al. (1998) argue that an alternative to the perfect agency relationship would be for the 
doctors to pass the information to the patients, who now being perfectly informed and knowing their 
own preferences can choose what is the best option for them. This makes the model conceptually 
identical to the informed model o f  decision making and as Gafni et al. (1998) argue it seems to be 
“superior to the model o f  the physician being a perfect agent in terms o f  feasibility o f  
implementation”.
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utility. The income-leisure framework is common to many models, while workload 
is another element. Scott argues that the latter “is likely to have arisen directly from 
the principal-agent theory where ‘effort’ (or the actions of the agent) is assumed to 
be negatively related to utility”.
The altruistic element is also often found in the models mentioned in the review 
(Scott 2000). Some models incorporate this by including patient’s utility or welfare 
in the GP’s utility function, while others include patient’s economic well being and 
the interests of society as arguments in his utility (Blomqvist 1991; Kristiansen 
1994).
It is shown from the above that Economic models allow doctors’ behaviour to be 
driven not only by altruistic elements but also other aspects such as workload, 
income, reputation and other non-altruistic factors.
Le Grand (2006) describes these two different aspects of doctor behaviour as 
knightly and knavish and argues that it is “perfectly possible for someone to be both 
a knight and a knave: that is, to have altruistic motivations for some of his activities 
or behaviour and self-interested ones for others”. In addition, he has argued that it is 
not only financial considerations such as income that drive self interested behaviour. 
Doctors want not only to improve their economic status but also maintain a certain 
lifestyle, have respectful working relationships with their colleagues and the ability 
to make clinical decisions without too much interference. That said, a doctor’s 
failure to be entirely empathetic to the patient is not only driven by individualistic 
elements but also by organisational constraints, such as time pressure and long lists.
On the patient’s side, the literature of Health Economics is more limited in 
modelling patient behaviour. Significant progress has been made by the lately 
increasing field of Behavioural Economics, which has resulted in models that offer 
useful insights into the reasons for patients’ decisions by introducing the notion of 
beliefs in their utility functions. The core of these models is based on the 
Psychological Expected Utility theory (henceforth PEU theory) introduced by 
Caplin and Leahy (2001). The theory is an extension of the expected utility theory of 
von Neumann-Morgenstem to situations in which agents experience feelings of 
anticipation regarding future states. It allows for the patient’s utility function to
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depend not only on physical outcomes but also on beliefs about future physical 
outcomes.2
The PEU is mainly driven by the anxiety theory, but it seems compatible with a 
number of psychological models that examine the extent to which health beliefs can 
predict behaviours. They include the Health Belief Model, the Theory of Reasoned 
Action and the Theory of Planned Behaviour, which, as mentioned above, have been 
used extensively to examine non-adherence to medical recommendations (Hounsa, 
Godin et al. 1993; Budd, Hughes et al. 1996).
The PEU theory has been used to explain how anxiety may lead patients to avoid 
visiting the doctor (Koszegi 2003). Koszegi (2004) has also proposed a model 
describing the doctor-patient relationship where the doctor makes choices of actions 
taking into consideration the patient’s emotions. The model identifies a number of 
complications in the doctor-patient interaction that are attributed to anxiety, such as 
the paradox of emotional patients getting less useful information. However, it does 
not allow patients actively to reject doctors’ recommendations.
Caplin and Leahy (2004) have also applied the PEU theory in a model describing 
doctor-patient interaction but in a way different to the one presented by Koszegi. 
They explore the optimal procedure for supplying information to a patient who 
experiences anticipatory emotions regarding a future health status, after he has sent a 
signal regarding his emotional status. However, all the above attempts to model the 
doctor-patient relationship are based on the assumption of a perfect agency model, 
i.e. that the doctor is entirely empathetic to the patient and he maximises the 
patient’s utility function as if it were his own.
2.3.2.5 Towards a holistic theoretical framework
The models of doctor-patient interaction described above focus on a specific aspect 
of this relationship, the decision making process. This is without doubt very 
important especially with regard to understanding non-adherence and it also helps to 
narrow down the complexity of the issue. However, it does not offer a holistic
2 More detailed explanation o f  the Psychological Expected Utility theory and its application to the 
doctor-patient relationship is given in Chapter 6.
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perspective of the relationship and therefore it is not sufficient to understand the 
problem as a whole.
In a review of the literature of the doctor-patient relationship, Ong et al. (1995) 
proposed a theoretical framework that relates background, process and outcome 
variables and allows for clear hypotheses regarding these relations. The suggested 
theoretical framework is presented in Figure 2.5. It is composed of three main 
elements: the actual content of communication, the background variables and the 
outcomes resulting from this.
•  Culture
•  D octor-p atien t 
relationsh ip
•  T y p es o f  
patients and 
doctors
•  D isea se  
characteristics  
context
Background
Variables
Short-term  and  
interm ediate, e .g .: 
-S a tisfaction  
-C om p lian ce  
-R eca ll and  
understanding o f  
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-health  status, 
-psych iatric  
m orbid ity
Patient outcom es
•  C om m u n icative  
behaviours:
Actual
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o  Instrum ental 
vs. a ffec tiv e  
behaviou rs
Figure 2.5: Doctor-patient relationship (taken from Ong et al. (1995)).
The first direct effect is between background variables and the actual content of 
communication. Background variables include cultural factors that have been 
reported to affect the consultation (Ong, de Haes et al. 1995). They also include 
doctor-patient relationships in general, that is, if the relationship is regarded as a 
paternalistic one where the doctor has high control then it is to be expected that 
instrumental behaviours will be leading the consultation. Also, the different types of 
patients and doctors are important variables that affect the actual consultation, 
although there is a lack of empirical evidence to test this. Finally, disease 
characteristics are reported as background variables, as it has been argued that 
physicians may be communicating differently with their healthier patients than with 
less healthy ones (Ong, de Haes et al. 1995).
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The second direct effect is between the actual communication and patient outcomes. 
This relationship is clearer and has been supported more widely by empirical 
evidence. The term ‘outcome’ as used in health care can be defined as “an 
observable consequence of prior activity occurring after an encounter, or some 
portion of the encounter is completed” (Beckman, Kaplan et al. 1989). There are 
many outcomes related with the doctor-patient relationship including actual health 
status and quality of life but also satisfaction and -  what is of interest for this thesis - 
adherence to recommendations.
However, it is less straightforward and more complex to explain the relation 
between background variables and patient outcomes. The complexity of this 
relationship lies in two aspects: the methodological difficulty of testing the 
association between the background variables and the patient outcomes; and the 
difficulty of isolating the indirect effect of these variables, given that they influence 
the actual communication behaviour, which in its turn affects outcomes. Therefore, 
this aspect of the doctor-patient interaction in effect remains unexplored.
As far as adherence is concerned the model argues that doctor-patient interaction 
affects patients’ decisions to follow recommendations in two ways. First, the 
communication behaviour during the actual consultation has a direct effect on non­
adherence. Secondly, background variables, such as the doctor-patient relationship 
in general may affect it directly and indirectly through the actual communication 
process, which in its turn influences non-adherence.
Regardless of the flaws in the framework by Ong et al. (1995), it does provide a 
systematic and holistic perspective to the doctor-patient relationship and facilitates 
the understanding of how this relationship impacts on the patient’s decision to 
adhere to recommendations. The model illustrates clearly the associations between 
background variables, actual consultation and non-adherence. This thesis examines 
associations between these three aspects and therefore the model provides a useful 
framework that brings the three parts of the thesis together. This is more clearly and 
explicitly explained in Chapter 3.
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2.3.2.6 Discussion
The theoretical models discussed above are in agreement in one regard: the complex 
and multifaceted nature of the doctor-patient relationship. The models acknowledge 
that there is no single, commonly accepted theory that captures all aspects of this 
relationship and all are attempting to understand some of its components.
This thesis focuses on the impact that the doctor-patient relationship has on a 
patient’s decision to non-adhere but investigates the issue from different angles 
looking at the population level, the attitudes and beliefs of a specific patient group 
and the actual consultation. It therefore requires a conceptual framework that 
examines the relationship in a holistic way. For that purpose, the Ong et al. (1995) 
model is considered the most adequate one as it provides a holistic view of the issue. 
It clearly states how the actual consultation fits within the more general context of 
the country, and also how it is associated with the patient’s decision to non-adhere. 
The model and the ways in which it serves the aims and the specific research 
questions of this thesis are discussed further in Chapter 3.
In addition to the general conceptual framework, the models that look at the doctor- 
patient relationship in the more specific context of the decision-making process, i.e. 
the paternalistic, shared-decision and informed decision model as well as the 
principal-agent model, also provide useful insights for this thesis. For the empirical 
studies the models are used to interpret the results and identify any patterns in the 
way the doctor-patient relationship is perceived in Greece. To put it in another way, 
the two empirical studies may shed light on whether any of these models adequately 
explain the nature of the doctor-patient relationship in Greece, i.e. whether it is a 
paternalistic or a shared-decision making relationship, as well as looking at how this 
affects non-adherence to recommendations.
Chapter 6 of the thesis looks at how conflicts that occur during the consultation 
affect patients’ decision to non-adhere. The chapter in effect challenges the models 
of the doctor-patient relationship, especially the perfect-agency model, arguing that 
they fail to explain the conflicts between the doctor and the patient. It proposes a 
game theoretical approach to understanding the differences between the two parties, 
which may often result in the patient non-adhering to the recommendations.
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Arguments come from empirical evidence that claim the doctor and the patient come 
to the consultation with different purposes and agendas, which, if not met, lead to 
sub-optimal results such as non-adherence to medication. The review of the 
empirical studies that follows, in particular Section 2.4.2 on the impact of the 
doctor-patient relationship, supports these arguments.
2.4 Review of the empirical studies
The literature of empirical studies on determinants of non-adherence as well as on 
the impact of doctor-patient communication is quite diverse, varying from 
epidemiological to psychological approaches. The present chapter draws on a range 
of previous systematic reviews and reports to provide a general picture.
The reviews include the updated one of the Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great 
Britain (RPSGB) on compliance across a number of medical conditions (Carter, 
Taylor et al. 2003) and the systematic review of communication between patients 
and health care professionals, also commissioned by the RPSGB (Cox, Stevenson et 
al. 2004). The WHO (2003) report on non-adherence, and that for the National Co­
ordinating Centre for NHS Service and Delivery and Organisation R&D (NCCSDO) 
(Home, Weinman et al. 2005) were also very useful sources of information.
The empirical studies that have been carried out to identify the determinants of non­
adherence are numerous and vary significantly depending on the setting, the aim and 
the methods used. They are quantitative or qualitative in the methodology they 
employ, although some of them combine both aspects. The majority do not use a 
specific theoretical model from the ones presented in the previous chapter but do, 
however, have specific research hypotheses to test.
The rest of this section is as follows. First, an overview of the available methods 
used to measure non-adherence to medication is presented. It then reviews the 
studies on determinants of non-adherence categorising them into four groups of 
factors: demographic and socioeconomic, disease-related and regimen-related 
factors, and also patient beliefs. This categorisation is by no means completely 
inclusive, but it is an attempt to organise the chaotic empirical literature of non-
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adherence. Finally, given the focus of this thesis, the studies looking at the impact of 
the doctor-patient relationship on non-adherence are then presented in more depth.
2.4.1 Measurement of non-adherence
The main methods of measurement of non-adherence can be grouped into two major 
categories: direct and indirect. Each measurement procedure offers somewhat 
different information and has unique advantages and disadvantages (Dunbar 1984).
In terms of accuracy, indirect methods of measuring adherence are less important 
than direct ones, but they are far more practical. They can be distinguished in the 
following categories:
a) Self-report strategies. This method asks the patient directly about his/her 
adherence with the use of questionnaires or diaries. Although it seems to be the 
most commonly used method, some authors such as Gordis (1979) claim that there 
are serious questions regarding the validity of the interview responses, since 
patients often report higher adherence rates. Even when providers are asked to rate 
the degree to which patients take their prescribed medication they also often 
overestimate adherence (DiMatteo and DiNicola 1982).
b) Behavioural counts include strategies such as pill counts. This method 
measures adherence through the comparison between the amount of medication 
remaining in the patient’s bottle and the amount that should remain.
c) Electronic monitors is a somewhat novel approach to indirectly monitoring a 
person’s medication-taking behaviour in an objective manner. The medication 
packaging contains a microprocessor that records the time and date the container 
was opened or the medication released. This is considered to be the most accurate 
of the indirect methods for measuring non-adherence to medication as it gives 
detailed information not only on the number of pills but also the time when the pills 
were taken. It is, however, a costly method that is only available under specific 
settings and it is not appropriate when a combination of medication is taken.
For accuracy, direct ways of measuring patient adherence are essential, but they are 
not without their limitations either. They can be classified into the following groups:
a) Biological indicators. This method measures adherence by looking for the 
presence of the drug in the blood or urine. This method is costly and findings can be
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misleading as they may be influenced by a variety of individual factors including 
diet, absorption and rate of excretion (Vitolins, Rand et al. 2000).
b) Clinical outcomes. A direct way of measuring adherence is to consider the 
treatment outcome. This means, that if the desired outcome occurs, then the 
researcher can assume that the patient was adherent, and if not then he/she was non­
adherent. This method is rarely encountered in the review of empirical studies, 
possibly due to its great subjectivity.
In general, it is the nature of the research questions, and the availability of resources, 
that determine which of the above methods is the most appropriate.
2.4.2 Determinants of non-adherence
Some reviews group the studies of the determinants of non-adherence according to 
the disease they are examining, while others according to the methods that were 
used, i.e. quantitative and qualitative. The structure followed here is an attempt to 
organise the studies on the basis of the main factors they investigate. This is an 
attempt to get an overview of the determinants of non-adherence. The doctor-patient 
relationship, as a factor affecting non-adherence, is reviewed separately at the end of 
this section.
2.4.2.1 Demographic and socioeconomic factors
There is no general consensus on the effect that demographic and socio-economic 
factors have on non-adherence to medication and the studies analyzing these factors 
present contradictory results. While, as seen below, a number of studies found 
significant association between these factors and non-adherence, this is not always 
the case. Demographic factors did not predict non-adherence in the study by Brus 
(1999) on patients with rheumatoid arthritis in the Netherlands and the study by Lin 
et al. (1995) on patients with depression in the USA.
Age
The effect of age on non-adherence is often conflicting. Faulkner et al. (1998) 
analysed the database of a large prescription management company in the USA and
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showed that non-compliance was associated with younger age. Similarly, in a study 
by Larsen et al. (2002) analyzing compliance with statin treatment with data taken 
from a prescription database in Denmark, younger patients seemed to adhere less 
than older ones. In rheumatoid arthritis older age was also associated with higher 
adherence in a study by Part et al. (1999) in the USA and a three year longitudinal 
study conducted in Norway, France and the Netherlands by Viller et al. (1999).
In a study by Bloom (1998) among patients under antihypertensive medication in the 
USA the results were less clear. It was shown that patients aged more than 65 as 
well as those less than 40 showed higher persistence rates with medication. 
Similarly inconsistent results were shown in the study of patients on anti-epileptic 
drugs in the UK, where being a teenager or being aged under 60 was a predictor of 
non-compliance (Buck, Jacoby et al. 1997).
Other researchers in the USA, however, argue that adherence is particularly 
problematic for those over 75, due to a number of critical factors, such as cognitive 
changes related to ageing, the existence of one or multiple chronic illnesses and the 
fact that people may also be prescribed multiple prescription medication (Dunbar- 
Jacob and Mortimer-Stephens 2001).
■ Social environment and life style
A quantitative survey among HIV patients in the USA reported that more adherent 
patients lived further from their treatment site, did not live alone and were more 
likely to depend on a significant other for support, socioeconomic or emotional 
(Morse, Simon et al. 1991). There is also increasing evidence that life style affects 
non-adherence. A busy lifestyle predicted non-adherence in a study by Park et al. 
(1999) in a sample of patients with rheumatoid arthritis in the USA.
■ Income and socioeconomic status
In a study by Paterson et al. (2000) in the USA HIV adherent patients were more 
likely to be older, to be white and to have higher monthly income. They had been 
infected for longer and had fewer alcohol abuse problems compared to the non­
adherent people.
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■ Education
Evidence on the impact of education is also conflicting. In a review of the factors 
associated with better adherence in psychosis by Nose et al. (2003) four studies 
identified a positive relationship between higher education and adherence to 
treatment programmes.
However, a few studies have shown opposite results. A study by Ruscher et al. 
(1997) on psychiatric patients’ attitudes in Canada found that patients with only 
elementary education were more likely to adhere to their medication. The authors 
argue that more educated people may be more “interested in or feel more confident 
about exercising control over their medication regimen” and this may explain why 
they adhere less to the medication.
To sum up, the results on the effect of socio-demographic factors presented above, 
i.e. age, income, education and life style, are contradictory. Older age is associated 
with better adherence in some studies, but reported to be a predictor of non­
adherence in others, possibly due to forgetfulness or a more complex regimen. 
Findings on the impact of education were also inconsistent. Some studies showed no 
significant correlation between socio-demographic factors and non-adherence. These 
inconsistencies may explain a tendency to depart from studies that are looking for 
the ‘typical’ - in terms of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics - non­
adherent person and to consider demographic factors as influences rather than direct 
determinants (WHO 2003).
. 2.4.2.2 Disease-related factors
Findings on the effect that disease related factors, such as severity and symptoms, 
have on non-adherence vary among different studies. In Hormone Replacement 
Therapy (HRT) two studies report different types of association between symptoms 
and non-adherence. Hunter et al. (1997) found women on HRT in the UK would 
avoid medication for menopause, which they perceived as a natural process, unless 
severe symptoms were reported. However, in Bjom and Backstrom’s study (1999) 
women with HRT in Sweden reported they stopped taking medication because they 
expressed a desire to find out if  climacteric symptoms had ended and wished to deal 
with problems naturally. Gao and Nau (2000) investigated the relationship of disease
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severity and adherence among HIV/AIDS patients in the USA and concluded that 
patients in later stages of the disease were more adherent than those in early stages.
On the other hand, a number of studies present the opposite results. Mann et al. 
(1992) in the USA tested the hypothesis that adherence to inhaled corticosteroids 
improves during periods of increased severity of asthma and found no significant 
relationship between the change in asthma severity and compliance with the 
regimen. Similarly, Lin et al. (1995) in a study among patients in antidepressant 
therapy in the USA have shown that the severity of the disease did not predict non­
adherence. Two studies on rheumatoid arthritis also confirm no relationship between 
illness severity and adherence to medication (Brus, van de Laar et al. 1999; Park, 
Hertzog et al. 1999).
To sum up, studies on disease related factors show that severity of the condition as 
well as symptoms may be related with higher rates of adherence. However, results 
are not always consistent.
2.4,2.3 Regimen-related factors
Problems with the use of medication, such as side effects and difficulties in the 
consumption of the drug were reported by Barber et al. (2004) as the main factor for 
non-adherence to new medication in a study in the UK. In the same study, where 
patients were interviewed ten days and four weeks after recruitment, it was shown 
that information needs was an additional reason for non-adherence to medication. 
Side-effects were also reported as a main determinant of non-adherence in a study 
by Bemman et al. (1997) analysing prescription refill data from 2106 women with 
Estrogen Replacement Therapy in the USA. Negative side-effects were also 
associated with non-compliance in a study by Bjom and Backstrom (1999) among 
women with HRT in Sweden. On the other hand, side-effects only at severe levels 
were associated with non-adherence in anti-depressive therapy (Myers and 
Branthwaite 1992).
Bloom (1998) analyzed a prescription database in the USA and concluded that 
regimen characteristics influenced patients’ use of drugs. The study showed that
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initial drug choice seemed to influence discontinuation of therapy, i.e. those patients 
taking A-II antagonist therapy were more likely to continue their therapy.
Simple one-drug regimens were associated with better compliance and persistence 
than more complex multiple-drug regimens in a study by Dailey et al. (2001) among 
patients with anti-hyperglycemic drug regimens participating in the Medicaid 
program in the USA. Likewise, the analysis of the MEMO database in Scotland 
showed that administration of one tablet per day was associated with greater 
adherence than multiple tablets (Donnan, MacDonald et al. 2002). Good compliance 
was inversely associated with the use of multiple pharmacies and number of 
medications prescribed overall, as shown by Monane et al. (1997), who analysed 
8,643 outpatients with newly prescribed anti-hypertensive therapy in the New Jersey 
Medicaid programs. According to this study good compliance was associated with 
the use of newer agents.
On the other hand, in a study of 128 patients with type 2 diabetes in a health centre, 
north of Boston, it was found that the number of medicines prescribed was not 
correlated with non-adherence while side-effects were the most commonly reported 
problem with medication use (Grant, Devita et al. 2003). Medication load did not 
predict adherence errors in the study by Park et al. (1999) among patients with 
rheumatoid arthritis in the USA. In a study on antidepressant medication by Myers 
and Branthwaite (1992), there was no significant difference in compliance between 
doctor-prescribed and patient chosen regimen or between dosage once a day and 
three times a day.
Difficulty using inhalers, inconvenience and laziness were reported as determinants 
of non-compliance among 49 patients with asthma in Greater Glasgow (Buston and 
Wood 2000). Inability to access medication, forgetfulness, interruption of routine 
and lack of reminders, were associated with unintentional non-adherence by Johnson 
et al. (1999) among elderly people with hypertension in the USA. Similarly, 
Meystre-Agustoni (2000) interviewed 37 patients on antiretroviral therapy in 
Switzerland and reported that conflict between recommendations and daily life as 
well as side-effects were the main factors associated with non-adherence.
To sum up, the evidence shows that regimen-related factors, including side-effects 
and complicated dosages, are not consistently associated with higher rates of non-
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adherence. A possible explanation could be that it is not the complexity of the 
regimen that results in non-adherence but rather the conflict of taking the regimen 
with the patient’s daily routine.
2.4.2.4 Patients’ beliefs
There is increasing evidence on and considerable research attention to patients’ 
beliefs and whether they affect their decision to adhere or not. The term ‘beliefs’, 
however, is quite diverse, varying from beliefs regarding specific medication and 
illness to the social representation of medicines.
Adams et al. (1997) conducted in-depth interviews with asthmatic patients and 
concluded that their attitudes to medication practice were linked to their beliefs 
about their coping strategies. These beliefs in turn were linked with the extent of 
their acceptance and rejection of the identity of ‘asthmatic’. Similarly, Buston and 
Wood (2000) in a qualitative survey in Scotland support the idea that denial that one 
is asthmatic and the belief that the medication is ineffective were reasons for non- 
compliance. They also report fears of side effects. Similar fears among asthmatic 
patients of side effects and dependence, weight gain, building large muscles, causing 
infections and making bones brittle were associated with non-adherence in a study 
by Boulet (1998) in Canada.
In epilepsy, fear of dependence not only on medication but also on family, friends 
and doctors and the fear of stigmatisation were reasons for patients not taking their 
medication (Buck, Jacoby et al. 1997). The perception of the medication as not 
needed or not effective or even not safe has been reported as a main determinant of 
non-adherence in studies on hypertension in the UK (Benson and Britten 2003).
Home et al. (2001) focus largely on the analysis of patients’ beliefs and their impact 
on adherence to medication, mainly using elements from the self-regulatory. 
Studying haemodialysis patients in the UK they found that intentional non­
adherence with medication correlated with concerns about potential adverse effects. 
In another study among asthmatic patients Home and Weinman (1999) report that 
non-adherence was associated with doubts about the necessity of medication and
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concerns about its potential adverse effects with more negative perceived 
consequences of illness.
Views towards menopause and medication were associated with the use of Hormone 
Replacement Therapy use in a qualitative study by Hunter et al. (1997) in the UK. In 
another study on HRT, fear of cancer was one of the main reasons for non-adherence 
among women who were enrolled in a health maintenance organization in the USA 
(Siegel, Karus et al. 2000).
In many cases patients avoid medication because they are afraid that treatment will 
reveal their disease. This is supported by the study by Meystre-Agustoni (2000) 
among HIV patients in Switzerland.
Morgan and Watkins (1998) examine how cultural beliefs affect beliefs about 
medication and therefore adherence among patients recently being treated for 
hypertension in a borough of London. They showed that West Indians’ beliefs were 
often associated with the use of herbal remedies and traditional cultural patterns. 
Siegel et al. (2000) have investigated potential racial differences in a number of 
attitudes domains that have been linked to adherence among patients with 
HIV/AIDS. They found significant differences between African and White 
American men in the USA. Africans expressed more doubts regarding their ability 
to use and adhere to protease inhibitors and more doubt regarding physicians’ 
competence.
In general, there is increasing evidence that patients’ beliefs about illnesses and 
medicines, such as fear of side-effects and dependency, concerns about their 
necessity and stigmatisation are a significant predictor of adherence. What is also 
worth mentioning is that these beliefs may derive from considerations unrelated to 
the drug’s pharmacology (Barry, Bradley et al. 2000).
2.4.2.5 Doctor-patient communication related factors
Moving from the concept of compliance to the concept of adherence, where the 
patients play a more active role during the consultation, more emphasis is placed on 
the doctor-patient relationship and its influence on the use of medication.
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In terms of methodology used, the majority of the empirical studies on the doctor- 
patient communication do not investigate the relationship directly, i.e. through 
videotape and observation. As will be shown below, they mainly examine patients’ 
or doctors’ perception of this relationship. The studies presented are divided into 
those that look at the patient’s perception of the issue, those that look at the doctor’s 
perception and finally those that examine the issue on a two-way basis.
■ Patient’s perception
The evidence suggests various factors affect a patient’s perception of the doctor- 
patient relationship and consequently adherence. Farber et al. (2003) conducted 
telephone interviews with parents of asthmatic children in the Medicaid program in 
the USA and reported that misunderstanding of medication was associated with 
decreased adherence. The risk of misunderstanding was lower if the patient had seen 
a specialist. Berman et al. (1997) showed that the physician’s gender as well as 
his/her specialty was associated with non-adherence. Confidence in the physician 
and the health care system as a whole led to better adherence in the study by 
Kjellgren et al. (1998) in Sweden. Physicians’ follow-up communication style and 
client satisfaction were both predictors of better adherence in the US (Bultman and 
Svarstad 2000).
■ Doctor’s perception
Stevenson et al. (2000) interviewed 20 doctors in the UK to examine the decision 
making process in the patient-doctor communication about drugs. They found no 
evidence that patients and doctors followed a decision making model. Therefore 
patients used medication in a different way to that the doctors had suggested, or 
volunteered to try alternative therapies such as acupuncture and herbal remedies.
■ Two-way communication
In a qualitative study by Barry et al. (2000) in England doctors and patients were 
interviewed to examine their level of communication during consultation. Indeed, it 
was shown that most of the patients’ desires were not met during the consultation 
and this led to poor adherence. Further analysis of the same qualitative study by 
Berman et al. (1997) showed that misunderstandings between patients and doctors 
have potential or actual adverse consequences, leading to non-adherence.
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Jenkins et al. (2003) interviewed both patients and GPs to correlate their 
expectations and potential non-adherence. They found that patients had high 
expectations for communication and participation in the consultation and that 
unnecessary prescribing and problems in communication may lead to poor outcomes 
in terms of non-adherence. Lin et al. (1995) support the belief that discussion with 
physicians can give better results in terms of adherence in antidepressant therapy in 
a study in the USA.
2.4.3 Discussion
The empirical studies that investigate patients’ perceptions of the doctor-patient 
relationship are not without their limitations. The majority focus on specific settings 
and consultations and refer to specific doctors. However, the general perception that 
patients or the population have about doctors and its impact on the patient’s decision 
to adhere has not been fully investigated. The country context and the health system 
within which the issue is examined needs to be investigated further. Also, empirical 
studies on the effect of the doctor-patient relationship on non-adherence do not have 
a clear theoretical background. A more systematic effort to view the issue in a more 
holistic way is necessary.
This thesis builds on the empirical evidence in two ways. First, findings from 
existing studies provide useful insights into what determines non-adherence among 
patients and therefore similar aspects can be tested in the general population. This is 
investigated in the analysis of the population survey presented in Chapter 4. 
Previous studies that have tested the validity and reliability of different scales were 
particularly useful in identifying which scale was to be used in the questionnaire 
survey in Greece (Chapter 5).
Secondly, empirical evidence has shed light on a number of conflicting aspects of 
the doctor-patient relationship that are not captured in any of the existing theories. 
Hence, they provide strong arguments that help the development of the theoretical 
framework presented in Chapter 6.
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2.5 Greece and the Greek health system
This thesis investigates the problem of non-adherence in Greece, a country where no 
previous systematically collected evidence on the issue exists. Some background 
information on the country’s health profile and the structure of the system provides 
the context for the analysis and also facilitates the understanding of the methods 
used in this thesis. It also helps explain the results of the empirical parts.
2.5.1 Health profile
Life expectancy in Greece, following the trend of most European countries, is 
increasing. According to the WHO (2007), in 2005 life expectancy at birth for Greek 
women was 82 years while that for men was 77 years. The healthy life expectancy at 
birth was respectively 73 and 69.
Cerebrovascular and ischemic heart diseases are the top two causes of death in 
Greece, accounting for almost one third of the total deaths in 2002 (20% and 15% 
respectively) and 28% of years of lost life, WHO (2007). Trachea, bronchus and 
lung cancers follow, accounting for 6% of the total deaths, reflecting one of the 
biggest health issues in Greece in the last decades - smoking. Greece has the highest 
prevalence of smoking, not only among members of the European Union but also 
among all members of the OECD, with studies estimating that 40% of the adult 
population are daily smokers. One in two adolescents in certain areas is also a 
current smoker (Vardavas and Kafatos 2007).
Obesity is the other big problem in public health in Greece. Recent studies show that 
obesity levels have increased dramatically over recent years, bringing Greeks among 
the most obese citizens of the European Union (Obesity 2002). Results are even 
worse when it comes to childhood obesity. Over 30% of Greek children were 
estimated to be obese or overweight in 2000, and studies in regions of Greece reveal 
that bad dietary habits and lack of exercise are the main reasons for these numbers 
(Kosti, Panagiotakos et al. 2007). Despite the increasing evidence that specific 
conditions are deteriorating and threatening public health, there are currently no 
disease management programmes in Greece to tackle any of these problems.
3 Statistics on healthy life expectancy at birth are based on 2002 data.
52
Chapter 2
2.5.2 Structure of the health system 
Finance and delivery
A National Health System (NHS) was introduced in Greece in 1983. The Greek 
health system is highly centralised. Three ministries are involved in the finance and 
delivery of health care. The Ministry of Health and Welfare is responsible for the 
NHS. The Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance is responsible for the insurance 
funds, which play a significant role in financing and providing health services. The 
Ministry of Finance is retrospectively subsidising the NHS and Health Insurance 
Funds (HIFs) (Mossialos, Allin et al. 2005).
The Greek health system has a mix of public and private funding. Taxation and 
social insurance are the two sources of public financing, but entitlements are defined 
through occupationally-based insurance fund membership and not on the basis of 
citizenship. Figure 2.6 briefly illustrates health care funding and delivery in Greece.
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Figure 2.6: Organization of the Greek health system: financing flows and 
delivery of health services (taken from Mossialos et al (2005)).
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Health services coverage and access
Two main types of coverage are available to the population: health insurance funds 
and private medical insurance. The NHS offers a third type of coverage, as anyone 
can access public hospitals and rural and semi-urban primary health centres, even if 
they have no insurance or are illegal immigrants. Most funding is public from 
taxation and social insurance (56.3% of total expenditure), with payments from 
private health insurance accounting for about 2.3% and the remaining 41.4% from 
out-of-pocket payments, a significant proportion of which are informal (Mossialos, 
Allin et al. 2005).
Insurance coverage is compulsory for all employed persons and their dependants. 
There are approximately thirty social health insurance funds providing coverage to 
the vast majority of the Greek population. Three of them cover about 80% of the 
population: the Social Insurance Organisation (IKA) covers the majority of the 
working population; the Agricultural Insurance Organisation (OGA) covers 
agricultural workers; and the Insurance Organisation for the Self-employed (OAEE) 
covers professionals, small business and merchants. Other funds include those for 
the self-employed, civil servants and military personnel, banking and public utilities. 
The unemployed are covered through government benefits. The retired population 
continues to be covered by their pre-retirement insurers, apart from OAEE, which 
shifts its retired population to IKA (Mossialos, Allin et al. 2005).
Private financing plays a significant role in the health system, particularly in the 
form of direct and informal payments, and to a lesser extent, through private medical 
insurance (PMI), levels of which remain quite low. Approximately 8% of the Greek 
population has PMI, which covers services in the private sector. Mossialos et al. 
(2005) argue that this may be explained by the reluctance of individuals to pay a 
third party, in addition to cultural and historical factors. When people are 
accustomed to paying their doctor or a hospital directly, the transfer of money to a 
third party may be seen as an unnecessary erosion of the patient-doctor relationship 
and a reduction in the assurance of quality of care (Mossialos and Thomson 2002). 
On the other hand, out-of-pocket payments in Greece, mostly direct and informal 
payments, are the highest in the European Union. The way primary health care 
provision is structured and financed forces patients to use both public and private
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services concurrently. Doctors are able to transfer patients from social insurance 
funds, where they work part-time, to their private practices.
Although private practice for public hospital doctors has been forbidden since 1983, 
except for university hospital doctors and doctors working for the army, many 
doctors run illegal private practices or ask for informal payments. Since 2002 there 
has been an attempt to legalise limited private practice for hospital based doctors in 
order to formalise some informal payments, but the idea has not been popular among 
doctors. Possible explanations could be the public ethos, the lack of incentives as 
informal payments are still higher, tax reasons and the oversupply of specialists in 
Greece, which reduces the opportunities to attract private patients.
Health care delivery
There is currently a plethora of physicians in Greece. In 2004 there were 4.9 
practicing physicians per 1000 Greeks. On the other hand, the number of nurses is 
very low, with only 3.8 nurses for the same size of population.4 This indicates that 
there is a lack of nurses who could take over some of the doctors’ responsibilities, 
which results in expensive heath care delivery. There were also 1.2 dentists per 1000 
population and 0.8 pharmacists for the same number of people and an excess of 
specialist doctors (OECD 2006).
Due to the lack of organised primary health care coupled with limited 
encouragement to produce more general practitioners, there is currently no system of 
referral. There is no integration between primary and secondary care in the Greek 
health system.
Expenditure trends
Greece spends a significant proportion of its wealth on health care and is heavily 
dependent on private expenditure. In 2004, Greece spent in total 10% of its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) on health; public expenditure was 5.4% of GDP while the 
other 4.6% was private (OECD 2006).
4 Data on nurses refers to 2002.
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Payment o f doctors
In public hospitals and health centres doctors are salaried, while contracted doctors 
in ambulatory settings are paid on a fee-for-service basis. All public hospital doctors 
are full-time employees and until recently they were not allowed to see patients 
privately for fees. However, this did not work in practice and public hospitals are 
often used by doctors to recruit patients for private practices. Informal payments is 
an ongoing issue that the medical associations argue it exists because of the low 
payments.
Doctors in primary care are paid on a fee-for-service basis with the exception of two 
insurance funds: doctors in OAEE are paid on a capitation system, while in IKA 
they are salaried. Anecdotal evidence suggests that when doctors are paid on a fee- 
for-service basis fees are set relatively low and doctors inflate their claims in order 
to increase their income by adding false consultations (Davaki and Mossialos 2006).
Therefore, as Davaki and Mossialos (2006) point out, the medical care payment 
system in Greece does not provide doctors with incentives to improve efficiency and 
quality.
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND GENERAL METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the research questions and hypotheses of the thesis. It builds 
on the literature review of the empirical studies and theoretical models presented in 
the previous chapter. A section presenting the general methodology that is used to 
address the hypotheses and questions of the thesis follows.
3.2 Research questions and hypotheses
The aim of this thesis is twofold. It empirically investigates the relationship between 
the doctor-patient interaction and non-adherence to medication in Greece, a country 
where no previous available evidence exists. Investigation is undertaken both on a 
population and a patient level. It also develops a theoretical model of the doctor- 
patient relationship using non-cooperative game theory to explain how supply of 
information under conflict conditions affects non-adherence.
After a careful review of the literature, the model of doctor-patient relationship 
proposed by Ong et al. (1995), described in Figure 2.5 above, is chosen as the one 
that provides a holistic view of the issue and identifies clear hypotheses on the 
associations between background variables, actual communication and patient 
outcomes.
Three aspects of the doctor-patient relationship are examined in this thesis:
■ The direct effect that the background variables have on patients’ outcomes 
(Figure 3.1). More specifically, the thesis examines how the context of the country 
within which the issue of the doctor-patient relationship and non-adherence is 
investigated helps in understanding an individual’s decision to non-adhere. In 
particular, the way people think of their doctors and perceive the doctor-patient 
relationship is important in understanding how they behave when they are 
prescribed medication. The lack of available empirical evidence in the area 
indicates the importance of further research in this aspect of the doctor patient
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relationship. This is examined in Chapter 4, where the European Social Survey is 
analysed.
Background Patient outcomes
Variables
•  Culture •  AdherenceW
•  Doctor-patient
relationship
Figure 3.1: The direct effect between background variables and adherence.
■ The direct effect that the actual communication has on patient outcomes 
(Figure 3.2). The thesis investigates how specific aspects of the actual 
communication have an impact on patients’ decision to adhere. In particular, 
issues that are examined are the perception of the doctor’s role during the 
consultation, the supply of information and the beliefs that patients have about 
aspects of their illness and their medication. This part builds upon elements of the 
psychological theories presented in Chapter 2 and also evidence from empirical 
studies in similar settings. This is examined in Chapter 5 of the thesis, through the 
questionnaire survey conducted among Greek hypertensive patients.
Actual Patient outcomes
Communication
•  Communicative •  Adherence
behaviours
Figure 3.2: The direct effect the actual communication has on adherence.
■ The effect that background variables have on the actual consultation and 
consequently on outcomes (Figure 3.3). More specifically, the thesis looks at how 
different patient preferences affect the consultation and this in turn affects their 
final decision. Empirical evidence has shown that the two parts come to the 
consultation with different agendas, which, when not met, may lead to non­
adherence. However, there is a lack of theoretical framework to capture these 
conflicts and this thesis fills this gap by introducing a game theoretic approach to 
addressing the issue and explaining non-adherence. This is presented in Chapter 6.
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Figure 3.3: The direct and indirect effect of background variables on actual
communication and adherence.
Having set the conceptual framework of the thesis, the specific hypotheses as well as 
the research questions that are used to test them are developed:
HI: The country context within which the issue of non-adherence is
examined plays an important role in its understanding.
■ Ql: What do Greeks believe about their doctors’ role in
prescribing and the treatment of illnesses? What are their 
general attitudes towards medicines?
■ Q2: To what extent do these beliefs and attitudes differ from those
of other Europeans?
- Q3: How do a population’s beliefs about doctors, in Greece
specifically and Europe in general, affect their decision to 
adhere to prescribed medication?
H2: The patient perceptions of doctor’s role, above all else, have an
impact on their decision to adhere to medication.
■ Q4: What do Greek patients with hypertension think of their
doctors and how does this affect their attitudes towards 
medicines?
■ Q5: Which information channels do patients use and how do these
channels influence patients’ behaviour towards medicines? 
What is the importance of doctors in supplying information?
- Q6: What other factors may affect non-adherence? Is it beliefs
towards the disease and the treatment or the disease and 
treatment characteristics themselves that influence non­
adherence?
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H3: A game theoretical approach that captures the patient’s preferences
for information and the doctor’s inability to understand them may 
explain why patients fail to adhere to medical recommendations.
■ Q7: Do previous theoretical models of the doctor-patient
relationship explain differences between the two parties that 
may lead to non-adherence?
■ Q8: How does a game theoretical model capture these
differences?
3.3 General methodology
Two empirical studies and a theoretical framework are used to address the aims of 
the thesis. The specific methodology for each study and the game theory framework 
are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. These different methodological 
approaches are due to the differing nature of the two empirical studies and the 
theoretical section. However, a broader introductory section is presented here to 
connect the main research hypotheses and questions of the thesis with the general 
methods to address them.
3.3.1 Empirical studies
Two empirical studies address hypotheses HI and H2 and their related questions. 
Below is a brief description of the two surveys and how they are connected to the 
research hypotheses and questions.
3.3.1.1 European Social Survey
The first empirical study draws on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) to 
examine the views and beliefs of the Greek population about doctors and medication 
and their impact on non-adherence. It is used to address hypothesis HI and the 
related questions Q l, Q2 and Q3.
The ESS is an academically driven multi-country survey covering over twenty 
nations. Its purpose is “to monitor and interpret changing public attitudes and values
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within Europe and to investigate how they interact with Europe’s changing 
institutions” (Jowell and the 2005). It satisfies high standard technical requirements. 
It involves strict random probability sampling, a minimum target response rate of 
70% and rigorous translation protocols. These will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4.
In the second round, the survey includes a section on health care. It includes 
questions on the health care system of the countries in general but also has specific 
questions on what the general population thinks of their doctors, and examines their 
beliefs and attitudes towards prescribed medication including non-adherence.
In the present study data from the second round of the ESS edition 2.0 is used, 
which includes 24 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Ukraine and United Kingdom.
The thesis focuses on Greece and therefore the analysis uses data from this specific 
country. However, comparisons with the other European countries to identify 
idiosyncratic differences require the analysis of data on an aggregate level as well.
3.3.1.2 Questionnaire survey among hypertensive patients in Greece
The second empirical study is a questionnaire survey conducted in Greece to 
examine the views of a group of hypertensive patients on doctors and medications 
and their influence on the patient’s decision. This study aims to answer hypothesis 
H2 and the related research questions.
The survey was planned, designed, conducted and analysed for the purposes of the 
thesis. The questionnaire uses a number of items to examine patients’ beliefs and 
attitudes towards medication and their views of the doctor’s roles (Q4). Patients are 
also asked a number of questions regarding information channels (Q5), as well as 
other clinical and demographic characteristics to examine whether these may predict 
non-adherence to medication (Q6). Also, a number of questions indirectly try to 
identify whether it is beliefs towards the disease and the treatment or the disease and 
treatment characteristics themselves that influence non-adherence (Q6). Finally,
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validated items are used to measure non-adherence to medication in an indirect and 
objective way.
The selection of the sample was based on specific characteristics of the Greek health 
system. Different methods of data collection were considered, including telephone 
survey, collection of questionnaires administered by a researcher, or mailing 
questionnaires to the patient to decide on the most appropriate one for the purpose of 
this survey. These methodological concerns are discussed further, and in more depth 
in Chapter 5.
3.3.2 Game theory model
A game theoretic approach is used to address hypothesis H3 and the related 
questions. It presents three models of the doctor-patient interaction to describe the 
supply of information by the doctor during consultation. The models take the form 
of a non-cooperative game in an extensive form. They are all games between a 
doctor and a patient. The doctor diagnoses the patient and needs to decide how much 
information to provide. Patients vary in their preferences regarding information; 
they are distinguished between ‘blunters’, i.e. information-averse patients, and 
‘monitors’, i.e. information-loving patients, following the work by Miller et al. 
(1987). After receiving the information, the patient needs to decide whether to 
adhere or not to the recommendations.
The first two models assume that the doctor knows with certainty the preferences the 
patient has regarding information. The first one assumes that the patient is a blunter 
while the second assumes that the patient is a monitor. The third presents a more 
realistic situation where the doctor does not know with certainty the type of patient. 
Model 3 is the most involved game of the three but also the one that explains how a 
doctor’s failure to understand the patient’s preference for more detailed information 
may lead to non-adherence to their recommendations.
In terms of preferences, all three models employ the Psychological Expected Utility 
(PEU) theory (Caplin and Leahy 2001). This theory, derived from the combined 
field of Economics and Psychology, is an extension of the expected utility theory of 
von Neumann-Morgenstem in situations in which agents experience anticipatory
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feelings prior to the resolution of uncertainty. It has been used to explain supply of 
information during the consultation (Caplin and Leahy 2004) and to understand 
patient behaviour (Koszegi 2003). However, these previous models confine 
themselves to situations in which the doctor is entirely empathetic to the patient, and 
do not allow the patient actively to decide whether to accept the recommendations or 
not.
In an attempt to capture more realistic behaviours of the two agents, the thesis takes 
steps in new directions. The models presented in this thesis are novel in two 
respects. First, they relax the assumption of perfect agency, i.e. that the doctor 
maximizes the patient’s utility as if it were his own. In order to do so, they introduce 
the assumption that the doctor needs to put effort into supplying information to the 
patient. Secondly, they allow for interdependent decisions with an active role both to 
the doctor, who needs to decide on how much effort to make and to the patient, who 
needs to decide whether to accept the doctor’s recommendation.
Extensive game trees explain the order in which players move, their available 
actions, the information they have regarding their opponents and their strategies. In 
the case of Model 3, the uncertainty regarding the patient’s preference for 
information is resolved under various hypotheses of bounded rationality. This is a 
well-known approach in economics for modelling problems with uncertainty so that 
progress in analysis can be made.
The models offer - under specific but reasonable assumptions - a complete 
resolution of the games, i.e. results are obtained concerning how much effort the 
doctor will put in and the patient’s decision to adhere to the recommendations. They 
use comparative statics, give economic interpretations and finally allow for a 
discussion on the policy implications that they have. Limitations of the game 
theoretical approach used here as well as possible extensions are discussed after the 
presentation of the models.
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CHAPTER 4
NON-ADHERENCE AND DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP;
A POPULATION SURVEY
4.1 Introduction
The review of the evidence on the issue of non-adherence and the doctor-patient 
relationship in Chapter 2 has identified an important gap in the literature, which is 
the lack of empirical insights at the population level. This chapter empirically 
considers this important issue using data from the European Social Survey 
(henceforth ESS). It focuses primarily on Greece, but it allows for more general 
comparisons with the European sample to be made.
The doctor-patient relationship is mainly established during the consultation when 
the patient visits the doctor to seek diagnosis. However, this complex interaction 
goes beyond the clinical practice and involves elements that are developed outside 
the encounter. There are several pre-existing factors that have been shown to affect 
the actual communication during the consultation and its outcomes. Ong et al. 
(1995) refer to these factors as ‘background variables’ and categorise them into four 
main groups: (1) cultural variations, (2) the doctor-patient relationship, (3) the
differences in the types of patients and doctors and (4) the specific disease 
characteristics. In this chapter we will focus on the first two groups: cultural 
variations and the doctor-patient relationship.
Cultural variations acknowledge that differences in historical, sociological and 
geographic context affect the way that medical care is perceived and therefore how 
individuals think of their health systems in general and their doctor more 
specifically. A study by Grol et al. (1999) compared seven countries to determine 
the priorities of patients in general practice care and to identify whether they vary in 
different countries in the way they perceive medical care. A common consensus was 
found with respect to the expectations people have regarding general principles, 
such as equity and access. However, the study also identified significant differences 
in a number of views, including speed of care and the doctor’s role in providing 
care.
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Grol et al. (1999) argue that these variations may partly reflect cultural differences, 
such as the extent to which individuals value an authoritarian or a democratic 
relationship with their doctor as well as their views on technology, prevention and 
their expectations for a quick solution to health problems. On the basis of their 
findings, they argue that variations may also reveal the actual differences in health 
care systems. For example patients “may value highly the care they are used to or 
the care which they would like to get and which is not provided”. Indeed, Boerma et 
al. (1997 ) in a study looking at national differences in the structure and organisation 
of health care in Europe showed that these differences reflect the way individuals 
perceive doctors and the doctor-patient relationship.
It is also accepted that the way the doctor-patient relationship is perceived shapes the 
actual communication. If, for example, the relationship is regarded as paternalistic, 
where the doctor is the main decision maker and the patient obeys, it is very likely 
that this will affect the actual consultation (Ong, de Haes et al. 1995).
However, empirical evidence to support the association of cultural differences and 
general perceptions about the doctor-patient relationship with non-adherence to 
medication is limited. Non-adherence to medication is mainly examined at a patient 
level and the majority of the studies in the area, as shown in Section 2.4 of the 
review of the literature, focus on specific disease groups or consultation settings. It 
is therefore difficult to examine general perceptions and attitudes. In addition, large 
scale data that allows the analysis of the issue in the population is restricted. Hence, 
the association between the perception of the doctor-patient relationship and 
patients’ decision to follow recommendations remains largely unexplored.
This part of the thesis aims to shed light on the perceptions of the doctor-patient 
relationship as these are formed within the country context. The aim is to examine 
how these perceptions affect the outcomes of the consultation and, more specifically, 
the patient’s decision to adhere (See Figure 4.1). Other background variables, such 
as demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the individuals, although they 
are not the primary focus of this study, will also be considered, mainly as control 
variables in the analysis.
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Figure 4.1: Association between background variables and outcomes.
For this purpose, data from the second round of the ESS is used (Jowell et al. 2005). 
This population survey examines individuals’ beliefs and attitudes on a range of 
issues including health care. The doctor-patient relationship is at the heart of the 
survey’s section on health care. Questions on people’s attitudes towards medication, 
including non-adherence to prescribed medicines, are also included.
The main hypothesis that drives this part of the thesis is that the way people think 
about their doctors and perceive the doctor-patient relationship in general is 
important in understanding how they behave when they are prescribed medication. It 
is generally expected that the country where people live shapes the way they 
perceive this relationship.
More specifically, the research hypothesis tested in this chapter and the research 
questions that will be used to facilitate it are:
HI: The country context within which the issue of non-adherence is
examined plays an important role in its understanding.
■ Ql: What do Greeks believe about their doctors’ role in prescribing
and the treatment of illnesses? What are their general attitudes 
towards medicines?
■ Q2: To what extent do these beliefs and attitudes differ from those
of other Europeans?
■ Q3: How do a population’s beliefs about doctors, in Greece
specifically and Europe in general, affect their decision to 
adhere to prescribed medication?
The rest of this chapter is organised in the following way. Section 4.2 begins with 
the methodology of the ESS. It then presents the specific variables of the survey 
which are appropriate to address the research hypothesis and questions. Section 4.3
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presents the econometric model giving specifications on the test used. Section 4.4 
shows the main results. It begins with comparisons on how the population in Greece 
differs from the other Europeans not only in the way they think of their doctors but 
also in their attitudes towards medication. Hence, it allows for idiosyncratic 
differences to be identified. It then focuses on the determinants of non-adherence to 
prescribed medication and compares the results of the Greek sample with those of 
Europe, which includes all 24 countries. Section 4.5 discusses the limitations of the 
study, while Section 4.6 discusses the findings in relation to the research questions 
and the policy implications. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Data
This section describes the data used in this chapter. It begins by describing the ESS, 
giving details on the survey and sample design, the response rates and the 
questionnaire design. It then presents the main variables that will be used in the 
analysis, both dependent and explanatory. The latter are divided into those of 
primary interest, i.e. the main explanatory variables, and those that the analysis 
controls for, i.e. control variables. For all variables, detailed explanation is given on 
how they were used for the purpose of this thesis.
4.2.1 The European Social Survey (ESS)
The ESS provides a unique opportunity to explore the issue of non-adherence and 
the doctor-patient relationship among the population, filling a gap in the empirical 
evidence on the topic. Twenty-four European countries participated in the survey, 
and hence the analysis of the data makes it possible not only for the issue of non­
adherence to be examined within a country context but also for comparisons 
between countries to be made. That makes the ESS a unique dataset to explore the 
aims of this part of the thesis. A population approach will give useful insights into 
the heterogeneity of different health systems and the impact on individuals’ 
decisions to non-adhere. Also, analysing the issue of non-adherence and the doctor- 
patient relationship at the population level, rather than disease specific ones, will 
allow policy makers to identify more general interventions to tackle the issue.
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The ESS is an academically-driven multi-country survey. Its three aims, as stated in 
its documentation, are “firstly, to monitor and interpret changing public attitudes and 
values within Europe and to investigate how they interact with its changing 
institutions; secondly, to advance and consolidate improved methods of cross­
national survey measurement in Europe and beyond; and thirdly, to develop a series 
of European social indicators, including attitudinal indicators” (Jowell et al. 2005).
It is funded via the European Commission’s 5th Framework Programme, the 
European Science Foundation, and national funding bodies in each country. The 
Norwegian Social Science Data Services was the data archive and distributor of the 
ESS data. The project is directed by a Central Co-ordinating team led by Roger 
Jowell at the Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University, UK.
An hour-long face-to-face interview includes, amongst others, questions on family, 
work and well-being, health and economic welfare. Information was recorded at an 
individual level and eligible participants were all persons aged 15 and over resident 
within private households regardless of their nationality, citizenship, language or 
legal status.
In the present study, data from the second round of the ESS edition 2.0 are used. It 
includes 24 countries for analysis: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Ukraine and United Kingdom.
Sampling design and sample size
Strict random probability methods were used at every stage of data collection in all 
countries. In Greece, in particular, the sample design included three stages: area 
units (average 40 households), households, and persons. In the first stage, area units, 
i.e. Primary Sampling Units (henceforth PSUs) were sorted into 90 strata. Greater 
Athens was divided into 31 geographical strata, Greater Thessalonica into 9 and the
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rest of Greece into 50 strata, defined by the degree of urbanization and region (15 
regions).1
Sample size was allocated to strata in proportion to the Census number of 
households. The sample size was then divided into PSUs, based on 5, 6, or 7 sample 
households per PSU, the number depending on the stratum. Within each stratum, 
PSUs were selected with probability proportional to size. The total number of 
sampled PSUs was 528. In the second stage, within each sampled area unit, 
interviewers made a complete listing of all resident households.
For all towns and cities, the interviewer was given a Census map clearly showing 
the area unit; for rural areas field supervisors created a rough map and description of 
the boundaries. The completed listing was passed to a field supervisor, who would 
then apply a random start and interval to select households systematically. At the 
third and last stage, one resident over 15 was selected at random using the Kish grid 
(Kish 1949).2
The minimum ‘effective achieved sample size’ was set to 1,500, after discounting 
for design effects, or 800 in countries with populations of less than 2 million. Thus, 
with the help of the sampling panel, each country determined the appropriate size of 
its initial issued sample by taking into account the realistic estimated impact of 
clustering, eligibility rates (where appropriate), over-sampling and response rate on 
the effective sample size. Greece reached a sample size of 2,406 individuals. The 
final sample size of each country is presented in Table 4.1:
1 Greece is divided into 13 regions, but for the purpose o f  the ESS the region o f  Attica and Thessalonica 
is divided into 2 parts.
2 The Kish grip is a method for choosing who to interview in each household in a random way.
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Table 4.1: Net sample size
Country Frequency
Austria 2256
Belgium 1778
Switzerland 2141
Czech 3026
Germany 2870
Denmark 1487
Estonia 1989
Spain 1663
Finland 2022
France 1806
United Kingdom 1897
Greece 2406
Hungary 1498
Ireland 2286
Iceland 597
Luxembourg 1635
Netherlands 1881
Norway 1761
Poland 1716
Portugal 2052
Sweden 1948
Slovenia 1442
Slovakia 1512
Ukraine 2031
Total 45700
Response rates
A minimum target response rate of 70% in each country had been specified. In order 
to increase the response rates the ESS set:
■ Fieldwork period of at least one month, within a period of 4 months.
■ Face-to-face briefing and training of all interviewers.
■ Limited interviewer workloads (max. 24 issued sampling units).
■ Face-to-face data collection.
■ At least 4 visits/calls on different days and at different times.
■ Visits spread over at least 2 different weeks.
■ No substitution at any stage.
■ The use of refusal conversion strategies.
■ The use of detailed contact forms.
■ Specified quality control back-checks.
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Table 4.2 below gives the exact definition of response rate and calculates it for 
Greece:
Table 4.2: Breakdown of response and non-response in Greece
a) Total number of issued sample units (addresses, households or 
individuals):
3056
b) Refusal by respondent: 36
c) Refusal by proxy (or household or address refusal): 446
d) No contacts (after at least 4 visits): 112
e) Language barrier: 16
f) Respondent mentally or physically unable to co-operate 
throughout the fieldwork period:
9
g) Respondent unavailable throughout the fieldwork period for 
other reasons:
9
h) Address not residential (institution, business/industrial 
purpose):
0
I) Address not occupied (not occupied, demolished, not yet 
built):
1
j) Address not traceable: 0
k) Other ineligible address: 0
1) Respondent moved abroad: 1
m) Respondent deceased: 0
n) Number of achieved interviews: 2406
o) Interviews not approved: 0
P) Records in the data file: 2406
X) Number of sample units not accounted for: 0
Response rate main questionnaire (n-o)/(a-(sum h,I,k,l,ni)): 78.78%
Number of completed supplementary questionnaires: 2406
Questionnaire design -  process
ESS has two questionnaires in every round: a) a face-to-face interview questionnaire 
and b) a short supplementary one that is self-completed or face-to-face, depending 
on the country. The interview questionnaire includes ‘core’ items, i.e. that remain 
constant at each round, and ‘rotating’ items, which vary from round to round.
The core questionnaire items cover a range of themes. Subjects covered include: 
public trust in government, politicians and institutions, political participation and 
orientation, moral, political and social values, social inclusion and exclusion, 
national, ethnic and religious allegiances, well-being, health and security, 
demographic composition, education and occupational background, financial 
circumstances and household circumstances.
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The content of the rotating parts is determined via a call for proposal from 
multinational teams of social scientists. Round 2 contains a part on health care and 
services, which remains the main interest of this thesis. The aim of this part was to 
provide data with which to map the interrelationships between structure and culture 
regarding health and care seeking (Kooiker 2001).
The supplementary questionnaire includes two parts. The first contains questions on 
human values. The second contains repeat measures from the main interview 
questionnaire in order to determine measurement errors and reliability of the items. 
Finally, there were some additional country-specific questions for national use. In 
Greece, both the main and the supplementary questionnaire were completed through 
face-to-face interviews.
Data collection in Greece
The market research company OPINION SA, based in Athens, was responsible for 
the data collection in Greece and the funding agency was the National Centre of 
Social Surveys. The main fieldwork period was set to last for at least one month 
within a four-month period. The fieldwork period lasted from 10.01.05 to 20.03.05, 
with a pre-test period from 10.12.04 to 15.12.04. The fieldwork was conducted by 
171 experienced interviewers, who received an ESS specific personal briefing. The 
first contact with potential respondents was face-to-face, with a minimum of 5 
required visits per respondent.
Description of variables
This section describes the variables that will be used in the analysis. First, the 
dependent variable, i.e. non-adherence to prescribed medication, is explained. Then 
the explanatory variables are presented and a distinction is made between the main 
explanatory variables and the control ones. The variables described here generally 
refer to all country unless the particularities of Greece, the country of main interest,
e.g. differences in the educational system, required different classification and 
converge of the categories. This is clearly stated whenever it is necessary.
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Dependent variable
Non-adherence to medication was the main dependent variable. It was self-reported 
and was measured by asking the interviewee to “think back to the last time a doctor 
prescribed you a medicine you had not had before. Which statement comes closest 
to what you did with the prescription?” Seven options were given for a response:
a. I didn’t collect the medicine from the pharmacy.
b. I collected the medicine but didn’t use any of it.
c. I used some or all of the medicine but not exactly as prescribed.
d. I used the medicine exactly as prescribed.
e. Can’t remember last occasion.
f. Never had prescription from doctor.
g. Other answer.
For the present study this variable was converted into a new one based on the 
assumption that any deviation from the doctor’s suggestion is considered non­
adherence to medication (Barber, Parsons et al. 2004). Therefore, the respondents 
are classified as ‘non adherents’ if they did not collect the medicine from the 
pharmacy, collected it but didn’t use it, or used it but not exactly as prescribed 
(responses a, b and c). ‘Adherents’ are those responding that they used the medicine 
exactly as prescribed (response d). Finally, the rest of the responses were set as 
missing (responses e, f  and g).
Explanatory variables
The main focus of the thesis -and this chapter in particular- is to examine how 
individuals’ perceptions of the doctor-patient relationship affect their decision to 
non-adhere to prescribed medication. The ESS provides a number of questions that 
look at individuals’ perceptions of this relationship. These questions are considered 
to be the main explanatory variables for the present analysis. Nevertheless, in 
addition to the impact of the doctor-patient relationship on non-adherence, the 
review of the empirical variables in the introductory part identified four more groups 
of determinants. These are demographic and socioeconomic factors, disease related 
factors, drug related factors and patient’s beliefs on illnesses and medication (see
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part 2.4.2 for more details). It is considered essential for the analysis to control for 
these factors.
However, this is a population survey, therefore some modifications and adaptations 
of the data are necessary. To start with, the survey has no available information on 
specific disease and regimen characteristics of the respondents. Hence disease and 
drug related data cannot be used. However, some variables can be used to identify 
the general state of health, such as self-reported health status and disability level. As 
far as individuals’ beliefs on medication and illnesses are concerned there were not 
many questions in the ESS, but there was a question on fear of side-effects. Also, the 
ESS includes questions on health systems regarding choice and preferences over 
doctors. These factors, although they are rarely investigated in patient empirical 
studies, have been identified by the WHO (2003) as possible determinants of non­
adherence. It will be interesting to examine their impact on the general population’s 
decision to follow doctors’ recommendations.
To sum up, the main cluster of explanatory variables that will be examined here are 
individuals’ beliefs about the doctor-patient relationship. However, a number of 
control variables will also be considered. These include demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics, self-reported health status, fear of side effects and 
health system related factors. Both explanatory and control variables are now 
described in more detail.
Perceptions o f the doctor-patient relationship
The interaction between doctors and patients and the way individuals perceive it has 
been attracting the attention of many researchers during recent years. Evidence 
identifies a number of problems in the area. Expectations for communication and 
participation in the consultation (Jenkins, Britten et al. 2003), misunderstandings 
between the two parties (Britten, Stevenson et al. 2000) (Farber, Capra et al. 2003) 
and different agendas that are not met during the consultation (Barry, Bradley et al. 
2000) are a few examples of the challenging aspects of the doctor-patient 
relationship that may lead to non-adherence to medication.
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In ESS a number of questions asked individuals to show their agreement or not with 
the following statements (variable codes are given in parenthesis):
□ “People can cure themselves without having to visit a doctor” (PPLCURE).
□ “People rely too much on their doctors rather than themselves to keep 
healthy” (PPRLDC).
□ “When people are sure about what medicine they need, their doctor should 
just prescribe it for them” (PSMDCPR).
□ “I generally feel a bit disappointed when I leave a doctor’s surgery without a 
prescription” (DSPLVPR).
Answers included: agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree and 
disagree strongly and for the purpose of this thesis were merged into two categories: 
agree (including those who agree or agree strongly) and not agree (including those 
who disagree, disagree strongly and neither agree nor disagree).
Another cluster of questions assessing the population’s beliefs about the doctor- 
patient relationship asked respondents to indicate how often they thought the 
following applies to doctors in general (variable codes are given in parenthesis).
□ “Doctors keep the whole truth from their patients” (DCKPTRT).
□ “GP’s treat their patients as their equals” (DCTREQL).
□ “Before doctors decide on a treatment, they discuss it with their patient” 
(DCDISC).
□ “Patients are reluctant to ask their doctors all they’d like to ask” 
(PTNRLCQ).
□ “Doctors are willing to admit their mistakes to their patients” (DCSDMMS).
□ “Doctors use words or phrases that their patients find difficult to understand” 
(DCDFCWR).
Responses were: never or almost never, some of the time, half of the time, most of 
the time, always or almost always. Answers to the above question were merged into 
two categories: yes, the statement applies to doctors (including never or almost 
never and some of the time), and no, it does not (including all the other categories). 
The theoretical elements behind the questions were not stated clearly in the ESS. 
However, it seems that the questions are mainly testing elements of trust (“doctors 
keep the whole truth”), paternalism (“treat patients as equals”) and shared-decision
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making (“before doctors decide on a treatment, they discuss”). The last two 
questions look at doctors’ sincerity and their ability to communicate effectively 
using simple words and phrases.
Control Variables
a. Demographic and socio-economic characteristics
As mentioned in the literature review (Section 2.4.2), the empirical studies 
examining socio-demographic factors as determinants of non-adherence to 
medication have led to contradictory results. Some studies report significant 
association of adherence with some of these factors (Buck, Jacoby et al. 1997; 
Faulkner, Young et al. 1998) while some other do not (Brus, van de Laar et al. 1999) 
(Lin, Von Korff et al. 1995).
Basic demographic measures used in this study were age (AGE), gender (SEX), 
marital status (MARITAL), domicile (URBAN), education (EDUC) and self- 
reported income (HINCFEL).
The question on marital status (MARITAL) included five categories: married, 
separated, divorced, widowed, never married. For the present analysis the variable 
was divided into married and not married (including ‘separated’, ‘divorced’, 
‘widowed’ and ‘never married’) in order to examine whether people who have a 
partner behave in a different way.
Respondents were asked to describe the area they live by choosing one of the 
following categories: a big city, the suburbs or outskirts of a big city, a country 
village, a farm or a home in the countryside. For the present study the variable was 
dichotomised into urban (“big city” and “the suburbs or outskirts of a big city”) and 
rural area (“country village”, “farm or a home in the countryside”). This variable 
was coded as URBAN.
The question on education (EDUC) was a country-specific one, which was then 
coded into the ESS coding frame as follows (ESS standard):
0. Not completed primary education.
1. Primary or first stage of basic.
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2. Lower secondary or second stage of basic.
3. Upper secondary.
4. Post secondary, non-tertiary.
5. First stage of tertiary.
6. Second stage of tertiary.
Education in Greece is obligatory in primary (6 years) and high school (3 years). 
Another 3 years of secondary education (lyceum) are non-compulsory. Non-tertiary 
education comprises national and private institutions for job-related skills providing 
entrance to the labour market. At the first stage of tertiary education there are 
Technological Educational Institutes (TEI), which were not equivalent to 
Universities till 2001 but have been under an equivalence programme since then. 
University degrees last for 4-5 years depending on the type of study. During the last 
ten years postgraduate departments have also been established leading to Masters 
and PhDs.
Education levels in the Greek part of the questionnaire were:
□ Illiterate/not completed primary education (ESS standard = 0).
□ Primary completed (ESS standard =1).
□ Partial secondary (ESS standard = 2).
□ Full secondary (ESS standard = 3).
□ Post secondary/polytechnic non-tertiary (ESS standard = 4).
□ University first degree (ESS standard = 5).
□ Post-graduate (Diploma/Master) (ESS standard = 6).
□ Post-graduate (PhD) (ESS standard = 6).
For the analysis here, education levels were merged into three categories, primary 
(ESS standard 0 and 1), secondary (ESS standard 2, 3 and 4) and tertiary (ESS 
standard 5 and 6).
A subjective measurement of income (HINCFEL) was obtained by asking: “Which 
of the following descriptions...comes closest to how you feel about your 
household’s income nowadays?”
□ Living comfortably on present income.
□ Coping on present income.
□ Finding it difficult on present income.
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□ Finding it very difficult on present income.
For the analysis, categories remained unchanged.
b. Self-reported health status and subjective well-being
The ESS is a population study without information on specific diseases or the 
clinical condition of the respondents. However, overall information on the state of 
health, even self-reported is considered important to be included in the analysis. 
Individuals in worse health may differ not only in their attitudes towards medication 
but also in the way they perceive the doctor-patient relationship.
In the ESS one item was used to measure self-reported health state (HEALTH). The 
question asked individuals whether they would say their health in general is very 
good, good, fair, bad or very bad. The answers were merged into three: good, fair 
and bad.
A second item referred to disability (HLTHMP). Respondents were asked if they are 
hampered in their daily activities in any way by any longstanding illness, or 
disability, infirmity or mental health problem and if  so, to what extent. Answers 
included: no, yes and yes to some extent and were merged into: yes or no.
c. Health system related factors
The literature on health services and non-adherence to medication is very restricted; 
however, in a study on hypertension it has been shown that confidence in the health 
care system as a whole led to better adherence (Kjellgren, Svensson et al. 1998). 
For this thesis two aspects regarding health systems were examined, i.e. choice 
(CHOICE) and preferences on specialised doctors (PRFSDC), as explained below.
People were asked if, when choosing a regular GP, they feel they have a) enough 
choice or b) not enough choice. This variable was treated as binary. Respondents 
were also asked whether they would prefer to see the same doctor for different 
everyday health problems. They could reply positively, negatively or express no 
preference either way. The variable was dichotomised here into those who would
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prefer to see the same doctor and those who do not (including those with no 
preference).
d. Fear o f side effects (FRSDEFF)
It was shown in the literature review of the empirical studies that there has been an 
increasing interest in peoples’ views about illnesses and medication and how these 
views may influence adherence (Home and Weinman 1999). The perception of the 
medication as either not needed or not effective (Boulet 1998; Johnson, Williams et 
al. 1999) as well as fears of side effects (Boulet 1998) were often mentioned as 
factors associated with non-adherence to prescribed medication.
The ESS included a question on fear of side-effects. Answers to the question “when 
you are prescribed a medicine how often do you worry about side-effects” were 
graded on a 5-point scale: never or almost never, some of the time, about half the 
time, most of the time and always or almost always. For the present analysis, the 
variable was merged into two categories, ‘yes’ (including categories ‘most of the 
time’ and ‘always and almost always’) and ‘no’ (including all the others).
Methods
This section presents the methodology followed in this chapter.
4.3.1 Preliminary analysis
The main explanatory variables looking at the population’s perceptions on doctors 
and the fact that they may be highly correlated with each other generated concerns 
about collinearity. To check for possible correlation between the variables, a 
covariance matrix among the belief variables was computed. The absolute value of 
the correlations ranged from to 0.0017 to 0.39 and therefore associations between 
the variables were very low (see Appendix, Table A.l).
To test further for collinearity between the independent variables, the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) test was used. Collinearity is a problem among the 
independent variables and therefore the VIF test from an OLS regression model is
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valid for a probit model with those variables. A regression model with the 
explanatory variables was run and the VIF was estimated to be 1.27. The low value 
of the VIF test suggests that collinearity is not a concerning limitation in the 
interpretation of the empirical estimates.
In addition, a factor analysis of the correlation matrix was performed with the aim of 
reducing the main explanatory variables (Gorsuch 1983). More specifically, the 
purpose of the analysis is to identify if the observed variables can be explained 
largely or entirely in terms of a much smaller number of variables, called the factors. 
In the case of the main explanatory variables factor analysis aims to find whether 
there is a pattern in the way people think about their doctors and possibly identify a 
few factors that will explain their perceptions.
All the main explanatory variables, i.e. perceptions on the doctor-patient 
relationship, are included in the factor analysis and different types are tried including 
four, three, two and one factor solutions. The results (presented in Tables A2.1-A2.6 
in the Appendix) fail to identify a simple pattern of relationship among these 
variables. Uniqueness is above 70%, indicating that the proportion of the common 
variance of the variable not associated with the factor is very high. In other words, 
the factor analysis fails to identify one (or more) factors that could replace the much 
larger number of the main explanatory variables. It also verifies that each of the 
belief variables is measuring a different aspect of the doctor-patient relationship.
The above results confirm that the variables showing beliefs about the doctor patient 
relationship do not associate highly, and that each of them is measuring different 
aspects of the relationship. Therefore the best approach would be to use all the main 
explanatory variables, i.e. the variables on people’s perception about doctors, in the 
analysis.
4.3.2 Model specifications
The main concern of this chapter is to explain non-adherence to prescribed 
medication by the variables presented in the previous section (Section 4.2.2.2).
3 Values o f  VIF higher than 10 indicate serious problem o f  collinearity (Belsley, Kuh et al. 1980)
80
Chapter 4
Hence, non-adherence to medication is specified as a function of the previously 
defined variables and in its general form could be expressed in the following way:
y , = t f + e ,  (4.1)
where y. is the dependent variable for observation i , i.e. self-reported non­
adherence to medication, /? is a ( & x l ) vector of the unknown parameters, xt is the 
(&xl) vector of the explanatory variables, and ei is the error term with £; ~tV(0,<7) .
The dependent variable y  is a binary variable where 0 stands for adherent and 1 for 
non-adherent respondent. The explanatory variables include the beliefs regarding the 
doctor patient relationship and a number of control variables. The main explanatory 
variables, beliefs regarding the doctor-patient relationship, are all binary variables 
(0=do not agree, l=agree). The effect they are expected to have on non-adherence is 
explained below.
The effect of PPLCURE, PPRLYDC, PSMDCPR, DSPLVPR, PTNRLCQ, 
DCKPTRT and DCDFCWR is expected to be positive. In particular, if people 
believe they can cure themselves without visiting a doctor (PPLCURE) they are 
more likely to non-adhere to what the doctor recommends and so are those who 
believe that people rely too much on doctors (PPRLYDC).
Similarly, those who think that when they are sure about the medication they need 
the doctor should prescribe it (PSMDCPR) and those who feel disappointed when 
leaving a clinic without a prescription (DSPLVPR) are more likely to non-adhere. 
The reason for this is that both statements express individuals’ expectations from the 
consultation that, if not met, is likely to lead to non-adherence to what the doctor 
suggested. Also, respondents who believe patients are reluctant to ask questions 
(PTNRLCQ), that doctors keep the truth from their patients (DCKPTRT) and that 
doctors use words that are difficult to understand (DCDFCWR) are more likely to 
non-adhere to what the doctor prescribes.
On the other hand, the effect of DCTREQL, DCDISC and DCADMMS is expected 
to be negative; when people believe that the doctor treats them as equals 
(DCTREQL), discusses the treatment with them before deciding on it (DCDISC)
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and admits their mistakes (DCADMMS) are less likely to non-adhere than those 
who think the opposite.
Control variables include six demographic and socioeconomic factors: AGE (in 
years), SEX (0=male, l=female), MARITAL (0=not married, l=married), EDUC 
(0=primary education, l=secondary, 2=tertiary), URBAN (0=rural, l=urban) and 
HINCFEL (0=living comfortable at present income, l=coping at present income, 
2=fmd it difficult at present income, and 3=find it very difficult to cope).
As was shown in the review of the empirical studies (Section 2.2.2), the impact of 
the demographic and socioeconomic variables is ambiguous. The impact of age 
(AGE) is complex and in some studies it was shown to be negatively associated with 
non-adherence while it is positively associated in others. This may be attributed to 
the fact that age is an indicator of health and medication taking. Older people may 
be more likely to consume medication for serious and symptomatic conditions 
therefore may be less likely to non-adhere. On the other hand, age exerts some 
behavioural and perceptual effects, namely it influences people’s memory loss, 
which may be a reason why people fail (unintentionally) to take their medication. It 
is therefore expected that the impact of age on non-adherence may be negative up to 
a point while it will be positive after this point. Hence, to examine this effect, a 
quadratic specification of age (AGESQR) is specified.
Marital status (MARITAL) is assumed to have a negative effect on non-adherence,
i.e. married people are less likely to non-adhere. It is expected that individuals may 
be reminded by their partners to take their medication. URBAN is assumed to 
measure access to health care in a way, with those living in urban areas having better 
access than those in rural areas. Hence it is expected to have a negative effect on 
non-adherence, i.e. people who live in urban areas have better access to health care 
and consequently are less likely to non-adhere.
The effect of education (EDUC) is also ambiguous. On the one hand, more educated 
people may be more interested in or feel more confident about exercising control 
over their medication and therefore adhere more (Gorsuch 1983). On the other hand, 
more educated people may question their doctor’s advice more, in which case a 
positive association of education with non-adherence is expected. Self-reported 
income (HINFEL) is assumed to have a positive effect on non-adherence; those
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reporting they have difficulties coping on their present income are more likely to 
non-adhere.
Other control variables are self-reported health status HEALTH (0=good, l=fair, 
2=bad) and disability HLTHMP (0=no, yes=l). HEALTH is expected to have a 
negative effect on non-adherence, with people in worse health being less likely to 
non-adhere, as worse conditions with symptoms and pain will force people to 
comply. Similarly, disabled people are expected to be less non-adherent. Health 
system related factors include choice CHOICE (0=not enough, l=enough choice) 
and preference for the same doctor for different conditions PRFSDC (0=no, l=yes). 
Both CHOICE and PRFSDC are expected to have a negative effect on non­
adherence, with those people who feel they have enough choice and prefer the same 
doctor for different conditions being less likely to non-adhere.
Before finally deciding on the appropriate model for the analysis, an important 
feature of the data merits attention. The dependent variable, which defines the nature 
of the model, is binary with 0 standing for ‘adherent’ and 1 for ‘non-adherent’ 
respondent. However, a third category, of those respondents who did not answer the 
question, could not remember, reported they had never had a prescription before or 
refused to answer was set as missing. Analysis with a probit model would be 
adequate if missing values were missing completely at random.
However, the question on non-adherence was self-reported and, what is more, it can 
be perceived by some respondents as a question judging people’s behaviour 
(DiMatteo and DiNicola 1982). It is likely that some of the respondents refused to 
answer because they felt they were being judged for their behaviour. In addition, 
some of the respondents who did not recall the last time they were prescribed 
medication may have memory loss problems, an issue associated with non­
adherence as well. All these elements raised considerations of sample selection and 
lead to a model specification that takes into account the information that may be 
hidden in missing values.
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To correct for the potential bias due to the missing values of the dependent variable, 
a Heckman probit model with sample selection is used.4 The model, proposed by 
Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) is based on the Heckman selection model 
(Heckman 1979), where the dependent variable is binary. The model accounts for 
the differential likelihood that the respondents have answered the question (i.e. they 
are non-missing). The model consists of two relations. First there is the regression 
model:
y l =x'fl  + £u (4.2)
and second there is the selection model:
z ' y + e 2i> 0. (4.3)
In the case of our model, observations for which y  is missing are assumed not 
selected and those for which y  is not missing are assumed selected. In the latter 
case the selection relation generates a value of 1. For the two relations above the 
following holds:
£*1,~V(0,<T),
£2/~V (0,l),
Corr (eu,£2i) = p .
The model tests the correlation between the two relations that are used to predict the 
probability of two events; non-adherence and report of adherence (non-missing). 
When p  -  0 the probit regression provides unbiased estimates, while when p  * 0 
the probit estimates are biased. In the presence of correlation the missing values 
affect the validity of being non-adherent. In this case, the model corrects for 
systematic differences between the two groups (missing and non-missing) so that the 
predicted probabilities for respondents do not have a selection bias. In other words, 
the probit selection model allows the use of information for the missing values, to
4 An alternative to the Heckman sample selection model is the two-part model (Duan, Manning et al. 
1983). There has been extensive debate in the literature regarding the choice between the two-part 
model and the sample selection model (Jones 2001). Leung and Yu (1996) used Monte Carlo 
simulations to compare these two differing methods and determined that the final choice depends on 
the empirical context. In general, the two-part model is more appropriate for sequential decisions or in 
cases where there is collinearity. None o f  these characteristics is present in our analysis therefore the 
Heckman sample selection is chosen for the analysis o f  our data. I am very grateful to Dr Marin 
Gemmill for bringing this point to my attention.
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improve the estimates of the parameters in the regression model. It provides 
consistent, asymptomatically efficient estimates for all parameters in the model.
In our study, the regression model (equation 4.1) predicts non-adherence to 
medication and the selected model (relation 4.2) predicts whether people were 
selected, i.e. were not set as missing. The selection function contains a set of 
explanatory factors zf which are a superset of x i . It has been argued that when the 
same explanatory variables are used to predict both the regression and the selection 
function, the parameters are theoretically identified but this identification is too 
weak to be applied in practice (Wooldridge 2006). Hence, in our model z. includes
all jc;. as well as another variable, INWTM, indicating the time that was needed to
complete the questionnaire. It is checked that the time needed to complete the 
interview is associated with whether the respondent answered the question but not 
with whether they decided to adhere or not.
Three main models are analysed. In Model I only socioeconomic variables are 
included as explanatory factors of non-adherence. Gradually, all control variables 
are included in Model II and finally Model III includes all explanatory variables, and 
both control factors and beliefs about the doctor patient relationship. The aim is to 
compare the three models in order to identify the model that is a better predictor of 
the dependent variable, i.e. non-adherence to medication.
For the analysis of the above data the statistical package STATA ed.9 was used.
4.3.3 Weighting survey data
The European Social Survey is a population study and therefore needs to be 
weighted to correct for specific characteristics that may bias the analysis. Two basic 
weights were used during the analysis; the population weight and the design weight. 
The population weight corrects for differences in the population size among the 
participating countries and was calculated as:
pweight = (population aged 15 and over) /(net sample in data file) x10 000
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The design weight, with which we adjust the observations, corrects for differences in 
the probability selection and was computed as the inverse of the inclusion 
probabilities:
dw eight = ---------- -----------
probx X . . . X probk
This is an n x 1 vector of weights, where k  depends on the number of stages of the 
sampling design. The weights were rescaled such in a way that their sum equals n .
Both weights were provided by the ESS. In the case where only Greek data were 
analysed only the design weight was used. When analysis included all 24 countries, 
both the design and the population weights were used to correct for the differences 
in population sizes between the countries.
4.4 Results
This section presents the main results of the analysis of the ESS conducted for this 
thesis. It begins with a description of the main variables of the analysis for both the 
Greek and the European sample. A t-test is used to examine differences in means 
between the two samples in order to explore idiosyncratic differences between the 
Greek population and the Europeans in terms of their perceptions regarding the 
doctor-patient relationship. It then presents the results of the Heckman probit model 
with sample selection and shows the factors associated with non-adherence to 
prescribed medication among Greeks. Similar analysis was used for the European 
sample and results are compared to those of the Greek one.
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics
This section describes the main variables used for the analysis, beginning with the 
dependent variable and then the explanatory ones.
Dependent variable; non-adherence to prescribed medication
It is convenient, at this point, briefly to recall the definition of non-adherence used in 
the analysis. As ‘non adherents’ are denoted all respondents who either did not 
collect the medicine from the pharmacy, collected it but didn’t use it, used it but not
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exactly as prescribed and as ‘adherents’ those responding they used the medicine 
exactly as prescribed. Finally, the rest of the responses were set as missing.
The following figure (Figure 4.2) shows the mean non-adherence rates among the 
ESS countries. Greece reports particularly low non-adherence rates. It is the second 
most ‘adherent’ country after Portugal, with only 7% of Greek respondents stating 
they did not follow the doctor’s prescription.
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24.7%U k r a i n e
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20 .3%Hungary
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Figure 4.2: Mean non-adherence among European countries.
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Figure 4.3 presents more analytically what Greeks did last time a doctor prescribed a 
medication they had never had before. It is clear that the vast majority o f Greeks 
(82.4%) took the medication exactly as prescribed by the doctor. Only a small 
proportion (4.7%) used the medication but not exactly as prescribed, and an even 
smaller proportion did not collect the medication from the pharmacy (1.2%) or 
collected it but did not use it at all (0.8%).
■ Didn't collect it from pharmacy
■ Collected but didn't use it
□ Used it but not exactly as 
prescribed
□ Used exactly as prescribed
■ Can't remember last occasion
□ Never had prescription from 
doctor
■ Other answer
Figure 4.3: What did you do last time a doctor prescribed medication for you
(Greece)?
Explanatory variables
Table 4.3 describes the main explanatory variables used in the analysis. These were: 
demographic and socioeconomic factors, health related factors, institutional factors 
and beliefs about the doctor-patient relationship.
The average age for the Greek sample is 50.9 years and 44% are women. Around 
62% are married and this is significantly higher than the mean European average 
proportion, which is 55%. Thirty-eight percent had primary education, 48% had 
received secondary education and 12% had a University degree. It is also clear that 
Greece is a highly urbanised country, with over 56% of the sample reporting that 
they live in a big city or in the suburbs of one. There are also significant differences 
when it comes to self-reported income, with only 8.8% of Greeks feeling
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comfortable on their present income, 40.9% reporting that they cope on the present 
income and 50.3% finding it difficult or very difficult to cope. Greeks, however, 
report being healthier than the average Europeans with 73.8% claiming good health 
while the respective proportion for Europeans is 65%. Levels of disability are also 
lower, with only 18% of the Greeks reporting being hampered in their everyday life 
due to disability.
Table 4.3: Description of variables
ESS-24 GREECE
Mean St. Err. Mean St. Err.
Demographic and socioeconomic factors
age (years) 48.0677 0.1040 50.985 0.4281
sex (0=male 1 =female) 0.4555 0.0029 0.4433 0.0113
married (0=not married l=married) 0.5486 0.0028 0.6207 0.0110
education (0=primary education) 0.1841 0.0022 0.3864 0.0110
secondary 0.6187 0.0028 0.4857 0.0113
tertiary 0.1970 0.0023 0.1277 0.0075
urban 0.3145 0.0027 0.5654 0.0112
feeling about household’s income (0=living 
comfortable) 0.2992 0.0026 0.0884 0.0064
coping at present income 0.4514 0.0028 0.4092 0.0111
difficult on present income 0.1862 0.0022 0.3652 0.0109
very difficult on present income 0.0630 0.0014 0.1370 0.0078
Health status
health status (0=good) 0.6509 0.0027 0.7382 0.0100
fair 0.2662 0.0025 0.2074 0.0092
bad 0.0828 0.0016 0.0543 0.0051
disability (0=no, l=yes) 0.2506 0.0025 0.1805 0.0087
Health system related factors
choice regarding GP (0=not enough, l=enough 
choice) 0.7184 0.0026 0.5659 0.0112
prefer same doctor (0=not same, l=same) 0.7225 0.0026 0.4500 0.0113
Worried about side effects (0=no, l=yes) 0.3412 0.0027 0.3341 0.0107
Doctor-patient relationship
believe people can cure themselves * 0.8472 0.0020 0.7677 0.0096
believe people rely too much on doctors * 0.6564 0.0027 0.6109 0.0110
believe when people sure of medicine doctor 
should prescribe * 0.2805 0.0026 0.1815 0.0087
feel disappointed when leave without 
prescription * 0.0952 0.0017 0.0641 0.0055
believe doctors keep the whole truth ** 0.1518 0.0020 0.2183 0.0093
believe doctors treat patients as equals ** 0.4955 0.0029 0.4831 0.0113
believe doctors discuss treatment before they 
decide ** 0.5475 0.0028 0.4919 0.0113
believe patients are reluctant to ask questions ** 0.2519 0.0025 0.1883 0.0088
believe doctors admit their mistakes ** 0.1116 0.0018 0.0832 0.0062
believe doctors use words patients find difficult 
to understand ** 0.2872 0.0026 0.2736 0.0101
* 0=not agree, l=agree 
** 0=no & to some extent, l=yes
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Regarding their views on health systems, Greeks do not believe they have enough 
choice in selecting their doctor. Only 56% of the Greeks feel they are given enough 
choice, while the equivalent proportion of Europeans is 72% (t =19.43, p<0.001). 
Also, Greeks prefer visiting different doctors for different health problems while the 
majority (72%) of the Europeans opt for the same one (t=29.43, p<0.001). This may 
reflect the fact that, as explained in Section 2.5.2 of the thesis, there is a plethora of 
specialists in Greece and no gate-keeping system.
Particular attention is paid to what people think of doctors in order to identify 
possible idiosyncratic differences between Greeks and the rest of the Europeans. T- 
test is used to compare differences in the means. There is a clear tendency of the 
Greek respondents to rely on doctors more than the rest of the Europeans. They are 
less likely than the rest of the Europeans to believe that people can cure themselves 
without visiting the doctor (t=10.89, p<0.001). In a similar way, the proportion of 
Greeks that believe people sometimes rely too much on doctors rather than 
themselves to keep healthy is significantly smaller than the ESS average (60% and 
67% respectively; t=6.069 and p<0.001).
In terms of the prescription of medicines, a similar tendency is observed with Greeks 
showing more trust of doctors than do Europeans. Only 19% of the sample believe 
that when people are sure of the medicine they need, doctors should prescribe it to 
them, while the proportion of Europeans who agree with this statement is 28% 
(t=9.07, p<0.001). A possible explanation may be that Greeks put more weight on 
their doctor’s opinion than the other Europeans, when they are prescribed 
medication. This may also explain why they are less disappointed than Europeans 
when they leave the doctor’s clinic without a prescription (6% and 10% 
respectively; t=4.669 and p<0.001).
As far as doctors telling the truth and admitting mistakes is concerned the picture is 
quite different. Greeks are more likely to believe that the doctors keep the whole 
truth from their patients than the rest of the Europeans (22% and 15% respectively) 
and this was statistically significant (t=-8.5455, p<0.001). Regarding doctors’ errors 
Greeks believe less strongly than Europeans that doctors are willing to admit their 
mistakes to the patients (8% in comparison to 10% for the Europeans, t=3.9653 and 
p<0.001). However, no statistically significant difference is observed in the way the
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two samples think of the doctor’s communication skills, in terms of using words and 
phrases that patients find difficult to understand (t=0.1857, p<0.37).
In terms of equal treatment and discussion during the consultation, distinctions are 
less clear. When asked whether they believe that doctors discuss a treatment with 
their patients before they decide on it, Greek respondents are less likely to agree 
with the statement than the other Europeans (49% and 55% respectively with 
t=6.5738 and p<0.001). On the other hand, Greeks also report that they are less 
reluctant (19%) than the Europeans (25%) to ask their doctors what they want 
(t=6.852, p<0.001). Finally, there is no significant difference in the way Greeks and 
the other Europeans feel about doctors treating their patients as equals (t= 1.783, 
p=0.0745).
To sum up, there is a tendency for the Greek population to rely more on their 
doctor’s advice when it comes to treating a condition even if this is just a common 
cold. They also show a clear preference for not treating illnesses alone but following 
the doctor’s recommendation. There are also some hints to support the opinion that 
the doctor-patient relationship is perceived by Greeks as a paternalistic one. Greeks 
are less likely to believe that doctors discuss the treatment with their patient before 
they decide. They also believe, even more strongly than the rest of the Europeans, 
that doctors keep back the whole truth.
The impact of the above explained differences and similarities in the explanatory 
variables between the ESS and the Greek sample will be examined through the 
regression results which follow.
4.4.2 Determinants of non-adherence
This stage of the analysis looks for the association between non-adherence and the 
explanatory variables by using the Heckman probit model with sample selection. It 
first presents the findings of the analysis from Greece that is of main interest in this 
thesis. It then presents results from all 24 European countries to discuss similarities 
and differences in the determinants. For purposes of clarity, results from the 
selection model are omitted and only the rho ( p ) and its p-value will be reported
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here. More detailed results of the selection models, including tables with beta 
coefficients are presented in Appendix A3.1 and A3.2.
4.4.2.1 Results from the Greek sample
Three main models are compared here and presented in Table 4.4. In Model I only 
socioeconomic variables are included as explanatory factors. Progressively, all 
control variables are included in Model II and finally Model III includes all the 
explanatory variables, all control factors and the beliefs about the doctor patient 
relationship. The tables present the marginal effects (indicated in the text by mfx) 
which are more meaningful than the beta coefficients and easier to interpret.
In general, Model III, which includes all the control and explanatory variables, is the 
best predictor of non-adherence (log-likelihood was -354.68 as compared to -524.69 
and -444.75 for Models I and II). In other words, perceptions about doctors along 
with the control variables constitute the model that better explains non-adherence to 
prescribed medication.
In addition, the model indicates that there is sample selection in all 3 models (Model 
I: p  = 5.513, p<0.001, Model II: p  = 1.582, p<0.001 and Model III: p  = 1.436, 
p<0.05). Results confirm that the Heckman probit model with sample selection was 
the most appropriate model for the analysis.
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Table 4.4: Factors associated with non-adherence - all models / Greece
Model I Model II Model in
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Effects Effects Effects
Socio-demographic factors
age squared (years) -0.00001 -0.000017 3.43E-06
age (years) 0.00039 0.00012 -0.0020
sex (0=male 1 =female) 0.0223* 0.0286** 0.0206*
married (0=not married l=married) -0.0007 0.0019 0.0081
education (0=primary education)
secondary -0.0046 -1.77E-06 0.0043
tertiary -0.0231 -0.0255 -0.0150
urban -0.0161 -0.0145 -0.0207
feeling about household’s income (0=living
comfortable)
coping at present income 0.0055 0.0064 -0.0006
difficult on present income 0.0014 -0.0037 -0.0042
very difficult on present income 0.0241 0.0173 0.0045
Health status
health status (0=good)
fan- 0.0482* 0.0434*
bad 0.0221 0.0241
disability (0=no, l=yes) -0.0024 0.0014
Institutional factors
choice regarding GP (0=not enough, l=enough
choice) -0.0114 -0.0140
prefer same doctor (0=no, l=yes) -0.0121 -0.0059
Worried about side effects (0=no, l=yes) 0.0008 -0.0129
Doctor-patient relationship (I believe..)
..people can cure themselves (0=not agree, l=agree) 0.0231*
..people rely too much on doctors (0= not agree,
l=agree) 0.0037
..if people sure of medicine doctor should prescribe
(0=not agree, l=agree) 0.0247
..feel disappointed when leave without prescription
(0=not agree, l=agree) 0.0243
..doctors keep the whole truth (0=no, l=yes) -0.0115
..doctors treat patients as equals (0=no, l=yes) 0.0170
..doctors discuss treatment before they decide (0=no,
l=yes) -0.0252**
..patients are reluctant to ask questions (0=no, 1 =yes) 0.0332*
..doctors admit their mistakes (0=no, l=yes) 0.0131
..doctors use difficult words (0=no, l=yes) 0.0165
Log pseudolikelihood -524.6968 -444.7568 -354.6829
athrho 5.51373*** 58209*** 1.4367*
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Perceptions about doctors, the main explanatory variables, were strong predictors of 
non-adherence. Table 4.5 describes in more detail results for Model III as this is the 
most involved model of the three and the one we are mainly interested in.
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Table 4.5: Factors associated with non-adherence Model III / Greece
Marginal
Effects
Stand.
Error P>t 95% C.I.
Socio-demographic factors
age (years) 0.000003 0.00002 0.8450 -0.000031 0.000038
age squared (years) -0.0020 0.0018 0.2540 -0.0056 0.0015
sex (0=male l=female) 0.0207 0.0118 0.0790 -0.0024 0.0437
married (0=not married l=married) 0.0081 0.0117 0.4880 -0.0148 0.0311
education (0=primary education)
secondary 0.0043 0.0147 0.7680 -0.0245 0.0332
tertiary -0.0150 0.0194 0.4380 -0.0529 0.0229
urban -0.0207 0.0126 0.1000 -0.0454 0.0040
feeling about household’s income 
(0=living comfortable)
coping at present income -0.0007 0.0197 0.9730 -0.0392 0.0379
difficult on present income -0.0043 0.0196 0.8280 -0.0427 0.0342
very difficult on present income 0.0045 0.0234 0.8470 -0.0413 0.0503
Health status
health status (0=good)
fan- 0.0434 0.0260 0.0940 -0.0075 0.0943
bad 0.0241 0.0458 0.5980 -0.0656 0.1138
disability (0=no, l=yes) 0.0014 0.0211 0.9470 -0.0399 0.0427
Institutional factors
choice regarding GP (0=no, l=yes) -0.0140 0.0120 0.2450 -0.0376 0.0096
prefer same doctor (0=no, l=yes) -0.0060 0.0116 0.6060 -0.0288 0.0168
Worried about side effects (0=no & 
to some extent, l=yes) -0.0129 0.0113 0.2520 -0.0350 0.0092
Doctor-patient relationship
believe people can cure themselves * 0.0231 0.0117 0.0490 0.0001 0.0461
believe people rely too much on 
doctors * 0.0037 0.0111 0.7370 -0.0181 0.0256
believe when people sure of 
medicine doctor should prescribe * 0.0248 0.0158 0.1170 -0.0062 0.0558
feel disappointed when leave 
without a prescription * 0.0244 0.0251 0.3320 -0.0249 0.0736
believe doctors keep the truth ** -0.0115 0.0124 0.3530 -0.0359 0.0128
believe doctors treat patients as 
equals ** 0.0171 0.0121 0.1600 -0.0067 0.0408
believe doctors discuss treatment 
before they decide ** -0.0252 0.0117 0.0310 -0.0482 -0.0023
believe patients are reluctant to ask 
questions ** 0.0333 0.0175 0.0560 -0.0009 0.0675
believe doctors admit their mistakes 
** 0.0131 0.0220 0.5500 -0.0299 0.0562
believe doctors use words patients 
find difficult to understand ** 0.0166 0.0131 0.2050 -0.0090 0.0422
* 0=not agree, l=agree
** 0=no & to some extend, l=yes
Respondents who believe that people can cure themselves without consulting a 
doctor are 2.3% more likely to non-adhere to the prescribed medication when given
94
Chapter 4
some (p=0.049). When people do not consider it necessary to visit a doctor they are 
more likely to follow his recommendations when they see one.
Also, those respondents who believe that patients are reluctant to ask questions are 
3.3% more likely to non-adhere (p=0.056). Two possible explanations can be given 
here. First, it is possible that, when people do not ask the doctor to provide what 
they want, they may leave the consultation with confusion regarding their 
medication. Misunderstanding of medication was associated with decreased 
adherence in a study by Farber et al. (2003). Secondly, reluctance to ask questions 
may be an indication of an authoritarian doctor-patient relationship where the doctor 
prescribes and does not allow the patient to address other issues. Unvoiced patient’s 
agenda items led to reduced adherence rates in a study by Barry et al. (2000).
On the other hand, people who think that doctors who discuss the treatment before 
they decide on it are 2.5% less likely to non-adhere to the recommendation than 
those who believe the opposite (p=0.031). This is an important finding indicating 
that involvement in the decision making process affects non-adherence to 
medication. This finding supports previous empirical evidence, such as the study by 
Jenkins et al. (2003) in GP practices in the UK.
In view of the significance of the belief factors, we checked for the interaction 
effects between some socio-demographic variables and a number of perceptions 
regarding the doctor-patient relationship and their impact on the analysis. In 
particular we looked at the interaction between age and ‘believe doctors discuss 
treatment before they decide’, age and ‘believe doctors treat patients as equals’, secondary 
and tertiary education and ‘believe doctors discuss treatment before they decide’, age 
and ‘doctors use difficult words’, education and ‘doctors use difficult words’. The 
results did not provide any significant findings and are presented in Appendix A 
(Tables A4.1-A4.8).
We now consider the effect of the control variables. Of the socio-demographic 
factors only sex is associated with non-adherence in all three models, with women 
being about 2% more likely to non-adhere than men. From the remaining control 
variables only health status is shown to be statistically significant. Those 
respondents that reported fair health status are 0.4% more likely to non-adhere than 
those in good health. Our initial expectation that people in worse health are less
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likely to non-adhere, due to the severity of the condition, is not confirmed. However, 
our findings are not really contradictory with previous evidence. Severity of 
condition is not always related with better adherence (Mann, Eliasson et al. 1992) 
even in conditions with severe symptoms, as in rheumatoid arthritis (Brus, van de 
Laar et al. 1999). Therefore, a possible explanation of our findings here could be that 
people in worse health are using a larger number of drugs and possibly more 
complicated regimen therefore are more likely to non-adhere.
Finally, despite extensive evidence from the literature (Berman, Epstein et al. 1997; 
Newton, LaCroix et al. 1997; Grant, Devita et al. 2003) the analysis shows that fear 
of side-effects is not a significant factor in non-adherence, in any of the three 
models.
4.4.2,2 Results from the European sample
Similar analysis is conducted for the European sample (all 24 countries, including 
Greece). A Heckman probit model with sample selection is used to identify factors 
associated with non-adherence to medication among the Europeans. Data is 
clustered by country and a dummy variable of the countries is also introduced to 
control for differences among them. Then, results of the two samples (Greek and 
European) are compared to identify any similarities and/or differences.
Table 4.6 presents the marginal effects and their level of significance for all three 
models for the ESS sample. Similar to the Greek sample, in the European one Model 
III better explains non-adherence to the prescribed medication.
Most of the main explanatory variables, i.e. perceptions regarding the doctor-patient 
relationship, are strong predictors of non-adherence to medication in the European 
sample. Those more likely to non-adhere are respondents who believe that people 
rely too much on doctors (mfx=0.0222, p<0.001) and that when people are sure of 
medicine the doctor should prescribe it (mfx=0.0331, p<0.001). Similarly, those 
who are disappointed when they leave without a prescription (mfx=0.0436, 
p<0.001), those who feel that doctors keep the whole truth (mfx=0.0259, p<0.05) 
and those who feel people are reluctant to ask questions (mfx=0.0144, p<0.05) are 
more likely to non-adhere to prescriptions. On the other hand, those who believe that
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doctors treat patients as equals (mfx=-0.0412, p<0.001) and discuss the treatment 
with the patient before they decide (mfx=-0.0301, p<0.01) are less likely to non- 
adhere. The latter finding indicates that the nature of the perceived asymmetry of 
information appears to be an important factor affecting patients’ adherence.
Another interesting finding arising from the analysis of the European sample is the 
effect that institutional factors have on respondents’ decision to non-adhere. These 
results are particularly valuable in view of the limited evidence in the area. More 
specifically, choice has a significant effect on people’s decision to follow 
recommendations. Those Europeans who felt they have enough choice are less likely 
to non-adhere (mfx=-0.0373, p<0.001 for Model II and mfx=-0.0322, p<0.001 for 
Model III).
A possible explanation lies in what the review of the theoretical models, in Section 
2.3, defined as ‘perceived control’. Being able to choose the doctor may be 
perceived by the individuals as a way of having control over their own care. Another 
possibility may be the fact that more choice improves satisfaction with the 
consultation and consequently may lead to better adherence to recommendations. 
Indeed, some evidence supports this explanation as it shows that the patient’s 
opportunity to select their personal physician may influence subsequent satisfaction 
with recommendations (Schmittdiel, Selby et al. 1997).
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Table 4.6: Factors associated with non-adherence- all models / ESS-24
Model I Model II Model IE
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Effects Effects Effects
Socio-demographic factors
age squared (years) -0.000033*** -0.000026** -0.00002*
age (years) 0.001961 0.00098 0.0005
sex (0=male l=female) 0.017675* 0.0194* 0.0205*
married (0=not married 1 =married) -0.02486*** -0.0252*** -0.0234**
education (0=primary education)
secondary 0.013082 0.0100 0.0131
tertiary 0.012861 0.0055 0.0217
urban 0.012113* 0.0153* 0.0121
feeling about household’s income (0=living
comfortable)
coping at present income -0.00976 -0.0074 -0.0106
difficult on present income 0.010772 0.0226* 0.0103*
very difficult on present income 0.015532 0.0217* 0.0011
Health status
health status (0=good)
fan- -0.0060 -0.0007
bad -0.0252*** -0.0220*
disability (0=no, l=yes) 0.0198 0.0210
Institutional factors
choice regarding GP (0=not enough,
l=enough choice) -0.0373*** -0.0322***
prefer same doctor (0=no, l=yes) -0.0373 -0.0312
Worried about side effects (0=no & to some
extent, l=yes) 0.0142 0.0091
Doctor-patient relationship (I believe...)
..people can cure themselves (0=not agree,
l=agree) 0.0048
..people rely too much on doctors (0= not
agree, l=agree) 0.0222***
..if people sure of medicine doctor should
prescribe( 0=not agree, l=agree) 0.0331***
..feel disappointed when leave without
prescription (0=not agree, l=agree) 0.0436***
..doctors keep the whole truth (0=no, l=yes) 0.0259*
..doctors treat patients as equals (0=no,
l=yes) -0.0412***
..doctors discuss treatment (0=no, l=yes) -0.0301**
..patients are reluctant to ask questions (0=no,
l=yes) 0.0144*
..doctors admit their mistakes (0=no, l=yes) 0.0004
..doctors use difficult words (0=no, l=yes) 0.0049
Log pseudolikelihood -20536.34 -16788.87 -13186.09
athrho 0.6446848 0.2468262 0.3122342**
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
From the socio-economic factors some interesting findings are shown. Female 
Europeans are more likely to non-adhere than men and this is constant in all three
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models. Female gender was also a predictor of non-adherence in the Greek sample 
as well. On the other hand, age, marital status and self-reported income were not 
significant predictors in the Greek sample but they are in the European. Age is not 
significant, yet age squared is negatively associated with non-adherence in all three 
models indicating that after a certain age people are less likely to non-adhere. These 
results are not inconsistence with previous evidence where older people have been 
shown to adhere more to recommendations (Bloom 1998; Buck Jacoby et al. 1997).
Married respondents are about 2% less likely to non-adhere in all three models, 
indicating that having a spouse increases adherence rates. A possible explanation 
may be that support by the partner may help the individual remember to take the 
medication. Indeed, Morse et al. (1991) in a study among HIV patients in the USA 
showed that living with someone else was associated with improved adherence rates.
Analysis also reveals that those who reported lower income were more likely to non- 
adhere. The literature has shown that lower income is associated with primary non­
adherence, i.e. patients not having their prescription filled in the pharmacy (Jones 
and Britten 1998). However, lack of information on prescription costs in the ESS 
does not permit such an analysis here.
In contrast with the Greek sample, those Europeans reporting worse state of health 
are less likely to non-adherence. Severity of a condition has been reported to be 
related to better adherence, yet evidence is not always confirmed.
A number of interaction effects of health status with health beliefs were tested to 
reveal any hidden determinant of adherence, and results are presented in appendix 
A. In particular, we tested the interaction effect of health with a) the belief that 
“people can cure themselves” (Table A4.9), b) the belief that “people rely too much 
on doctors” (Table A4.10), c) the belief that “doctors treat patients as equals” (Table 
A4.11) and d) the belief that “doctors discuss with patients before they decide on the 
treatment” (Table A4.12). Only the first of the above interaction effects was shown 
to be significant, indicating that people in worse health who believe that they can 
cure themselves are more likely to non-adhere.
To sum up, the European sample showed similar findings to the Greek one. The 
belief factors are the most significant predictors of non-adherence in both the Greek
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and the European sample. Two of these factors are common in both samples and 
these are discussion of the treatment and being reluctant to ask questions. In general 
the analysis verified that people’s views of doctors influence their decision on 
whether to take the prescribed medication or not.
4.5 Limitations
The ESS provided a solid foundation for a statistical analysis of the issues which 
concern this thesis. It is a unique opportunity of a large scale dataset that allows for 
the issue of doctor-patient relationship and adherence to medication to be examined 
at a population level. This section discusses the limitations of the study, which will 
facilitate the discussion of the results before final conclusions are drawn.
One drawback of this study is that it was based on secondary data and therefore we 
had no influence over the design of the questions or other methodological issues. 
First, the measurement of non-adherence to prescribed medication was restricted to 
only one question. Non-adherence was self-reported and the timing of drug 
consumption to which the question was referring was rather vague. Nevertheless, the 
ESS is, to our knowledge, the only multinational survey that included a question on 
non-adherence to prescribed medication as well as questions on the perceptions of 
the doctor patient relationship. Hence, it provided a unique opportunity to examine 
the issue at a population level and make cross-country comparisons.
Another problem that arose as a result of the secondary analysis was the lack of a 
clear conceptual framework behind the choice of the particular questions, especially 
the ones on people’s perceptions regarding the doctor-patient relationship. In 
general, the variables chosen covered the main areas identified in the literature of 
non-adherence and the ones that this study intended to investigate.
Another study limitation was the lack of data about prescription costs. This type of 
data would have allowed one to examine whether cost was a predictor for not filling 
the prescription and maybe identify any potential difference between primary non­
adherence, i.e. the actual non-redeeming of the prescription and secondary non­
adherence, i.e. whether patients take their drug as intended by the prescribing doctor 
(Jones and Britten 1998). Any attempt to correct for this limitation by introducing
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average prescription costs per country would be misleading as there are several 
exemptions that depend, among others things, on an individual’s income or health 
condition.
4.6 Discussion and policy implications
This section discusses the findings of the analysis of the ESS, with respect to the
hypothesis and the research questions set. A more broad discussion as well as policy
implications are considered in Chapter 7, along with all the findings of the thesis.
*
Q1: What do Greeks believe about their doctors ’ role in prescribing and treatment 
o f illnesses? What are their general attitudes towards medicines?
Q2: To what extent do these beliefs and attitudes differ from those o f other 
Europeans?
Non-adherence rates in Greece are shown to be very low. Greeks are the second 
most adherent Europeans after the Portuguese, with only 7% reporting that they did 
not take their medication exactly as prescribed by their doctor. Before rushing to 
conclusions, we consider whether a possible explanation may lie in the definition of 
non-adherence used in this study. Respondents were defined as ‘adherents’ or ‘non­
adherents’ based on their attitudes towards prescribed medication. The Greek health 
system allows for some types of medicine, such as antibiotics, to be bought over the 
counter without a doctor’s prescription. As a result, one could argue that Greek 
patients would prefer to treat conditions, such as the common cold, without 
consulting a doctor and they would seek a prescription in more serious situations 
when they are more determined to adhere.
However, the above explanation does not seem to be actually supported by our 
empirical findings. When asked to comment on whether “people can cure 
themselves without having to visit a doctor” and on whether “people rely too much 
on their doctors rather than themselves to keep healthy” the Greeks appeared to 
credit doctor’s expertise significantly more than the other Europeans. Even in 
questions referring to less serious conditions, such as the common cold, they agreed
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that people can cure themselves but, again, they did so to a lesser extent than the 
other Europeans.
The above, therefore, indicates that although the system allows Greek patients to 
buy some types of medication without prescription from a doctor, it seems that they 
still count on doctors’ advice more than the other Europeans do. Therefore, the 
definition of adherence employed in this analysis may indeed partly account for the 
low adherence rates. However, there is not enough evidence to conclude that this is 
the main reason explaining why Greece is in the lowest positions in the non­
adherence rating.
On the contrary, what the analysis identified as strong predictors of adherence 
among Greeks was their relationship with doctors. On people’s views of the doctor’s 
role in consultation, evidence indicates that Greeks show a clear tendency to respect 
and trust doctors’ advice significantly more than other Europeans do. Both in terms 
of treatment of illnesses and prescription of medication, the doctors’ opinion has 
greater weight with Greek patients. One explanation lies in the nature of the 
relationship. Indeed, there is some evidence suggesting that the doctor-patient 
relationship is perceived as a paternalistic one, as Greeks were significantly less 
likely to believe that doctors discuss on the treatment with the patient before they 
decide on it.
Q3: How do individuals’ beliefs about doctors affect their decision to adhere to 
prescribed medication?
The analysis of the survey shows interesting results and confirms that perceptions 
individuals hold regarding doctors affect their decision to adhere to prescribed 
medication. This was shown in both the Greek and the European sample, where the 
model that included the belief factors was the one explaining non-adherence to 
medication better than the ones that included only control variables.
More specifically, in the Greek sample the way that individuals perceive the doctor’s 
role and the doctor-patient relationship were shown to be the most significant 
predictors of non-adherence to the prescribed medication. More likely to non-adhere 
are those who believe that people can cure themselves without visiting a doctor and 
those who think that patients are reluctant to ask the questions they want. Also, those
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less likely to non-adhere are the respondents who believe doctors discuss the 
treatment with the patient before they decide on it. Therefore, in the Greek sample, 
self-efficacy and involvement in the decision making process were the strongest 
predictors of non-adherence to the doctors’ prescribed recommendations.
Of the control variables in the Greek sample, the only predictors of non-adherence 
were female sex, living in a rural area and reporting fair health status. Other 
demographic and socioeconomic factors, institutional variables and fear of side- 
effects did not significantly predict non-adherence.
In the European sample, again the strongest determinants of non-adherence were the 
perceptions of the doctor-patient relationship. More specifically, predictors of non­
adherence were the beliefs that people rely too much on doctors to keep healthy, that 
when patients are sure of the medicine they need doctors should prescribe it, that 
they are disappointed when leaving the clinic without a prescription, and that 
patients are reluctant to ask the questions they want. On the other hand, the beliefs 
that doctors treat patients as equals and that they discuss before they decide on the 
treatment were negatively related with non-adherence.
From the control variables, the most interesting results given the lack of relevant 
evidence is the impact of institutional factors, i.e. the ability to choose a doctor. 
Other control variables predicting non-adherence were not being married and 
reporting lower income. Finally, fear of side-effects was not shown to be a 
significant factor related to non-adherence to medication.
Comparisons with results of the analysis of the European sample revealed 
idiosyncratic differences between Greeks and Europeans in terms of what they think 
of their doctors and how this influences non-adherence to medication. However, and 
despite the particular differences, both the Greek and the European analysis showed 
that beliefs about the doctors and the doctor-patient relationship were the strongest 
predictors of non-adherence to medication. Socioeconomic factors were not strong 
predictors of non-adherence, neither in the Greek nor in the European sample.
Hence, it seems that putting the issue of non-adherence and the doctor patient 
relationship in the country context allows a better understanding. This confirms the
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first hypothesis of the thesis (HI), that the country context within which the issue of 
non-adherence is examined plays an important role in its understanding.
From a policy perspective, the findings confirm that non-adherence to medication 
should not be considered a patient-driven problem only. This traditional 
misconception dominated the literature for a long time. However, more recent 
evidence has shown that the typical non-adherent individual does not have specific 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristic. Individuals’ beliefs and perceptions 
are important determinants of non-adherence and this needs more attention when 
interventions are designed.
The results of this chapter indicate that the system within which the issue of non­
adherence is examined is important in its understanding. The doctor-patient 
relationship, and more specifically the way it is perceived by the individuals, is a 
strong predictor of their decision to follow prescribed recommendations. 
Institutional factors, including more choice and preference of same doctor, were also 
shown to affect adherence to medication and need to be taken into consideration 
when appropriate policies are built.
4.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we have drawn upon an empirical examination of a widely 
representative database, the ESS, to explore the underlying determinants of 
individuals’ adherence to mediations, especially to disentangle the role of the 
doctor- patient relationship.
In particular, we have explored the Greek population’s beliefs and attitudes towards 
medication, to see how they differ from those of other Europeans, mainly to identify 
predictors of non-adherence to prescribed medication. Despite its limitations, the 
ESS is one of the very few attempts systematically to collect data on medicine 
taking and the doctor-patient relationship from a large number of countries on a 
population basis. Hence, it provides a unique opportunity to study the issue of non­
adherence within a country context.
The study demonstrated that Greeks show particularly high adherence rates to 
prescribed medication. It was also shown that the generally good opinion that the
104
Chapter 4
individuals have about the role of the doctors in the treatment of illnesses was an 
important factor influencing their decision to adhere to the prescribed 
recommendations. In particular, involving patients in the decision making process 
and allowing them to ask questions were significant predictors of non-adherence to 
medication both in the Greek and the European sample. Other aspects of the doctor- 
patient relationship that predicted non-adherence were the belief that people can cure 
themselves without visiting a doctor and that people rely too much on doctors. 
Finally, treating patients as equals was negatively related to non-adherence.
Also, a significant predictor of non-adherence was the way people perceive the 
doctor’s role in prescribing. Non-adherence increased with the belief that when 
people are sure of the medicine they want the doctor should prescribe it, as well as 
with the disappointment of leaving the doctor’s clinic without a prescription.
Institutional factors were also significant predictors of non-adherence among the 
European sample. Being able to choose the doctor was a significant predictor of 
better adherence. On the other hand, results on the impact of socioeconomic 
variables on individuals’ decision to non-adhere were not consistent.
The findings support the opinion that, irrespective of the disease characteristics or 
the specific circumstances of a consultation, the doctor-patient relationship remains 
one of the key issues in the problem of non-adherence. They support further and 
even more strongly the need for better doctor-patient relationships as the basis of 
any intervention that intends to help patients follow recommendations. Key points 
that contribute to a good atmosphere and improve adherence were shown to be 
involvement in the decision making process and treating patients as equals.
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CHAPTER 5
NON-ADHERENCE AND DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP;
A PATIENT SURVEY
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 of the thesis examined how the general perceptions that individuals have 
regarding the doctor’s role in prescribing and treatment have an impact on their 
decision to adhere to prescribed medication. The findings revealed there is a strong 
association between what people think of doctors and their attitude towards 
medication. In Greece in particular, individuals seem to think highly of their doctors, 
and weight their opinion more than the rest of the Europeans do. These beliefs were 
the strongest determinants of individuals’ decision to follow prescribed medication 
both for the Greek and the European sample.
Having studied the issue of non-adherence within the broad country context, it 
remains to be examined whether similar beliefs and attitudes are observed within 
specific disease groups in Greece. This is the objective of Chapter 5, which focuses 
on a group of hypertensive patients in Greece. In particular, the aim is to examine 
how the way patients perceive the doctor’s communicative behaviour and role 
during the consultation has a direct effect on patients’ decision to adhere to 
medication (Figure 5.1).
Actual Patient outcomes
Communication
• Communicative • Adherence
behaviours
Figure 5.1: Association between actual communication and outcomes.
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Why hypertension?
Hypertension is a condition for which adherence is particularly important. Untreated 
hypertension can lead to serious complications, increasing the risk of cardiovascular 
diseases and stroke. Cessation of beta-blocker use was found to be a predictor of 
angina and myocardial infarction in hypertensive patients in the USA who had no 
prior history of coronary heart disease (Psaty, Koepsell et al. 1990). More recent 
evidence from the USA, based on reviews of clinical trials, warns of the risk 
untreated hypertension has on increasing cardiovascular events (Psaty, Weiss et al. 
2006).
Adherence to medication also affects the efficiency of hypertension treatment. A 
study examining the cost-effectiveness of arterial hypertension treatment by age, 
sex, arterial hypertension stage, type of drug used and level of treatment compliance 
concluded that improvement of treatment compliance yields the greatest gain both in 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the treatment (Mar and Rodriguez-Artalejo 2001).
Determinants o f non-adherence in hypertension
The main determinants of non-adherence in chronic conditions, discussed in the 
review of the literature in part 2.4.2 of the thesis, i.e. socio-economic and 
demographic factors, condition related factors, regimen related factors, patients’ 
beliefs and doctor-patient communication, have also been found to be associated 
with non-adherence in antihypertensive medication.
More specifically, the asymptomatic nature of the disease is an important 
characteristic of hypertension that has been argued to be a significant factor 
contributing to poor adherence (WHO 2003). Symptoms, such as pain, often work as 
warning signs for patients, forcing them to take their medication, yet this is not the 
case in hypertension.
Regimen related factors have also been reported as determinants of non-adherence 
due to the complexity of drugs for hypertension. A study among hypertensive 
patients in a Medicare population in the USA showed that patients adhere better to
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simple treatment regimens than complex ones (Fung, Huang et al. 2007). Another 
study in the UK showed that patients have reservations about antihypertensive drugs 
including preference for an alternative to drugs, doubts about their necessity and 
possible long-term or hidden risks (Benson and Britten 2003). All these reservations 
were shown to be associated with non-adherence to medication.
In terms of demographic and socio-economic factors evidence is less clear as it is for 
the majority of the conditions explored in the literature review of this thesis.
Evidence has clearly shown that the actual communication between the doctor and 
the patient and the way this is perceived by the patient has an impact on the latter’s 
decision to adhere to antihypertensive medication in a study in the USA (Clark 
1991). Positive experience with doctors, including advice given and issues of trust 
were identified as reasons for patients to take antihypertensive drugs in a study by 
Benson and Britten in the UK (2002).
Research questions
This is, to our knowledge, one of the first attempts to examine the problem of non­
adherence within a specific group of patients in Greece, a country where no previous 
systematic empirical evidence exists.
The hypothesis addressed here is:
H2: The patient perceptions of the doctor’s role, above all else, have an 
impact on their decision to adhere to medication.
The specific research questions that will be used to examine this hypothesis are:
- Q4: What do Greek patients with hypertension think of their doctors and
how does this affect their attitudes towards medicines?
- Q5: Which information channels do patients use and how do these channels
influence patients’ behaviour towards medicines? What is the importance of 
doctors in supplying information?
- Q6: What other factors may affect non-adherence? Is it beliefs towards the
disease and the treatment or the disease and treatment characteristics 
themselves that influence non-adherence?
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To address the above questions, a questionnaire survey among patients in Greece 
was designed, supervised and analysed. The survey took place in the Centre for the 
Treatment of Hypertension in the Hippocration General Hospital of Athens.
The rest of this chapter is organised in the following way. First, the methodology of 
the survey is described in detail in Section 5.2, explaining the sampling procedures, 
interview techniques, the design of the questionnaire as well as its evaluation. Then, 
the results of the analysis are presented in Section 5.3, starting with an evaluation of 
the scale used and the response rates, followed by a description of the variables. The 
chapter then presents the determinants of non-adherence among the group of 
hypertensive patients in Greece. Section 5.4 discusses the limitations of the study, 
while Section 5.5 is a general discussion of the findings with respect to the research 
questions. Some policy recommendations are also suggested here. Finally, Section
5.6 concludes.
5.2 Methodology
This section presents the methodology of the study, explaining the rationale for the 
choice of the sample under study, the research design and the development of the 
questionnaire used to address the research questions.
5.2.1 Sampling Procedures
It is considered essential to discuss the general methodological difficulties of 
research in Greece, before explaining the specific methods used for the present 
study. The lack of organised data is one of the main drawbacks in conducting 
research in Greece and makes secondary analysis a difficult task.
However, primary data collection is not easy either. As mentioned in the brief 
description of the Greek health system above (see Section 2.5) there is a lack of 
organised primary health care and a plethora of specialised doctors. Greeks are not 
enrolled in lists, there is no system of referral and no integration between primary 
and secondary care in the Greek health system. This is reflected in the way patients 
choose who to visit for diagnosis and treatment. For example, an individual with
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hypertension can consult a family doctor, a cardiologist, a hospital doctor (public or 
private) but can also visit a centre that specialises in the treatment of the condition.
Hence, getting a representative sample of patients with hypertension in Greece is not 
possible from existing overall lists. It was therefore decided that a more appropriate 
way of defining a homogeneous sample would be to conduct the study in a centre 
that specialises in the treatment of hypertension. Despite its limitations, choosing the 
sample from a specialised centre has its own advantages. It made the data collection 
more convenient and results can be interpreted within a specific context and setting.
The survey took place in the Centre for the Treatment of Hypertension in 
Hippocration General Hospital of Athens. The Centre remains one of the country’s 
biggest and most well known centres for the prevention and treatment of 
hypertension. More than 3,500 patients visit the centre regularly. The beginning of 
the contacts with the doctors coincided with the end of a clearing up period of the 
data, which was conducted by the Centre in order to make sure that all the patients 
on the list were regularly visiting the Centre, had not changed doctor and had not 
passed away. The contact details of all the patients on the list were also checked. 
This resulted in an up-to-date database, turning it into an even more valuable source 
of information.
Given the availability of the patients’ contact details it was decided that the 
interviews could be conducted by phone. For that purpose the survey company 
RASS, based in Piraeus, was recruited to conduct the telephone interviews. The 
company would contact all persons on the list.
5.2.2 Sample size
Seven hundred and forty-three individuals finally completed the interview. The 
sample size is sufficiently high for our investigation, having a power of 95% at the 
0.05 significance level and a sampling error of less than 3.5%.
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5.2.3 Interviewing Techniques
The choice of telephone interviewing technique was primarily opted for as the most 
efficient, given that the Centre for the Treatment of Hypertension in Hippocration 
keeps records of the patients’ phone numbers. However, telephone interviews have 
more benefits, as well as weaknesses that are discussed below.
Strengths o f telephone interviews
Generally, phone surveys get quite high response rates and interviews can be taken 
quickly and with little expense (Weisberg and Bowen 1977).
In the context of the specific study, there are more benefits. The selection of patients 
from the medical records makes possible the generalization for patients not 
episodes, as would have been the case if the survey were conducted in the outpatient 
clinic while the patients are waiting to see the doctor.
The telephone survey also solves an important methodological issue regarding the 
estimation of adherence rates. The desire to please the health care provider or 
researcher may encourage patients to exaggerate reports of medication adherence. 
The setting where assessment occurs as well as the relationship to the interviewer 
may also influence the extent that this social desirability effect occurs (Stone, 
Turkkan et al. 2000). In the case of the telephone interviews patients are less likely 
to associate the survey with their treatment and their doctor and therefore it is less 
probable that they report biased adherence rates in order to please their physician.
Evidence also shows that patients tend to adhere better the closer they are to visiting 
their doctors and therefore surveys conducted in a clinic setting just before or after a 
consultation report higher adherence rates (Dunbar-Jacob and Schlenk 2001). This 
obstacle can also be overcome with the telephone interview when patients are 
interviewed at a random moment of their everyday life.
Finally, in the busy context of a hospital setting patients are probably willing to 
dedicate less time to completing a questionnaire. A contact by telephone gives the
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patient the chance to choose a different and more convenient time or day for the 
interview to take place and this reduces the non-response rate.
Weaknesses o f telephone interviews
Telephone interviews are not without problems. The style of the interviewers is 
quite important as it may lead to biased answers. Therefore, the design of the survey 
must be done in such a way that the interviewers’ different styles do not influence 
the patients’ responses. The present study, however, was conducted by interviewers 
who were experienced in telephone surveys; they were trained prior to the 
commencement of the survey, and were supervised throughout the interviews.
Instructions to interviewers
The interviewers were given specific instructions on how to introduce themselves to 
the interviewees. They began by informing the interviewee they were calling from 
the opinion research company RASS, which was conducting a survey on 
hypertension for academic purposes. The interviewers explained that the aim of the 
survey was to examine people’s views and opinions regarding hypertension. 
Emphasis was put on reassuring the interviewees that all answers would be treated 
anonymously and that their doctors would not have access to the data. They then 
kindly asked the person whether s/he would like to participate in the survey.
The interviewers did not refer to the Hippocration Hospital in an effort to avoid 
association of the survey with their doctors and treatment, which may bias 
respondents’ answers. However, they were instructed to give this information if the 
individuals asked for it.
5.2.4 Questionnaire Design
This stage includes the process of translating the broad objectives of the survey into 
questions that can obtain the required information. The questionnaire was designed 
to cover all fundamental aspects of our inquiry. It satisfies all tested criteria for a
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well designed set of questions that will allow a thorough investigation of the issues 
that concern us.
The main purpose of the thesis is to investigate how the perceptions patients have 
about the doctor-patient relationship affect their decision to adhere. However, this 
cannot be isolated from other influences which also need to be examined. These 
include demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, clinical factors, beliefs 
regarding medication and the condition. We are also interested in examining the 
information sources patients use and their impact on adherence.
The order of the questioning was also considered crucial to avoid a number of 
potential biases. However, it is not indicative of the importance we give to each 
section. For example, the adherence measurement items were left towards the end of 
the questionnaire so that patients would not think of the survey as one that was 
investigating their behaviours but as one that was looking for their views. To avoid 
another bias, that of association of the survey with the physicians, patients were not 
asked to give their opinion on doctors at the beginning of the survey, but rather in 
the middle of the interview. Finally, the risk questions were asked after the 
measurement of non-adherence to avoid bias caused by the fact that when people are 
aware of the implications of untreated hypertension they tend to report better 
adherence rates. Socio-demographic characteristics were left to the end of the 
interview.
Following the above, the order of the questions followed was:
■ Clinical characteristics (Q1.01-Q1.03).
■ Information about medication and hypertension (Q2.01 -Q2.04).
■ Perceptions about the specific drugs used (Q3.01a-Q3.05b).
■ Relationship with the doctor (Q4.01 -Q4.17).
■ Measurement of adherence (Q5.01-Q5.04).
■ Perception of risk (Q6.01 -Q6.02).
■ Socio-demographic characteristics (Q7.01-Q7.06).
Apart from the information collected with the questionnaire, additional information 
was taken from the medical records of the Centre for Hypertension, mainly 
regarding medical characteristics of the patients. This information was taken into
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consideration for the development of the questionnaire and data that could be 
extracted from the medical records was not repeated in the interview unless 
necessary. For this reason, in the following description of the questions it is 
considered essential to explain what kind of information was gathered from the 
medical records and what was left to be collected from the questionnaire.
Clinical factors
This section examines whether clinical characteristics of the individual are 
associated with non-adherence to medication. Information taken from the medical 
records includes:
■ Information on hypertension. Information includes time since the patient has 
been diagnosed with hypertension. The variable is continuous and measured in 
years.
■ Clinical records on other conditions. Information was given on whether the 
patient suffers from other illnesses including dislepidemia, coronary heart 
disease, diabetes and whether they have suffered a stroke or heart failure. All the 
variables are binary (0=no, l=yes).
The questionnaire, given in Appendix B, asks the individuals to self-report their 
health status, using two items taken from the European Social Survey (Q1.01- 
Q1.02); subjective general health and disability. The question on health status asks 
individuals whether they would say their health in general is very good, good, fair, 
bad or very bad. The answers were merged into three: good, fair and bad.
The question on disability asks respondents if they are hampered in their daily 
activities in any way by any longstanding illness, or disability, infirmity or mental 
health problem and if yes, to what extent. Answers include: no, yes and yes to some 
extent and were merged into: yes (including ‘yes, to some extent’) and no.
A question on smoking habits is taken from the European Community Household 
Panel Survey (Q1.03). Individuals are asked whether they smoke or if they ever did. 
Answers include: smoke daily, smoke occasionally, do not smoke, used to smoke 
daily and never smoked. Answers are merged into three groups: never smoked,
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smoke (daily or occasionally) and do not smoke (used to smoke daily or 
occasionally).
Information
Literature on the topic of non-adherence aims to explore people’s knowledge on 
illnesses and medication but it pays little attention to the information channels which 
affect patients’ decisions. This study focuses on the information patients get both 
regarding their condition (Q2.01) and their medication (Q2.02). Eight different 
options are given: Family/friends, doctor, pharmacist, nurse, other patient with 
hypertension, the Media (TV, Radio, and Newspaper), Internet and Magazines on 
health issues and nutrition. The questions are open-ended and the patient could 
report any other sources of information they use.
Finally, individuals are asked to comment on how well informed they consider 
themselves regarding hypertension (Q2.04) and the medication they are using to 
treat it (Q2.05).
Beliefs and Personal experience
A number of beliefs about medication have been identified in the literature as 
common among patients with chronic illnesses (Home and Weinman 1999). Some 
research supports the idea that patients’ beliefs may derive from considerations 
unrelated to the drug’s pharmacology (Benson and Britten 2002). Therefore, it is of 
interest to explore whether it is the beliefs about medication rather than the actual 
experience with them that affect patients’ decision to take medication or not. To 
explore this issue the following method is used.
A number of factors that have been shown to be associated with use of medication 
are identified: efficacy of medication, control, side effects (Berman, Epstein et al. 
1997; Newton, LaCroix et al. 1997; Grant, Devita et al. 2003) and dependence and 
addiction (Boulet 1998). Patients are first asked to express what they believe about 
medication (e.g. “Medication for blood pressure has many side effects for those who 
use it”) and then whether they have personally experienced it (e.g. “I have
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personally experienced side effects due to the use of the prescribed medication for 
blood pressure”).
Questions Q3.01a-Q3.05a on beliefs ask patients to indicate how strongly they agree 
or disagree with the following statements:
■ High blood pressure can be treated without medication.
■ People who use medication regulate their blood pressure.
■ Medication for blood pressure has many side effects for those who use it.
■ People who take blood pressure medication become addicted to it due to its 
long-term use.
■ People with high blood pressure are dependent on their medication for life.
Answers to each of the above questions are scaled on a 5-point scale ranging from
“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” and were merged into two groups (agree, 
disagree) for the purpose of the analysis.
The second cluster referring to personal experience Q3.01b-Q3.05b asks patients to 
indicate whether the following statements apply to them:
■ In the past, I have been successful in treating my blood pressure without the 
use of medication.
■ I have regulated my blood pressure thanks to the medication I have been 
taking.
■ I have personally experienced side effects due to the use of the prescribed 
medication.
■ I feel I have become addicted to my medication for blood pressure as a result of 
long-term use.
■ I will always be dependent on my medication for blood pressure.
Answers to each of the above questions are binary (0=no, this does not apply to me, 
l=yes, this applies to me).
Doctor-patient relationship
This section of the questionnaire focuses on the main purpose of this chapter, which 
is how patients view the doctor-patient relationship. This remains a topic of great
116
Chapter 5
interest in the literature of non-adherence and has been shown to be associated with 
patients’ decision on whether to take medication (Britten and Ukoumunne 1997; 
Britten, Stevenson et al. 2000; Jenkins, Britten et al. 2003). The present study 
examines patients’ views of the doctor and two groups of questions were used for 
this purpose. The first group (Q4.01-Q4.10) is adopted from the ESS and aimed at 
getting an understanding of the way patients think about doctors in general, looking 
at issues of trust, communication and reliability.
Questions ask individuals to show their agreement with the following statements:
■ Most illnesses cure themselves without having to visit a doctor.
■ People rely too much on their doctors rather than themselves to keep healthy.
■ When people are sure about what medicine they need, their doctor should just 
prescribe it for them.
■ It’s best to follow doctors’ orders.
■ I generally feel a bit disappointed when I leave a doctor’s surgery without a
prescription.
Answers to each statement above include: agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor 
disagree, disagree and disagree strongly, and for the analysis are merged into two 
categories: agree (including those who agree or agree strongly) and not agree 
(including those who disagree, disagree strongly and neither agree nor disagree).
Another group of questions asks respondents to indicate how often they think the 
following applies to doctors in general.
■ Doctors keep the whole truth from their patients.
■ Before doctors decide on a treatment, they discuss it with their patient.
■ Patients are reluctant to ask their doctors all they would like to ask.
■ Doctors are willing to admit their mistakes to their patients.
■ Doctors use words or phrases that their patients find difficult to understand.
Responses to each statement above include: never or almost never, some of the time, 
half of the time, most of the time, always or almost always. Answers to the above 
question are merged into two categories: yes, the statement applies to doctors 
(including never or almost never and some of the time) and no, it does not (including 
all the other categories).
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A factor analysis was conducted to identify whether it is possible to reduce the 
number of the above variables on doctor-patient relationship. The analysis did not 
confirm this was possible (see Appendix B1.1-B1.2) and therefore, all variables 
were included in the regression model.
The theoretical elements behind the questions are not always stated clearly in the 
ESS. However, it seems that the questions are mainly testing elements of trust 
(“doctors keep the whole truth”), paternalism and shared-decision making (“before 
doctors decide on a treatment, they discuss”). The last two questions look at doctors’ 
sincerity and their ability to communicate effectively using simple words and 
phrases.
The purpose for adoption of questions from the ESS is twofold. First, it serves to 
examine whether beliefs about doctors affect patients’ decision to follow 
recommendations. But also it allows for a comparative discussion to be done first 
within the country context and then on the specific patient group. Although the ESS 
and the study on hypertensive patients are two different surveys in terms of 
population under study, methods and context, it is interesting to identify similarities 
and/or differences between the views of the general population and those of the 
specific group of Greek patients regarding the same issues. Some of these 
comparisons are discussed at the end of this part, while most in depth comparisons 
are left for the final discussion chapter of the thesis.
The second group of questions (Q4.ll-Q4.17) explores the patient’s feelings 
regarding the last consultation and her/his satisfaction with it. The literature has 
identified a number of problematic aspects of the consultation that may be 
associated with non-adherence to medication, such as issues of time (Brown 2004), 
discussion about medication and illness (Lin, Von Korff et al. 1995), explanation on 
medication and illness (Bond and Bywaters 1999) and overall satisfaction with the 
consultation (Bultman and Svarstad 2000). The questions ask patients whether the 
following statements apply to them:
■ The doctor did not have much time for me.
■ I discussed everything regarding my condition with the doctor.
■ I discussed everything regarding the prescribed medication with the doctor.
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■ The doctor explained to me everything I needed to know about blood pressure.
■ The doctor explained to me everything I needed to know about the prescribed 
medication.
■ The doctor explained the medication’s side effects and how to deal with them.
■ I was generally satisfied with the outcome of the visit.
Some respondents (known as “yea sayers”) tend to agree with statements rather than 
disagree. For this reason it is suggested that the items should not be presented in a 
way that strongly agree always links to the same broad attitude (Boynton and 
Greenhalgh 2004). Following this suggestion, in an attempt to reduce bias from the 
“yea sayers”, some questions are presented in a positive way, i.e. “I was overall 
satisfied with the outcome of the consultation”, while others are phrased in a 
negative, such as “The doctor did not have much time to dedicate to me”.
Measurement o f non-adherence (Q5.01-Q5.04)
As discussed in the literature review chapter there are various adherence 
measurement procedures, but no “gold-standard”. Two main factors were considered 
at this point: a) the nature of the present study, i.e. telephone interviews and b) the 
lack of other available methods for measuring non-adherence, such as electronic 
monitoring, prescription refills and biological indicators (see Chapter 2.4.1 for more 
details on the measurement of non-adherence). Therefore, the self-report method 
was chosen as the most appropriate measurement procedure for non-adherence.
Questioning of patients is widely used as a method of measuring adherence, but the 
selection of the questions varies from study to study, depending on the illness, 
medication and the setting of the study (Vitolins, Rand et al. 2000). Regardless of 
the scale chosen, the questions should be asked in an indirect and, most importantly, 
in a non-judgemental way. No self-report method approaches perfection so, as a 
result, the selection of questions was based on a careful review of the literature and 
the items chosen have been tested in previous studies for their validity and reliability 
and are simple and comprehensible.
The Morisky scale (1986) was chosen as the most appropriate way of measuring 
non-adherence in our study. The scale is composed of 4 yes/no questions regarding
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use of medication and it is therefore a simple and quick adherence screening tool. 
The questions ask individuals a) whether they ever forget to take their medicine, b) 
if they are careless at times about taking medicine, c) whether, when they feel better 
they sometimes forget to take their medicine and d) if sometimes, when they feel 
worse when they take medicine, they stop taking it. The Morisky score is calculated 
by assigning one point for each positive answer, thus it ranges between 0 and 4. The 
scale has been widely used in previous empirical studies to measure medication 
adherence both in hypertension and other chronic illnesses (Gascon et al, Fairley et 
al, Afonso et al, George et al, Krapek et al, Roth et al.).
Morisky et al. (1986) in their paper defined a score of 3 or 4 as “low on the 
medication behaviour scale”, indicating therefore high likelihood of non-adherence. 
A similar cutting off point of the scale has been used in a number of studies. 
However, other researchers have been more strict and define as adherent patients 
only those who have answered ‘no’ to all four questions (Gascon, Sanchez-Ortuno et 
al. 2004; Roth and Ivey 2005; George, Munro et al. 2006).
On the other hand, Shalansky et al. (2004), however, suggest that the threshold score 
may differ from study to study, depending on the rate of non-adherence. When non­
adherence rates are low it may make sense to use a Morisky score threshold of 1 .^ In 
that case, and given that it is difficult to follow patients with other methods, such as 
prescription refills, it might be acceptable to ‘miss’ a proportion of non-adherent 
patients (i.e. low sensitivity) in an effort to quickly identify some patients who 
would most likely be non-adherent. However, in a cohort where adherence is low, 
results from the Erickson et al study (2001) suggest that the Morisky score of ^  
may be a valuable tool for identifying non-adherent patients. It was therefore 
decided that the threshold score should be defined after the completion of the data 
collection. This is discussed in Section 5.3.3 below, where a simple description of 
the Morisky score indicates the threshold to be used.
The use of the Morisky scale has been criticised for low internal consistency as this 
is measured by Cronbach’s alpha (Shalansky, Levy et al. 2004). However, 
Cronbach’s alpha is a coefficient which depends on the number of items on the scale 
(Bland and Altman 1997). This means that the more questions used to measure a
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behaviour the higher the coefficient. However, increasing the number of questions 
makes the questionnaire more complicated to answer and requires more time to be 
completed. For this thesis two main factors were considered at this point: the nature 
of the disease under study and the use of telephone interviews for the data collection. 
Given that hypertensive patients are usually older people and that interviews should 
be as short as possible it was suggested that keeping the scale simple should be the 
main criterion for selection.
Additionally, particular attention is paid in order to avoid obstacles that may affect 
the accuracy of the method. Some of these obstacles are discussed here. The 
interviewer’s skill has been claimed to be a factor that affects the accuracy and 
validity of self-reporting methods (Farmer 1999). The present study aims to 
overcome this barrier given that independent interviewers, who were not related to 
the development of the questionnaire and therefore cannot lead the discussion, 
conducted the interviews. The wording of questions about patients’ behaviour can 
also affect their responses; negative questions that seem to blame the patient will 
give biased answers (Ross 1991). To avoid bias an introductory phrase was used 
before the Morisky scale presenting non-adherence not as a behaviour that is 
socially undesirable but, on the contrary, as something other people may do.
However, despite its various limitations, it has been suggested that the Morisky scale 
is useful in specific situations. Shalansky et al. (2004), after pointing out the 
limitations of the scale, conclude that the use of the Morisky scale is reasonable in 
some settings, that is, in studies where “there are too many patients to follow in 
detail with the available pharmacy records” (Shalansky, Levy et al. 2004).
The Morisky scale has been developed in the English language and has been tested 
for psychometric properties and concurrent and predictive validity (Morisky, Green 
et al. 1986). However, the scale also needs to be psychometrically validated in the 
Greek survey by testing its reliability and validity.
Reliability concerns the extent to which an experiment, test, or any measuring 
procedure yields the same results on repeated trials (Carmines and Zeller 1979) and 
it is examined in this study both in terms of internal consistency and test-retest 
reliability. Internal reliability implies that the different items of the index measure
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different aspects of the same attribute. It is tested through a number of coefficients 
including Cronbach’s Alpha and inter-item correlation coefficient for the different 
scale items. The reliability of the scale in the original Morisky et al. (1986) study 
was “reflected in its relatively high (Cronbach’s Alpha=0.61) measure of internal 
consistency”. The same index, Cronbach’s Alpha, is used to calculate the internal 
reliability of the scale in the present study.
Test-retest reliability measures the degree of agreement between two measurements 
taken at two different points in time. To calculate the adequate statistic, i.e. kappa 
coefficient, a sub-sample of the participants (approximately 15%) was contacted 
randomly and asked whether they would like to participate again in the survey. They 
were reassured that this time the interview would be much shorter consisting of only 
4 questions. This retest interview was conducted 3 weeks after the original one.
The concept of validity refers to the best available approximation to the truth of a 
given inference, proposition or conclusion (Cook and Campbell 1979). Its estimation 
is less straightforward than the estimation of reliability. Face and content validity 
assessment was carried out in discussion with experts and in a pilot study. This 
included both academics working on the field but also the doctors working in the 
Centre.
Ideally, criterion validity should compare the self-reported measure with a “gold- 
standard” measure. However, as has been mentioned in previous chapter, there is no 
“gold standard” in the measurement of non-adherence and therefore construct 
validity is used as a validation process. In the original study by Morisky the scale 
demonstrated concurrent validity with blood pressure control at baseline but also 
with blood pressure control 6 and 42 months afterwards (Morisky, Green et al. 
1986).
Risk factors
The aim of this group of questions is twofold. First, it aims at exploring the patients’ 
knowledge of hypertension as a factor that increases risk for developing other 
diseases. It also explores patients’ knowledge of the importance of systolic and 
diastolic blood pressure. It then looks at the extent to which this knowledge may be
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influenced by the different information channels. The second aim is to explore 
whether patients who are aware of the risk implication of hypertension are adhering 
more to the prescribed medication.
Patients were asked (Q6.01) whether they agree with the statement that untreated 
hypertension can lead to a) stroke, b) heart attack, c) heart failure, and d) kidney 
failure. Evidence shows that patients are highly aware that hypertension increases 
the risk of developing stroke and heart attack, but they are less aware of that it 
increases the risk of heart failure and kidney disease (Alexander, Gordon et al. 
2003).
Patients are also asked to report (Q6.02) which of the two types of hypertension, 
systolic or diastolic, is more important for the development of other diseases. 
Evidence suggests that the systolic blood pressure is a more important risk factor for 
the development of other diseases (Basile 2002) and guidelines in the USA highlight 
its importance (Izzo, Levy et al. 2000).
Socio-economic and demographic characteristics
This section aims at forming a general idea of the patient’s profile and to examine 
whether demographic factors influence non-adherence. The literature review 
conducted in the previous chapter showed that evidence on the impact of socio­
demographic factors on non-adherence is controversial and varies from study to 
study (see Section 2.4.2 for more details).
For the present study the following characteristics of the patients are collected with 
the questionnaire:
■ Year of birth. The age is then calculated using 2006 as the base year. Age is 
used as a continuous variable (i.e. measured in years) for the analysis. 
However, as was shown in Section 2.2.2, the impact of age is complex with 
some studies showing positive association with non-adherence while others 
negative. One hypothesis is that the effect of age on non-adherence may be 
negative up to a point, while after this point the effect is positive due to 
memory loss or other behavioural effects. This hypothesis was tested in
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Chapter 4, but failed to be confirmed. It is again examined in this chapter, by 
taking into account a quadratic specification of age.
■ Education. We chose the scale suggested by RASS, the company that 
conducted the survey, because it is simple and it avoids possible 
misunderstandings due to the changes in the Greek educational system some 
decades ago. For the purpose of the analysis, the scale is rescheduled in the 
following way:
• Primary education (including answer a of the questionnaire).
• Secondary education (including answers b-d of the questionnaire).
• Tertiary education (including answers e-g).
■ Income. Income question is adopted from the ESS (Q1.04) and it is used as a 
proxy of income as it is based on what the individual believes about the 
household’s income.
■ Marital status, as used by RASS in similar Greek surveys. The question is 
rescaled into a binary variable (0= not married, l=married).
■ Living alone (1) or not (0).
■ Having children (1) or nor (0).
5.2.5 Cross-cultural adaptation
In order to be used in a Greek survey, the questionnaire needs to undergo cross- 
cultural adaptation procedures and linguistic validation. The methodology used in 
order to obtain semantic, idiomatic, experiential and conceptual equivalence in 
translation of the questionnaire was mainly based on the recommendations and 
guidelines of Acquardo and colleagues (2004) and Guillemin, Bombardier et al. 
(1993). It includes the following steps:
Step 1: Review and conceptual definition
The first stage aims at clarifying the concepts investigated by each item of the 
original instrument and to make sure they are reflected appropriately in the target 
language.
Step 2: Forward translation
The questionnaire was independently translated into Greek by the present author and 
another native speaker, who lived in Greece and was fluent in English. The second
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translator had been briefed thoroughly about the purpose of the study. Both 
translators produced a forward translation of the original English questionnaire into 
Greek without consulting each other. Then, the two translators met and agreed after 
discussions on the parts that were of ambiguous interpretations.
There was only one exception in the above translation process. The items adapted by 
the ESS were already translated into Greek for the purpose of the survey and 
therefore it was decided that this Greek version would be used for collection of data 
in the present study.
Step 3: Backward translation
A third translator was then recruited to backward translate the Greek questionnaire 
into English. The translator’s first language was English, she was fluent in Greek 
and lived in Greece. The translator worked independently. The present author then 
reviewed the backward translation and, in collaboration with the translator, 
discussed possible discrepancies.
Step 4: Pilot testing and approval o f the target version
This stage included two procedures, clinicians’ and academics’ review and cognitive 
debriefing. Clinician’s review aims at getting input from medical experts as to the 
domain-specific terminology. In particular the Director of the Centre suggested that 
the term ‘high blood pressure’ should be used instead of ‘hypertension’ as this is the 
term mainly used by doctors during consultation.1 The questionnaire was also 
reviewed by Professor Nicky Britten, an expert on the topic of the doctor-patient 
relationship, who gave useful feedback. More specifically, she offered helpful 
suggestions on distinguishing between ‘addiction’ and ‘dependence’. Finally, Dr 
George Tsakos also provided valuable comments on issues of the reliability and 
validity of the questionnaire.
The cognitive debriefing included interviews with patients to test the clarity and 
appropriateness of the questionnaire. It is essential to check that the questionnaire 
works in the study group and identify administrative and analytical problems 
(Boynton 2004). During the pilot phase, the researcher took notes on how long
1 From personal contact with Dr. Konstantinos Tsioufis, Head o f  the Centre for Hypertension at 
Hippocration Hospital in Athens, 20th January 2006.
2 Personal contact with Professor Nicky Britten, 15th February 2006.
3 Personal contact with Dr George Tsakos, 16th March 2006.
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people take to complete it, whether any questions need to be repeated or explained 
and whether the respondents show confusion or surprise at a particular question.
Twenty patients participated in the pilot phase. Their answers are not included in the 
final analysis as the questionnaire changed after the pilot survey.
Step 5: Proofreadin2
To avoid typing and grammatical mistakes the questionnaire was proofread at this 
stage, leading to the final version.
5.2.6 Fieldwork period and ethical approval
The interviews were conducted between the 11th and 12th of April 2006. The study
tHwas approved by Hippocratio’s Hospital Research Ethics Board on the 30 of March 
2006 (protocol number 7173).
5.2.7 Statistical specifications
The nature of the dependent variable determined the type of the statistical analysis 
used. Given that the Morisky scale measuring non-adherence to medication was 
merged into a dichotomous variable a probit model was used to identify 
determinants of patients’ decision.
The age and sex composition of the sample was different from the composition of 
the population, i.e. the sample had more women than men and age was above the 
average. Thus, at the beginning of the analysis we weighted the sample using post­
stratification weights for age and sex, on the basis of the overall list of the Centre.
Stata edition 9.2 was the statistical package used for the analysis.
5.3 Results
This section presents the main results of the analysis of the Greek survey. It starts 
with a discussion on the statistical and psychometric characteristics of the study. It 
continues with a general description of the sample and presents the patients’ clinical 
characteristics as well as responses on information channels. The next section
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presents the factors associated with non-adherence to prescribed medication among 
Greeks.
5.3.1 Response Rate
The opinion research company RASS contacted all members of the list of 
individuals enrolled in the Clinic for the Treatment of Hypertension in Hippocration 
General Hospital. There were up to four attempts to contact each person in the list, 
while an appointment was arranged with those who were willing to participate but 
for whom the time of the first contact was not convenient.
Seven hundred and forty-three individuals completed the interview, 318 refused to 
participate, 337 were not eligible and the rest did not pick up the phone after the 
fourth effort to contact them. We report here the Response Rate RR5 defined by the 
American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) as the number of 
completed interviews divided by the number of completed and refused ones 
(AAPOR 2006). The response rate is 68.8% and is considered sufficiently high for 
our investigation.
5.3.2 Reliability
The reliability of the Morisky scale is measured in the present study both in terms of 
internal consistency and test-retest reliability. Internal reliability is tested here 
through the Cronbach’s Alpha and inter-item correlation coefficient for the different 
scale items.
Table 5.1: Internal reliability -  Cronbach’s alpha
Item Sign
Item-test
correlation
Item-rest
correlation
Average inter­
item 
covariance Alpha
Forget + 0 .7024 0 .3687 0 .0352 0 .4559
Careless + 0 .757 0 .469 0 .0259 0 .3586
stop w hen better + 0.5808 0.3061 0.0491 0 .5096
stop w hen w orse + 0 .5629 0 .2252 0 .0540 0 .5697
Test scale 0.0411 0 .5539
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The reliability of the scale is lower than the original Morisky study, where 
Cronbach’s Alpha was 0.61 (Morisky, Green et al. 1986), yet not much lower. Also, 
the “careless” item has a lower alpha than the previous “forget” item.
Test-retest reliability measures the degree of agreement between two measurements 
taken at two different points in time. This retest interview was conducted 3 weeks 
after the original interview and the kappa coefficient was calculated. Kappa was
0.71, indicating a good strength of agreement (Altman 1991).
5.3.3 Descriptive analysis
Demographic and socio-economic characteristics o f the sample
The average age of the sample was 61 years and 41% of the respondents were men. 
The majority of the respondents was married (81%), had children (88%) and did not 
live alone (76%). Almost half of the respondents felt they could cope with the 
present household income. A proportion of 25% stated they live comfortably while 
another 25% felt it was difficult or very difficult for them to cope on present 
household income.
Table 5.2: Description of variables
Demographic and socioeconomic factors Mean
Stand.
Error
age (years) 61 .5835 0 .4 4 4 6
sex (0=fem ale l= m a le) 0 .4170 0 .0191
married (0=not married 1 =married) 0.8161 0 .0 1 4 9
education (0=prim ary education) 0.2571 0 .0 1 6 9
secondary 0 .4185 0.0191
tertiary 0 .3244 0.0181
feelin g  about h ousehold ’s incom e
(0= liv in g  com fortably) 0.2481 0 .0 1 6 7
cop in g  on present incom e 0 .4649 0 .0193
difficult on present incom e 0 .1928 0 .0153
very d ifficult on present incom e 0 .0942 0 .0113
children (0=n o l= y e s ) 0 .8894 0.0121
alone (0= liv in g  w ith  others 
l= liv in g  alone)
0 .2436 0 .0 1 6 6
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A proportion of 22% of the respondents had received primary education. The 
majority of the participants (42%) had finished secondary education (including those 
having finished Junior High School, High School or Technical School), while 28% 
held a University degree.
Clinical characteristics
On average, the patients had been diagnosed with hypertension for 7.8 years and 
were on medication for 5.2 years. About 39% of the respondents had been diagnosed 
with dyslipidemia, 5% had a coronary heart disease, 17% had diabetes and 4% had 
suffered a stroke.
The majority of the respondents (57%) rated their general health status as very good, 
or good. One third of the participants considered their health fair and only 8% said it 
was bad or very bad. Also, one out of three respondents felt hampered in their daily 
life in some way by a long-standing illness, or disability, infirmity or mental health 
problem.
A relatively high percentage of the respondents (24%) reported they smoke on a 
daily basis or occasionally, while almost 31% said they had quitted smoking and 
45% reported they had never smoked.
Doctor-patient relationship
Beliefs on illnesses and the doctor-patient relationship were explored through a 
number of questions.
The first group of questions asked respondents to indicate how much they agree or 
disagree with a number of statements regarding illnesses, medicines and doctors. 
Table 5.4 indicates that the biggest proportion of the respondents seem to disagree 
with the statement that most illnesses like common cold can be cured without 
visiting a doctor. Only 14% of the respondents held this opinion while 76% did not. 
On the other hand, a large proportion of respondents (68%) believe that people rely 
too much on doctors in order to keep healthy. About half of the patients (45%) 
believe that when people are sure of the medicine they need doctors should just
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prescribe it, but only 12% feel disappointed when leaving the doctor’s surgery 
without a prescription. Finally, the vast majority supports the statement that people 
must follow doctors’ advice (98%).
Table 5.3: Beliefs about illnesses, medicines and doctors
Agree or strongly agree that...
.. .most illnesses cure themselves without going to doctor 14%
.. .people rely too much on doctor 68%
...when people are sure, doctor should prescribe 45%
.. .it’s best to follow a doctor’s advice 98%
... feel disappointed when leaving doctor without a 
prescription 12%
The second cluster of questions was used to assess respondents’ beliefs about 
doctors in general. Table 5.5 demonstrates that about one out of five respondents 
believes that the doctor keeps the whole truth from their patients. Also, 58% think 
that before patients decide on a treatment, they discuss it with their patient. A similar 
tendency is shown when almost 30% of the patients are reluctant to ask their doctors 
all the issues they would like to ask. Finally, only 12% think that doctors are willing 
to admit their mistakes to their patients and about 34% that they use words or phases 
that their patients find difficult to understand.
Table 5.4: Beliefs about doctors
Believe that always or most of the times...
.. .doctors keep the whole truth from patients 24%
.. .doctors discuss treatment before they decide 58%
.. .patients are reluctant to ask doctors questions 29%
.. .doctors are willing to admit mistakes 12%
.. .doctors use words patients find difficult to understand 34%
Last consultation
Figure 5.2 presents respondents’ statements regarding the last time they consulted 
their doctor specifically for hypertension. Overall, the vast majority (92%) showed
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general satisfaction with the consultation. They felt they had the opportunity to 
discuss with their doctor all they wanted to know regarding hypertension (85%), and 
generally they believed their doctor explained to them everything about their 
condition (83%). However, when asked similar questions about medication their 
responses were less positive. Fewer respondents felt they discussed with their doctor 
everything about the medication, (75% for medication compared to 84% for 
hypertension). What is more, an even lower percentage felt that the doctor explained 
enough about medication (69%) and even less satisfied with the explanation the 
doctor gave on side effects (32%). Finally, what seemed the biggest drawback of the 
consultation was the time the doctor spent with them, where only 28% felt that the 
doctor had spent enough time.
1 was overall satisfied with the consultation 
s/he explained everything about side effects 
s/he explained all about medication 
s/he explained all about hypertension 
I discussed all about medicines 
I discussed all about hypertension 
s/he had no time for me
m
77%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100
■  yes □  no
Figure 5.2: Last time I visited my doctor...
Information Channels
Participants were asked to indicate the sources they use to get information on 
hypertension and medication for hypertension (Table 5.5). The doctor was the 
dominant source of information both for hypertension and the medication taken to 
treat it. All other sources were mentioned very rarely. An interesting finding is that 
the Media and magazines on health issues and nutrition were the second most 
commonly reported source of information for hypertension, more than the family 
and the pharmacist. Finally, the Internet was stated as an information channel only
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by less than 3% regarding hypertension and by only 1.5% regarding medication. 
Overall, sources of information regarding medication were very limited in relation to 
the ones for hypertension.
Table 5.5: Use of the following sources to get information regarding...
...hypertension ...m edication
Family/friends 4.3% 0.5%
Doctor 97.3% 97.9%
Pharmacist 6.3% 5.4%
Nurse 1.1% 0.3%
Other patients with hypertension 2.4% 0.3%
Media (TV, Newspaper, Radio) 10.8% 1.7%
Internet 2.8% 1.5%
Magazine on health issues and nutrition 13.9% 2.5%
Other sources 1.8% 0.4%
Beliefs and personal experiences
Respondents were asked to comment on a number of statements regarding 
medication, first by reporting what they generally believe about it and then whether 
they have personally experienced it (Figure 5.3). A t-test was used to examine 
differences in means between what patients believe and what they actually 
experienced.
100% -  
90% -  
80% -  
70% -  
60% -  
50% -  
40%1 
30% -  
20% -  
10%J
0%J
treat without regulate with side effect addiction dependance
med med
□  belief I  experience
Figure 5.3: Beliefs and personal experience regarding medication.
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■ Treatment of high blood pressure without medication
The majority of the respondents disagreed with the statement that hypertension can 
be treated without medication, with approximately 27% believing that this is true. 
Similar responses were given when individuals were asked to report whether they 
had personally tried to treat their condition in the past without using medication; 
again 26% responded they have. The difference between the two means is not 
statistically significant (t=-0.3376 and p=0.6321).
■ Use of medication and control of blood pressure.
As in the previous statement, the vast majority of the respondents (91%) believe that 
people who take antihypertensive medication regulate their hypertension and 
similarly 90% state they feel they have regulated their blood pressure thanks to the 
medication. The difference between beliefs and experience of regulating 
hypertension is not statistically significant (t=0.5297 and p=0.2982).
■ Medication for high-blood pressure and side effects
Answers regarding the use of medication and side effects were significantly different 
(t= 13.6013 and p<0.001) when patients were asked for their beliefs and personal 
experience. Almost two out of three respondents believed that people who take 
medication for hypertension have side effects but only one out of three reported that 
they have actually experienced side effects.
■ Medication for hypertension and addiction due to long-term use.
Similar results were given regarding addiction to medication and personal 
experience and beliefs. Fifty nine percent believe that people generally become 
addicted to the medication for hypertension due to long-term use but only 34% 
reported that they actually felt addicted. This difference was statistically significant 
(t=  10.2640 and p<0.001).
■ Medication for hypertension and dependence on it for life.
The vast majority of the respondents (87%) believed that people who take 
antihypertensive medication are dependent on it for life. But again, only 73% stated
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that they personally feel dependent on their medication and this difference was 
statistically significant (t = 7.4967, p<0.001).
Risk factors
Patients were asked whether they agree with the statement that untreated 
hypertension can lead to a) stroke, b) heart attack, c) heart failure and d) kidney 
failure. Results confirm what the evidence has shown (Alexander, Gordon et al. 
2003); patients are highly aware that hypertension increases the risk of developing 
stroke (98%) and heart attack (89%), but they are less aware of the fact that it 
increases the risk of heart failure (82%) and kidney disease (67%) (Figure 5.4).
stroke heart attack heart failure kidney failure
Figure 5.4: Untreated hypertension can lead to...
Patients were also asked to report which of the two types of hypertension, systolic or 
diastolic, is more important for the development of other diseases. Although the 
literature shows that the systolic blood pressure is a more important risk factor 
(Basile 2002) and guidelines in the US highlight this (Izzo, Levy et al. 2000) the 
patients seemed not to be aware of this. Only 12% reported that systolic blood 
pressure was the most important risk factor, 41% reported diastolic pressure and
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44% said they were both equally serious. Again these findings are in agreement with 
what previous studies have shown (Alexander, Gordon et al. 2003).
Non-adherence to medication
Table 5.6 shows the frequency of the responses to the combined items of the scale. 
The answers are very close to the responses of the original Morisky et al. study 
(1986), where the proportions were 43%, 24%, 17%, 7%, and 9% respectively.
Table 5.6: Patient Responses to Morisky Scale
Patient Answered "yes" to: n % of valid
0 item s 312 48
1 item 165 25
2 item s 99 15
3 item s 59 9
4 item s 14 2
Total 649 100
Non-adherence rates were very low. As discussed in Section 2.3, Shalansky et al. 
(2004) argue that the threshold score for the Morisky scale may differ depending on 
the rate of non-adherence and in cases where they are low he suggests that a cutting 
off point of ^  may be used. This suggestion was followed and therefore the 
threshold of ^  was used. That means that as ‘non-adherent’ we denoted those 
respondents who had answered ‘yes’ to at least two of the questions of the scale. All 
other respondents were defined as ‘adherent’.
5.3.4 Determinants of non-adherence
In general, the results in the tables below show that perceptions concerning the 
doctor-patient relationship are the strongest predictors of non-adherence. 
Information was also shown to be an important determinant of patients’ decision to 
follow recommendations, especially knowledge regarding medication for 
hypertension. Also, the importance of experience with medication affects patients’ 
behaviour and so does the perception that untreated hypertension increases the risk 
of kidney failure. However, demographic and clinical characteristics did not
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significantly predict non-adherence. We now consider each group of determinants in 
more detail.
Doctor-patient relationship
The perceptions patients have about the role of their doctor were strong predictors of 
their decision to adhere. When controlling for sex, age, education and income, as 
well as health status, three of the statements regarding the doctor-patient relationship 
were significant predictors of non-adherence.
More specifically, patients who believed that it is best to follow the doctor’s advice 
were less likely to non-adhere. On the other hand, those who believe that doctors use 
words that are difficult to understand and keep the whole truth from them are more 
likely to non-adhere (Table 5.7). Given that difficulty to understand the doctor’s 
instructions may be associated with age and education we tested for the impact of 
these interaction effects. Indeed, believing that doctors use difficult language was 
associated with non-adherence to medication even when the interaction effect of this 
belief with age and education was considered (Appendix B2.1-B2.2). The 
association was even stronger when the interaction terms were included.
The findings show that trust in the doctor’s expertise as well as his/her ability to 
clearly communicate with the patient and tell the truth were the factors that mostly 
affect non-adherence to medication.
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Table 5.7: Impact of doctor-patient relationship on non-adherence
Coef.
Std.
Err. P>t 95% C.I.
Demosraphic and socioeconomic factors
sex (0=male l=female) -0.0665 0.1510 0.6600 -0.3633 0.2302
age (years) -0.0183 0.0060 0.0030 -0.0301 -0.006
education (0=primary education)
secondary -0.2004 0.1979 0.3120 -0.5893 0.1885
tertiary -0.0690 0.2182 0.7520 -0.4979 0.3598
feeling about household’s income (0=living 
comfortably)
coping on present income 0.0011 0.1829 0.9950 -0.3583 0.3604
difficult on present income 0.2925 0.2272 0.1990 -0.1540 0.7390
very difficult on present income 0.0428 0.2976 0.8860 -0.5420 0.6276
Health status
health (0=very good)
fair -0.0745 0.1867 0.6900 -0.4415 0.2924
bad -0.2009 0.2830 0.4780 -0.7570 0.3552
hampered in daily activity (0=no l=yes) 0.2533 0.1744 0.1470 -0.0895 0.5961
Doctor-patient relationship
believe illnesses cure themselves without 
visiting a doctor * 0.0378 0.2184 0.8630 -0.3915 0.4671
believe people rely too much on doctors * 0.0146 0.1571 0.9260 -0.2942 0.3234
believe when people sure o f medicine doctor 
should prescribe * -0.1663 0.1489 0.2650 -0.4588 0.1262
believe it’s best to follow doctor’s advice * -1.5491 0.4700 0.0010 -2.4727 -0.6255
feel disappointed when leaving without 
prescription * 0.0003 0.2394 0.9990 -0.4702 0.4708
believe doctors keep the whole truth ** 0.3244 0.1624 0.0460 0.0053 0.6436
believe doctors discuss treatment before they 
decide ** 0.0310 0.1514 0.8380 -0.2665 0.3285
believe patients are reluctant to ask 
questions ** 0.0968 0.1543 0.5310 -0.2063 0.3999
believe doctors admit their mistakes ** 0.0421 0.1983 0.8320 -0.3475 0.4317
believe doctors use words patients find 
difficult to understand ** 0.3008 0.1540 0.0510 -0.0017 0.6034
cons 1.8184 0.6445 0.0050 0.5518 3.0850
* 0=not agree, l=agree 
** 0=no & to some extent, l=yes
Also, during the last consultation, those who were satisfied overall with the 
consultation were less likely to non-adhere (Table 5.8). Satisfaction with 
consultation is an important factor that has been discussed in the relevant literature 
and has been shown to affect patients’ decisions to non-adhere to medical 
recommendation (Bultman and Svarstad 2000; Ward, Morisky et al. 2000).
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Table 5.8: Impact of last consultation on non-adherence
Coef.
Std.
Err. P>t 95% C.I.
Demographic and socioeconomic 
factors
sex (0=male l=female) -0.0189 0.1361 0.889 -0.2862 0.2483
age (years) -0.0156 0.0055 0.004 -0.0263 -0.0049
education (0=primary education)
secondary -0.2681 0.1539 0.082 -0.5703 0.0342
tertiary -0.3779 0.1583 0.017 -0.6889 -0.0670
Durins the last consultation ...
...the doctor did not have time (0=no 
l=yes) 0.1368 0.1557 0.38 -0.1689 0.4425
...did not discuss about medication 
(0=no l=yes) 0.2121 0.1788 0.236 -0.1389 0.5632
...did not explain about medication 
(0=no l=yes) -0.2417 0.1566 0.123 -0.5492 0.0657
...I was satisfied with consultation 
(0=no l=yes) -0.4744 0.2484 0.057 -0.9623 0.0133
constant 0.9237 0.3909 0.018 0.1561 1.6912
Information
Information regarding medication was a significant determinant of non-adherence. 
Those who reported that they felt well informed regarding the medication for 
hypertension were less likely to non-adhere (b=-0.373, p<0.05). On the other hand, 
information regarding their condition was not a significant predictor of non­
adherence (Table 5.9).
This is an interesting result, especially when compared with some findings presented 
above (Section 5.3.3), showing that people feel better informed about their condition 
than they do about their medication. From the results it follows that it is this 
information about the medication that is more important for patients’ to adhere.
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T able 5.9: Im pact o f  in form ation  on n on-adh eren ce
Coef.
St.
Err. P>t 95% C.I.
Demographic and socioeconomic 
factors
sex (0=male l=female) -0.0740 0.1314 0.5740 -0.3320 0.1841
age (years) -0.0163 0.0057 0.0040 -0.0275 0.0052
education (0=primary education)
secondary -0.2952 0.1696 0.0820 -0.6283 0.0380
tertiary -0.2836 0.1732 0.1020 -0.6238 0.0566
feeling about household’s income 
(0=living comfortably)
coping on present income -0.0914 0.1650 0.5800 -0.4154 0.2326
difficult on present income 0.2331 0.2139 0.2760 -0.1869 0.6531
very difficult on present income 0.1129 0.2539 0.6570 -0.3858 0.6116
well informed about hypertension (0=no 
l=yes) -0.1383 0.2149 0.5200 -0.5602 0.2836
well informed about medication (0=no 
l=yes) -0.3736 0.1809 0.0390 -0.7290 0.0183
Sources o f information regarding 
hlood-pressure
Family/Friends (0=no l=yes) 0.7004 0.6415 0.2750 -0.5595 1.9603
Doctor (0=no l=yes) -0.2131 0.5087 0.6750 -1.2121 0.7859
Pharmacist (0=no 1 =yes) -0.0243 0.2894 0.9330 -0.5927 0.5441
Media (TV, Radio, Newspaper) (0=no 
l=yes) -1.2691 0.5630 0.0250 -2.3748 0.1633
Internet (0=no l=yes) -1.2067 0.6475 0.0630 -2.4784 0.0650
Magazines on health issues and nutrition 
(0=no l=yes) 0.4390 0.3573 0.2200 -0.2627 1.1407
Other sources (0=no l=yes) 0.5849 0.7787 0.4530 -0.9444 2.1142
constant 1.2078 0.6916 0.0810 -0.1504 2.5661
The sources of information that predicted non-adherence were the Media and 
Internet. Respondents who reported they had used these sources to get information 
regarding their prescribed medication for hypertension were less likely to non- 
adhere to it (b=-1.269, p<0.05 and b=-1.21, p<0.1 respectively).
Beliefs and actual experience
It was shown above in this chapter that what people believe about medication is not 
always compatible with their own actual experiences. It is now of interest to 
examine which of the two groups of questions are better determinants of non­
adherence.
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Table 5.10 presents the results of the probit model run with the belief factors, 
controlled for age, sex, education and income. From all the factors included in the 
regression only one was statistically significant. That is, when patients believe that 
hypertension can be treated without medication they are more likely to non-adhere 
than those who do not (b=0.397, p<0.05). All other factors were shown not to be 
statistically significant.
T able 5.10: Im p act o f  beliefs on n on-adh eren ce
Coef.
Std.
Err. P>t 95% C.I.
Demographic and socioeconomic factors
sex (0=male l=female) -0.0797 0.1432 0.578 -0.361 0.202
age (years) -0.0163 0.0058 0.005 -0.027 -0.005
education (0=primary education)
secondary -0.2188 0.1837 0.234 -0.579 0.142
tertiary -0.1661 0.2033 0.414 -0.565 0.233
feeling about household’s income (0=living 
comfortably)
coping on present income -0.1414 0.1853 0.446 -0.505 0.222
difficult on present income 0.3644 0.2202 0.099 -0.068 0.797
very difficult on present income 0.3549 0.2947 0.229 -0.224 0.933
Beliefs on adherence
believe hypertension can be treated without 
med (0=no 1 yes) 0.3979 0.1648 0.016 0.074 0.721
believe hypertension can be regulated with 
med (0=no l=yes) -0.3602 0.2242 0.109 -0.801 0.080
believe meds for hypertension have side- 
effects (0=no l=yes) -0.0324 0.1663 0.846 -0.359 0.294
believe medications for hypertension are 
addictive (0=no l=yes) 0.1686 0.1645 0.306 -0.154 0.491
believe medications for hypertension make 
patients dependent (0=no l=yes) 0.3143 0.2274 0.168 -0.132 0.761
cons 0.2691 0.4905 0.584 -0.694 1.232
On the other hand, Table 5.11 shows the results of the probit model when only 
factors referring to the actual experience are included, controlled again for sex, age, 
education and income. Results show that patients who had actually tried to treat 
hypertension without medication were significantly more likely to non-adhere 
(b=0.391, p<0.0130). On the other hand, those who responded that they have 
managed to regulate hypertension with medication were less likely to non-adhere 
(b=-0.541, p<0.05). Finally, a striking finding is that patients who reported they had 
become addicted to medication for hypertension were less likely to be non-adherent
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(b=-0.283, p<0.1). A possible explanation is that the patient may perceive addiction 
as a need of the body to continue taking the medication. Side-effects were not a 
significant predictor of non-adherence, neither as belief nor as an experienced fact.
Table 5.11: Impact of experience on non-adherence
Coef.
Std.
Err. P>t 95% C.I.
Demographic and socioeconomic factors
sex (0=male l=fem ale) -0.1521 0.1421 0.2850 -0.4313 0.1270
age (years) -0.0105 0.0060 0.0800 -0.0223 0.0013
education (0=primary education)
secondary -0.4581 0.1729 0.0080 -0.7978 -0.1184
tertiary -0.4766 0.1822 0.0090 -0.8346 -0.1186
feeling about household’s income 
(0=living comfortably)
coping on present income -0.1153 0.1871 0.5380 -0.4829 0.2522
difficult on present income 0.1558 0.2180 0.4750 -0.2725 0.5841
very difficult on present income 0.1520 0.2810 0.5890 -0.4000 0.7041
Personal experience 
I have treated hypertension without meds 
(0=no l=yes) 0.3916 0.1567 0.0130 0.0838 0.6994
I have regulated hypertension with meds 
(0=no l=yes) -0.5419 0.2194 0.0140 -0.9729 -0.1109
I have experienced side-effects because o f  
meds (0=no l=yes) -0.0049 0.1461 0.9730 -0.2919 0.2820
I have become addicted to meds for 
hypertension (0=no l=yes) -0.2830 0.1511 0.0620 -0.5799 0.0139
I have become dependent on meds for 
hypertension (0=no l=yes) -0.1018 0.1780 0.5680 -0.4514 0.2479
cons 0.8867 0.4568 0.0530 -0.0107 1.7841
To sum up, it seems from the analysis that actual experience with medication is a 
stronger predictor of non-adherence than what the patient believed about it.
Risk factors
Among the risk factors only one was statistically significant in predicting non­
adherence. Patients who believe that untreated hypertension due to non-adherence 
may lead to kidney failure were less likely to non-adhere to the prescribed 
medication (b=-0.347, p<0.05). A possible explanation of non-adherence is that 
patients are less aware that untreated hypertension is associated with a higher risk of 
kidney failure. This was also shown in Figure 5.4 above. Hence, the finding may
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indicate that awareness of the risk of kidney failure is a predictor of better 
adherence.
Table 5.12: Impact of risk factors on non-adherence
Coef. Std. Err. P>t 95% C.I.
Demographic and socioeconomic 
factors
sex (0=male l=female) -0.0151 0.1346 0.9110 -0.279 0.249
age (years) -0.0169 0.0052 0.0010 -0.027 -0.006
education (0=primary education)
secondary -0.2016 0.1602 0.2090 -0.516 0.113
tertiary -0.2430 0.1742 0.1630 -0.585 0.099
feeling about household’s income 
(0=living comfortably)
coping on present income -0.0075 0.1655 0.9640 -0.332 0.317
difficult on present income 0.3280 0.2090 0.1170 -0.082 0.738
very difficult on present income 0.2783 0.2706 0.3040 -0.253 0.809
Health status
health (0=(very good)
fair 0.0667 0.1584 0.6740 -0.244 0.377
bad -0.0747 0.2432 0.7590 -0.552 0.402
hampered in daily activity (0=no 
I=yes) 0.2497 0.1568 0.1120 -0.058 0.557
Risk factors
untreated hypertension can lead to 
stroke (0=no l=yes) 0.9034 0.5509 0.1020 -0.178 1.985
untreated hypertension can lead to 
heart attack (0=no 1 =yes) -0.1458 0.2465 0.5540 -0.629 0.338
untreated hypertension can lead to 
heart failure (0=no l=yes) 0.1094 0.1947 0.5740 -0.272 0.4917
untreated hypertension can lead to 
kidney failure (0=no l=yes) -0.3474 0.1465 0.0180 -0.635 0.0597
cons -0.2599 0.6882 0.7060 -1.611 1.0916
Demographic factors
Results of the probit analysis including demographic factors are shown in Table 
5.13. Only age and education were significant predictors of non-adherence. The 
effect of age confirmed our initial hypothesis; it is negative up to a point, 
demonstrating that older people adhere more to the medication. After this point 
however the effect is negative meaning that after a certain age older age is 
associated with worse adherence rates, possibly due to memory loss or other 
behavioural effects. In addition, more educated patients are less likely to non-adhere.
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All other demographic and socioeconomic factors were not significantly associated 
with patients’ decision to follow recommendations.
The findings confirm what the review of the empirical studies showed, i.e. that the 
impact of demographic factors is not always clear.
Table 5.13: Impact of demographic factors on non-adherence
Coef. Std. Err. P>t 95% C.I.
sex (0=male l=female) -0.0416 0.1333 0.755 -0.3033 0.2202
age (years) -0.0175 0.0056 0.002 -0.0285 -0.0066
age squared (years squared) 0.0005 0.0003 0.099 -0.0001 0.0010
married (0=no l=yes) 0.1569 0.1891 0.407 -0.2144 0.5283
education (0=primary education)
secondary -0.2173 0.1704 0.203 -0.5519 0.1174
tertiary -0.3062 0.1776 0.085 -0.6552 0.0427
children (0=no l=yes) 0.1846 0.2616 0.481 -0.3292 0.6983
living alone (0=no l=yes) 
feeling about household’s income 
(0=living comfortably)
0.0567 0.1599 0.723 -0.2575 0.3708
coping on present income -0.0034 0.1684 0.984 -0.334 0.3273
difficult on present income 0.3255 0.2066 0.116 -0.0802 0.7313
very difficult on present income 0.2126 0.2622 0.418 -0.302 0.7276
Constant 0.2614 0.4428 0.555 -0.6081 1.1310
Clinical Factors
Controlling for sex, age and health status, none of the clinical factors was 
significantly associated with non-adherence (Table 5.14). Having a more severe 
condition, such as heart failure or a stroke, was not associated with lower adherence 
rates. Hypertension is an asymptomatic condition and one would have expected that 
patients with more severe illnesses would be more aware of its consequences, yet 
this is not confirmed here. Similarly, the duration of the disease, or taking other 
medication was not a predictor of non-adherence rates, as might have been expected.
The findings show that the severity of the condition does not necessarily impact on 
patients’ decision to adhere. This is in agreement with previous empirical studies 
(Mann, Eliasson et al. 1992).
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T a b le  5.14: Im p act o f  c lin ica l fa c to rs  on  n o n -a d h eren ce
Coef. St. Err. P>t 95% C.L
Demographic factors and health
sex (0=male l=female) -0.1869 0.1351 0.167 -0.4525 0.0786
age (years) -0.0164 0.0056 0.003 -0.0273 -0.0055
health (0=(very good)
fair 0.0026 0.1829 0.989 -0.3567 0.3619
bad -0.2892 0.2899 0.319 -0.8589 0.2806
hampered in daily activity (0=no 
l=yes) 0.1568 0.1849 0.397 -0.2066 0.5201
Clinical factors
duration o f  hypertension (years) 0.0078 0.0089 0.38 -0.0096 0.0254
dislepidemia (0=no l=yes) -0.0759 0.1499 0.613 -0.3705 0.2186
CHD (0-n o  l=yes) 0.1481 0.3237 0.647 -0.4879 0.7842
diabetes (0=no l=yes) 0.1752 0.2011 0.384 -0.2201 0.5704
stroke (0=no l=yes) -0.0259 0.4040 0.949 -0.8197 0.7679
heartfailure (0=no l=yes) -0.9025 0.6829 0.187 -2.2445 0.4394
constant 0.2447 0.3548 0.491 -0.4524 0.9418
5 .4  L im ita t io n s
A statistical analysis summarises relevant data, sometimes in a raw and unprocessed 
form, and produces sharp and clear results and explanations. Such an analysis is 
extremely useful but it is based on technical assumptions and the availability of data, 
which of course means that not all finer aspects of reality are always captured. 
Therefore, the limitations of our study are considered below.
Self-reported non-adherence
The method of self-reported measurement of non-adherence has been used widely 
but there is no gold standard method for measuring non-adherence. However, self- 
report was the most appropriate method of measuring non-adherence in the present 
study, given that other methods, such as electronic monitoring, or prescription refill 
were not available.
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Low internal reliability o f the Morisky scale
As mentioned above, Cronbach’s alpha is a coefficient which depends on the 
number of items the scale has (Bland and Altman 1997) and therefore a scale with 
only four items is expected to have a lower alpha. Here Cronbach’s alpha was low,
i.e. 0.55, yet not much lower than the one reported in the original study by Morisky, 
where it was 0.61 (Morisky, Green et al. 1986). However, the selection of the 
Morisky scale was based on the fact that it is quick, simple and comprehensible and 
that it had been used and tested in previous studies for its validity and reliability.
Cross-sectional study
The patients were interviewed once and were not followed up, although in 
hypertension, as in most chronic conditions, non-adherence to medication is not a 
static phenomenon. It is a long-term process that may change as patients live with 
the condition. However, the aim of the present study was to identify general beliefs 
and attitudes towards medication and see how these may affect patients’ decision to 
adhere or not.
Setting o f study
The study cohort had some unique characteristics which may limit the ability to 
extrapolate the results to other populations. The Clinic of Hypertension in the 
Hippocration General Hospital in Athens is one of the few specialised clinics for the 
treatment in Greece. Therefore, patients visiting the clinic may be more determined 
to deal with hypertension than a patient with the same condition visiting a family 
doctor. However, identifying a more general group of hypertensive patients would 
be particularly difficult given the lack of GP lists in the Greek health system. 
Therefore, despite the special characteristics of the group under study, the sample 
was a unique opportunity to gather information from patients with hypertension.
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5.5 Discussion and policy implications
This section discusses the findings of the analysis of the questionnaire survey, with 
respect to the hypothesis and the research questions set at the beginning of the 
chapter. More general discussion on policy implications of the findings appears in 
Chapter 7.
Q4: What do Greek patients with hypertension think o f their doctors and how does
this affect their attitudes towards medicines?
Non-adherence rates among the hypertensive patients under study were shown to be 
particularly low. The results were close to the original study by Morisky and reveal 
that the sample studied here was mostly adherent to the medication. As discussed in 
the limitations, a possible explanation may be hidden in the fact that the sample was 
taken from a specialised centre. The Centre for the treatment of Hypertension in the 
Hippocration General Hospital in Athens is one of the most well known centres for 
the treatment of hypertension in Greece. The hospital specialises in the treatment of 
all cardiovascular conditions. Therefore, patients visiting the centre may be more 
determined in treating hypertension and this may partly explain the high adherence 
rates.
As far as the doctor-patient relationship is concerned the patients seem generally 
very satisfied with the consultation and express themselves positively in statements 
regarding doctors. However, they felt that the doctor explained to them more about 
their condition, less about the prescribed medication and even less about side effects. 
Similarly, they felt that they discussed with their doctor more about their condition 
and less about their medication.
The perceptions patients hold regarding their doctors were very strong predictors of 
their decision to follow their recommendations. Patients who believed that it is best 
to follow the doctor’s advice were less likely to non-adhere. However, those who 
think that doctors use words that are difficult to understand and keep the whole truth 
from them are more likely to non-adhere. Finally, during the last consultation, 
patients who were satisfied overall with the consultation were less likely to non- 
adhere.
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QS: Which information channels do patients use and how do these channels 
influence patients ’ behaviour towards medicines? What is the importance o f  doctors 
in supplying information?
Analysis showed interesting results regarding information sources and their impact 
on adherence. It is clear that the doctor was the dominant information source for the 
patients both regarding their medication and their condition. Also, patients reported 
being better informed regarding their conditions than they are regarding the 
medication they are prescribed.
Another source of information that was shown to be important was the Media. In 
fact, this information source was reported more often than the other sources, such as 
family and the pharmacist. Finally, the Internet was not a popular source of 
information. Apart from the doctor patients do not look for information in many 
other sources.
What is more, lack of information regarding medication was a significant predictor 
of non-adherence. It is therefore the information regarding medication rather than 
the condition that predicts whether patients will adhere or not.
Q6: What other factors may affect non-adherence? Is it beliefs towards the disease 
and the treatment or the disease and treatment characteristics themselves that 
influence non-adherence?
Research question Q3 considered beliefs towards the disease and treatment in 
comparison to actual disease and treatment characteristics and their influence on 
non-adherence. Beliefs and personal experiences varied significantly. More people 
believed that medications have side-effects, are addictive and make patients 
dependent on them but when asked whether they had actually experienced any side- 
effects, sign of addiction or dependency, responses were considerably lower. Results 
of the regression analysis indicated that most of the statements on experienced 
characteristics were significant predictors of non-adherence while the statements on 
beliefs regarding similar issues were not.
Socio-demographic factors were not strong predictors of non-adherence. Only two 
demographic factors were significant. Older patients were less likely to non-adhere
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and so were those with higher education. However, none of the clinical factors was 
significantly associated with non-adherence.
Overall, hypothesis H2 was confirmed by the statistical study. Patients’ perceptions 
of the doctors’ role had a great impact on their decision to follow recommendations.
The study identified a number of points that are interesting from a policy 
perspective. To begin with, the statistical analysis showed that the doctor-patient 
relationship and the way the patients perceive it plays an important role in their 
decision to adhere to the recommendations. In fact, of all the factors examined here, 
the perceptions of the doctor-patient relationship were the strongest predictors of 
adherence. In particular, believing that it is important to follow the doctor’s advice, 
understanding the terminology they use and feeling she is telling the truth were 
predictors of better adherence.
In general, the findings confirm the tendency to depart from the traditional 
misconception that non-adherence is a patient driven problem. The doctor’s role is 
important in helping patients to adhere and there is need to support them instead of 
blaming them.
Patients seem to be more informed about their condition and less informed about the 
medication. What is more, lack of information regarding medication was a strong 
predictor of non-adherence. Doctors need to identify the patients who are seeking 
more information regarding their medication and pass it on to them. It seems that 
both parties would benefit from this as the patient will be more likely to follow the 
advice and therefore get better health outcomes.
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter aimed at shedding light on non-adherence to medication among a 
specific group of hypertensive patients in Greece. For this purpose, a questionnaire 
survey was designed, administrated and analysed. The survey took place in the 
Centre for the Treatment of Hypertension, in the Hippocration General Hospital in 
Athens, Greece. Seven hundred and forty-three patients were interviewed and were 
questioned regarding their relationship with their doctors, the sources they use to get
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information about hypertension and the medication as well as risk factors and other 
clinical characteristics.
The analysis showed that the Greek patients are mostly adherent to the prescribed 
medication. The main factors affecting their decision were their good perceptions of 
their relationship with the doctors. They generally think highly of their doctors, they 
trust them and rely a great deal on their expertise.
Other factors affecting their decision to non-adhere included lack of information 
regarding their medication. In general, patients feel better informed regarding their 
conditions, less regarding their medication and even less regarding side-effects. 
Patients mainly rely on their doctors to get information and other sources they use 
are the Media and magazines on health issues and nutrition. Other sources, such as 
the pharmacist or Internet were very limited sources.
From a policy perspective, the aspects of the doctor-patient relationship that were 
shown to be important determinants of adherence were general satisfaction with the 
consultation, believing in the doctor’s expertise, use of language that patients can 
understand and telling them the truth.
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CHAPTER 6
DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP; A GAME THEORY APPROACH 
TO EXPLAIN NON-ADHERENCE
6.1 Introduction
The two empirical studies which we conducted and were presented in Chapters 4 
and 5 of this thesis confirmed, both at a population and a patient level respectively, 
the factors that have been argued might affect an individual’s decision to adhere to 
medication. The findings showed that the way individuals perceive the doctor- 
patient relationship and think about their doctor’s role in the prescribing and 
treatment of illnesses were important predictors of their decision to adhere or not. 
Beliefs that the patients have towards medication and their illness were also 
associated with patients’ departure from recommendations. The theoretical 
elements, such as self-efficacy, used to test the hypotheses of the empirical studies, 
successfully predicted part of the results.
However, the picture remains incomplete. Our studies identified some conflicts in 
the doctor-patient relationship -  also reported widely in previous empirical work - 
that significantly affected patients’ decision to non-adhere but which the theoretical 
elements used were not sufficient to explain. For example, patients who wanted 
more information during the consultation, but who reported that the doctor did not 
give them enough, failed to adhere to the doctor’s recommendation.
In general, the theoretical models that are used to explain non-adherence as well as 
the models of the doctor-patient relationship need to be examined more in depth to 
see the degree to which they can capture the conflicts of this interaction and their 
ability to predict patients’ decision not to follow recommendations. This is the 
objective we are pursuing in this chapter.
The upcoming field combining Psychology and Economics, commonly called 
Behavioural Economics, opens new ground for explaining behaviours that 
traditional models fail to capture. Particularly in the case of the doctor-patient 
relationship Behavioural Economics has made significant progress in the last few
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years. Models in this field that describe doctor-patient interaction and patients’ 
behaviour have incorporated the notion of beliefs into the patient’s utility function 
and try to explain how these may lead to behaviours, such as avoiding visiting a 
doctor (Koszegi 2003). These models are based on the Psychological Expected 
Utility theory (henceforth PEU theory) introduced by Caplin and Leahy (2001). The 
theory is an extension of von Neumann-Morgenstem expected utility theory to 
situations in which agents experience feelings of anticipation regarding future 
states. This theory, when applied to health behaviour, allows for the patient’s utility 
function to depend not only on physical outcomes but also on beliefs about future 
physical outcomes. However, all the above attempts to model the doctor-patient 
relationship are based on the assumption that the doctor is entirely empathetic to the 
patient and maximises the patient’s utility function as if it were his own.
Evidence from the medical literature demonstrates contradictory results. The 
doctor-patient relationship is often characterised by antagonism and conflicts. Both 
parties have different expectations and agendas that they bring to the consultations 
which are often in conflict and when they are not met they result in undesirable 
situations such as non-adherence to medical recommendations (Britten, Stevenson 
et al. 2000). Of course, the consultation is influenced not only by the specific 
characteristics of the doctor and the patient but also by the context and the setting 
where the consultation occurs (Weinmann 1997).
The models we develop in this chapter extend previous Behavioural Economic 
models of doctor-patient interaction to examine how the actions of the two parties 
change when the notion of effort is incorporated into the model. Also, and most 
importantly, the models examine whether the introduction of the concept of effort 
may explain why consultations do not reach the desirable outcomes, i.e. lead 
patients to fail to adhere to medical recommendations.
The intention of this part of the thesis is to understand how background variables 
and assumptions, including differences in the types of patients and doctors, the 
possibility of lack of precise identification of the patient’s needs by the doctor 
during the actual communication, as well as organisational constraints such as 
effort, affect the actual communication and may explain non-adherence to 
recommendations.
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This causality is better illustrated in Figure 6.1.
•  Communicative 
behaviours: 
interactive 
decisions
Actual
Communication
Background 
Variables 
And Assumptions
Types o f  patients 
and doctors
Patient outcomes
(Non)-Adherence
Figure 6.1: Association between background variables, communication and
adherence.
The hypothesis tested in this chapter is:
H3: A game theoretical approach that captures the patients’ preferences
for information and doctor’s inability to understand them may 
explain why patients fail to adhere to medical recommendations.
To test the hypothesis the following related research questions need to be answered:
- Q7: Do previous theoretical models of the doctor-patient relationship
explain differences between the two parties that may lead to non­
adherence?
■ Q8: How does a game theoretical model capture these differences?
The rest of this chapter is organized in the following way. Section 6.2 begins by 
summarising some earlier discussed motivating facts from the medical literature 
that show how conflicting aspects of the doctor-patient relationship influence 
patients’ decisions to adhere or not to recommendations. Particular emphasis is 
given to the supply of information during the consultation and how this affects 
communication. It then challenges previous models on the doctor-patient 
relationship both from Health Psychology and Economics, with respect to their 
ability to capture the conflicts that occur during consultation. The chapter then 
presents our game theoretical model and is intended to explain the doctor-patient 
interaction and conflict. It introduces new ideas, such as the notion of effort as a
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new variable. Limitations as well as possible directions for future research are then 
discussed. Finally, the last section discusses the policy implications and concludes.
6.2 Motivating facts
The purpose of this section is to present the motivating facts that lead to the 
conceptualisation of the models presented in Section 6.3. It begins with evidence 
from the medical literature that identifies differences between patient and doctor 
needs during consultation and how these, when not met, may be linked to non­
adherence to recommendations. Particular emphasis is given to issues concerning 
the supply of information. It then briefly discusses the models of doctor-patient 
relationship reviewed in Chapter 2 with the purpose of identifying whether they can 
capture these conflicts, or whether they can provide useful insights for our models. 
Finally, the section concludes with a discussion of the elements on which the game 
theory model will be built.
6.2.1 Empirical evidence
There is consistent evidence showing that the flow of information exchanged during 
the consultation is very critical for the formulation of diagnosis and the organisation 
of treatment (Lambert and Loiselle 2007). Thus, effective communication is 
necessary to ensure not only that the doctor understands the patients’ problems and 
concerns but also that relevant information on diagnosis and treatment is accurately 
and effectively transferred to maximising benefits from consultation. Input factors 
which influence the consultation include both aspects of the doctor’s and the 
patient’s behaviour but also the context and setting in which this occurs (Weinmann 
1997).
The literature shows that the patient’s emotions and beliefs influence his decision 
on whether to adhere or not (Home, Sumner et al. 2001). There is evidence that 
information regarding patients’ health affects their emotions and patients vary in 
their preferences regarding how much they want to know about their health (Miller 
and Mangan 1983). Not all patients want information or benefit from it. For 
example, a study by Siminoff and Fetting (1991) found that patients who did not
153
Chapter 6
accept their physician’s treatment recommendations were told in more specific 
terms what the benefits of the treatment would be. The study therefore suggests that 
provision of detailed information will not always provide desirable results and in 
fact may lead to different therapy decisions than the physicians might hope for.
Doctors, on the other hand, with their communication style, can positively influence 
these beliefs and therefore lead to better adherence to recommendations (Bultman 
and Svarstad 2000). However, they are many times unable to understand differences 
in patient preferences regarding information and participation during consultation 
(Elkin, Kim et al. 2007). They often fail to listen to patients and explore their views 
on their disease and medication. Moreover, the doctor, just like the patient, also 
experiences feelings during the consultation such as anxiety or anger, which have 
been shown to decrease the overall satisfaction of both parties with the consultation 
and also the patient’s adherence to recommendations (Waitzkin 1984).
In addition, and more importantly for our model, the transmission (supply) of 
information during the doctor-patient interaction has been shown in the literature to 
be related to the clinical setting (Waitzkin 1984). Busy clinical settings often imply 
that the doctor may be restricted in the time he can spend with every patient. 
However, the effect of time on consultation outcomes is controversial. Some studies 
show that more time does not necessarily lead to better outcomes while other 
researchers suggest that optimal patient-provider communication requires longer 
consultations (Brown 2004). Despite the debate, longer consultations clearly 
indicate that more information is transferred to the patient.
To sum up the evidence from the medical literature, the supply of information is a 
very important issue during the consultation. Patients vary in their preferences 
regarding how much information they want to receive and doctors often fail to 
recognise these variations. This disconnection with patient’s needs may lead to 
unwanted results, such as decreased patient satisfaction with the consultation and 
higher rates of non-adherence.
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6.2.2 Review of previous theoretical models
The models reviewed here, which describe the doctor-patient relationship and aim 
to explain the behaviour of the two parties, come from two main areas, Health 
Psychology and Economics.
In Health Psychology, as was explained in Chapter 2 in more detail, three main 
models are commonly accepted: paternalism, shared decision and informed decision 
making. Despite their differences, the three models share a common characteristic. 
The roles of the two parties regarding supply of information and decision making 
are clearly defined and do not allow for antagonism between the doctor and the 
patient. Hence, they do not permit for inconsistency and conflict in decision making 
and cannot explain how differences between the two parties during the consultation 
can affect patients’ decisions.
In Health Economics also the doctor-patient relationship is of central importance 
and theories to describe it have been a great challenge for researchers in the area. 
The perfect-agency model has been very useful in understanding aspects of the 
doctor-patient relationship. However, it assumes that the doctor and the patient have 
identical utility function, therefore it fails to capture conflicts between the two 
parties. It also seems unrealistic for the perfect agency model to work in medical 
practice as the doctor, apart from the patient’s needs has other constraints as well 
during the consultation which must be taken into consideration, such as 
administrative constraints, time issues and personal interest.
Departing from the perfect-agency model, there is an extensive literature on how 
physicians can act beyond maximising the patient’s utility function only (Evans 
1974; McGuire 2000). Scott (2000) reviews the model of GP’s behaviour and notes 
that economic models allow doctors’ behaviour to be driven not only by altruistic 
elements but also other aspects such as workload, income, reputation and other self- 
interest factors.
Le Grand (2006), in his influential work, describes the two different aspects of the 
doctor’s behaviour as knightly and knavish and notes that it is “perfectly possible
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for someone to be both a knight and a knave: that is, to have altruistic motivations 
for some of his activities or behaviour and self-interested ones for others”.
On the patient’s side, the literature of Health Economics is more limited in 
modelling patient’s behaviour. The lately increasing field of Behavioural 
Economics has resulted in models that offer useful insight into what drives patients’ 
decisions by introducing the notion of beliefs into patient’s utility function. The 
PEU theory (Caplin and Leahy 2001) has been used successfully to describe certain 
aspects of the doctor-patient relationship (Caplin and Leahy 2004) and patients’ 
behaviour (Koszegi 2003). However, these models assume a perfect agency 
relationship between the doctor and the patient, i.e. the doctor maximises the 
patient’s utility as if it were his own.
To sum up, former traditional economic models vary in the way they approach the 
issue of the doctor’s utility function but in general they include, apart from the 
altruistic element, effort, a leisure-income element, as well as reputation and 
organisational characteristics. However, they do not allow for differences in 
information preferences. On the other hand, models of Behavioural Economics 
using PEU theory capture variations in information preferences, but they assume a 
perfect agency relationship between the doctor and the patient.
The choice o f a Game theory approach
Game theory provides a formal means for explaining optimal strategies under 
conditions of uncertainty in which the outcomes depend on choices of more than 
one individual. This is the reason why this approach is proposed for the doctor- 
patient relationship as the final outcomes for both parties depend not only on their 
individual actions but also on what the other person will also do.
The potential use of game theory in describing the doctor-patient interaction has 
been receiving increasing interest from researchers in recent years. The evidence 
from empirical studies that agreement is not always reached during consultation has 
initiated thoughts on the potential use of game theory to describe it (Elliott, 
Shinogle et al. 2008). Tarrant et al (2004) discuss three main game structures: the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the Assurance game and the Centipede game, but this is
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more of a general discussion and explorations of the opportunities and limitations of 
game theory and not a proposal for a formal model. Although discussions on the 
new perspective that game theory provides for research into the medical 
consultation are mainly theoretical debates they all agree on the potentiality of this 
new area of research. Game theory can provide the basis for empirically testable 
models of the doctor-patient relationship.
6.2.3 Combining health psychology and economics in our models
Following the discussion above, four aspects of the doctor-patient relationship that 
affect non-adherence are important for our model. First, information affects 
patients’ beliefs and these have an impact on patients’ decisions regarding 
treatment. Secondly, patients vary in their preferences regarding information. Some 
patients want information, some others feel better when they do not know much 
about their condition and treatment. Models based on the PEU theory take this into 
account. Thirdly, doctors do not appear to be consistently able to predict patient 
preferences. This may be due to organisational constraints that restrict the doctor 
from spending time with the patients or may be due to a lack of adequate training or 
due to self-interest. Finally, the doctor’s disconnection with the patient’s needs may 
lead to unwanted results, such as dissatisfaction with consultation and non­
adherence to medical recommendations.
We now combine all these elements to develop our non-cooperative game 
theoretical models. They are a development of previous Behavioural Economic 
models of doctor-patient interaction. They incorporate the notions of anxiety, effort, 
etc. and relax the assumption of a perfect agency relationship, in order to explain 
conflicts that occur during the consultation which may lead to non-adherence to 
recommendations.
6.3 The models
The models presented here attempt with a key number of variables and relations to 
capture the salient characteristics of a specific empirical area and their aim is to
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make predictions. These are compared with real evidence and can also explain the 
findings of the empirical parts of the thesis.
This section presents three models of the doctor-patient interaction to describe the 
supply of information by the doctor during consultation. The models take the form 
of a game in an extensive form. They are all non-cooperative games between two 
players, the patient (‘he’) who has symptoms of an illness and visits the doctor 
(‘she’) to get a diagnosis. The doctor makes the diagnosis and has to decide how 
much information to pass on to the patient. Patients, however, vary in their 
preferences regarding how much detailed information they want to receive and, 
following the work by Miller et al (1987), are distinguished between ‘blunters’, i.e. 
information-averse patients, and ‘monitors’, i.e. information-loving patients. The 
patient, after the information received from the doctor, needs to decide whether to 
accept the recommendations and adhere to them or not.
The first two models are based on the assumption that the doctor knows perfectly 
the type of patient. The first one assumes that the patient is a blunter while the 
second assumes that the patient is a monitor. The third model presents a game 
closer to reality. In this case the doctor cannot tell with certainty whether the patient 
is a monitor or a blunter. Empirical evidence presented earlier in the chapter (see 
Section 6.2.1 for more details) shows that indeed doctors very often fail to capture 
the patient’s preference for information (Elkin, Kim et al. 2007). Model 3 is the 
most involved game of the three but also the one that explains in the end how a 
doctor’s failure to understand the patient’s preference for more detailed information 
may lead to non-adherence to her recommendations.
The models presented below draw upon the PEU theory (Caplin and Leahy 2001). 
The PEU, as mentioned briefly in Section 6.2 above, is an extension of the expected 
utility theory in situations in which agents experience acute feelings of anticipation 
prior to the resolution of uncertainty. It has been used by Caplin and Leahy to 
explain supply of information during the consultation (Caplin and Leahy 2004) and 
by Koszegi to understand patients’ behaviour (Koszegi 2003). Koszegi (2003) 
confines himself to a model that explains the patient’s decision on whether to visit a 
doctor or not, when anxiety enters his utility function. Caplin and Lealy (2004) 
present an extensive form game in which the patient signals his types and the
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doctor, being completely empathetic, decides on how much information to pass on. 
This model does not allow the patient to play a part himself in deciding whether to 
accept the information or not.
The originality of the approach of the models presented in this section lies in two 
aspects. First, they relax the assumption of perfect agency that the models by Caplin 
and Leahy (2004) and Koszegi (2003) accept, i.e. that the doctor maximizes the 
patient’s utility as if it is hers. In order to show that the doctor cannot act as a 
perfect agent the models assume that she needs to put effort into supplying 
information to the patient. Secondly, they allow for interdependent decisions with 
an active role both for the doctor, who needs to decide on how much effort to put in 
and for the patient as to whether to accept the doctor’s recommendation.
The methodology adopted is that of game theory, which analyses interdependent 
decisions and their optimality in contrast to a more narrow decision theory approach 
which only looks at individual decisions. We set up extensive game trees, which 
explain the order in which players move, their available actions, the information 
they have regarding the game and their payoffs. In the case of Model 3, the 
uncertainty regarding the patient’s preference for information is resolved under 
various hypotheses of bounded rationality. This is a well-known approach in 
economics for modelling problems with uncertainty so that progress in analysis can 
be made. The models offer, under specific but reasonable assumptions, a complete 
resolution of the games, i.e. obtain results concerning how much effort the doctor 
will put in and the patient’s decision to adhere to the recommendations. They use 
comparative statics, give economic interpretations and finally allow for a discussion 
on the policy implications that they have.
6.3.1 Definitions and preliminaries
We explain here the notation used and, for the sake of completeness, the concepts 
employed in the models discussed:
■ N  denotes nature. This is a summary term which is used to denote all factors 
which determine the type of patient that comes to the doctor.
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■ There are two types of patient: blunters (B), i.e. information-averse patients, and 
monitors (M), i.e. information-loving ones. These types were introduced by 
Miller and Mangan (1983).
■ q is the probability with which the doctor believes that nature chooses the
patient to be a monitor and 1 -  q to be a blunter. The case where Q = ~
corresponds to bounded rationality discussed below. However, more general 
distributions are considered, q applies only in Model 3 where the doctor does 
not know the type of patient with certainty.
■ s denotes the health state of the patient. It is defined in the interval (5 , , s2) with 
probability density function f ( s ) . In other words, sx is the lowest level his 
health can be and s2 the highest.
■ p  denotes the probability that the patient will be in state s, and 1 -  p  that he 
will be in s2.
■ I is a non-negative constant that denotes a loss in health of the patient if he does 
not follow the doctor’s recommendation. It is assumed to be common for all 
types of patients, i.e. it is independent of the patient’s preference regarding 
information.
■ T and NT  are the two actions the doctor can take. T denotes that the doctor 
reveals the whole truth to the patient about his state of health, i.e. she tells the 
patient that he can be in state sx with probability p  and in s2 with 1 -  p  . NT  
denotes that the doctor does not reveal the whole picture but simply tells the 
patient that his expected state of health is s = p  • s{+ ( \ - p ) -  s2.
■ A and NA are the two actions available to the patient. A denotes that the 
patient will adhere to what the doctor recommends and NA that he will not.
■ uM and uB are the utilities of a monitor, and a blunter respectively, while uD is 
the utility of the doctor.
■ £x denotes the effort the doctor needs to put in to pass on the information to the 
blunter and £2the effort she needs to put in if the patient is a monitor. Both ex 
and e2 are positive constants and are subtracted from the doctor’s utility 
function every time the doctor decides to play T. It is assumed that £, < e 2. That
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is, more effort is needed to pass on information to a monitor, who is an 
information-seeking person, than to a blunter, who is information averse.
■ a denotes the anger that is created if a monitor realises that the doctor has not
told him all the truth. It is assumed that a is a positive constant and it is
subtracted both from the monitor’s and the doctor’s utility. We assume that 
a > £ 2, i.e. the anger created if the doctor does not pass on all the information is 
greater than the effort the doctor puts in to do so.
■ w denotes the worry that a monitor experiences if he decides to follow the
doctor’s advice although he has realised that she has not told him the truth. It is 
accepted that w is a positive constant and it is subtracted from the monitor’s 
utility.
Non-cooperative games: These describe situations in which each player chooses 
his strategy independently from the others with the aim of maximising his own 
payoff. The idea is to find a pair of equilibrium strategies. On the other hand, 
cooperative games allow the players to negotiate before the game starts. The game 
is then played according to a binding agreement (Binmore 2007). The games in this 
chapter are all non-cooperative.
Extensive form games: These refer to non-cooperative games. They describe, in a 
precise way, the role of the players, the moves available to them, the order with 
which they can move and what information they have every time they are to move 
and finally the payoffs received when the game is over (Gibbons 1992).
A game tree is a graphical representation of the extensive form games. On a tree 
the movement is always downwards and a node is visited only once. Usually all 
moves made by nature are made at the beginning. These are the random moves.
A node denotes the point in the game that, when reached, a decision needs to be 
made by a player until the terminal node is reached, i.e. the game ends.
A path is a unique way of going from the initial node of the tree to a terminal. No 
two paths can intersect.
An information set is a collection of nodes such that the player, whose turn it is to 
act, cannot distinguish among them. In other words, if an information set includes 
more than one node the player does not know exactly at which of those nodes he is. 
Games of perfect and imperfect information: A game is said to be of perfect 
information if every information set of the game contains only a single node, or in
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other words, no player will then ever doubt about what has happened in the game so 
far (Binmore 1991).
Complete information requires all players to know everything about the structure 
of the game as well as the strategies and the payoffs available to other players. 
Games of perfect recall: In games of perfect recall none of the players ever forgets 
what he once knew about the game (Glycopantis and Muir 1996).
Pure strategies: A pure strategy of a player in an extensive form game is a function 
that assigns an action to each information set of the players (Binmore 1991; 
Osborne and Rubinstein 1994; Glycopantis and Muir 1996).
Mixed strategies: A mixed strategy in an extensive form game is a probability 
distribution over the pure strategies (Glycopantis and Muir 1996).
Behavioural strategies: A behavioural strategy assigns independently to each of 
the player’s information sets a probability distribution over the actions available at 
that set (Glycopantis and Muir 1996).
Backward induction: Backward induction is a method used to solve a game. The 
method requires starting from the end of the game and then working backwards to 
its beginning. Suppose there are two players. The last player chooses first what the 
best option for him is, knowing what the other player(s) has played. He will select 
whichever of the actions gives him the highest utility. The tree then folds up 
showing the options left for the first player. Similarly, he will now select the action 
that gives him the highest utility. This will eventually give the predicted solution for 
the game.
Bounded rationality: This describes how a rational choice should be made when 
the agent is constrained by the amount of information available and by his 
computational abilities (Simon 1957). Given this limited information the players 
take optimal decisions by maximising (expected) payoffs.
The principle of insufficient reason is based on the notion of bounded rationality. 
The rationale is that if there is no sufficient reason for a player to assume that his 
opponent will be of a particular type, then he treats all alternative types as equally 
probable (Luce and Raiffa 1957; Glycopantis and Muir 1994).
Optimal path: An optimal path describes a series of optimal decisions by the 
players and occurs with the probability of the initial move. The payoffs of the 
players are attached at every terminal node. In our models they refer to the utilities
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of the doctor and the patient and will be discussed extensively below. Optimal 
decisions are reached in terms of expected utilities.
Nash equilibria (NE): A pair of strategies in a game of two players is a Nash 
equilibrium if each player’s strategy is the best response to the other player’s 
strategy (Binmore 1991). The Nash equilibrium, or Coumot-Nash equilibrium, is a 
confirmation of the beliefs of the agents concerning each other’s strategies. 
Subgame: This consists of an information set which is a singleton, i.e. a node, and 
the rest of the tree which stems from that node (Binmore 1991; Gibbons 1992). 
Subgame perfect equilibria (SPE): this is a Nash equilibrium for every subgame. 
It is a refinement of a Nash equilibrium. It safeguards the agents against possible 
mistakes or irrational behaviour of their opponents.
Assessment equilibrium: This solution concept defines an equilibrium not only in 
terms of what the players do but also in terms of what they believe. It consists of a 
pair of behavioural strategies and beliefs for which two properties hold: a) the 
players, given their beliefs, always choose an optimal action and b) the beliefs are 
updated using other beliefs and actions taken, by applying Bayes’ rule wherever 
possible (Binmore 1991).
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE): A PBE consists of a set of optimal 
behavioural strategies and a set of players’ beliefs which attach a probability 
distribution to the nodes of information sets. The strategies must be optimal given 
beliefs. The beliefs are formed from updating using the available information and 
they must support the optimal strategies. This concept must really be used when 
genuine Bayesian updating takes place (Glycopantis, Muir et al. 2003).
6.3.2 The utility functions
The patient’s utility function is basically of the nature proposed by Koszegi (2003). 
It is a version of the PEU which is defined not only over physical outcomes but also 
over beliefs about future physical outcomes. It is assumed there are Periods 1, the 
present, and 2, the future. The game is played in Period 1 when the payoffs are also 
calculated. The patient needs to decide whether to follow the doctor’s advice 
according to what he believes his health will be in period 2. His von Neumann- 
Morgenstem type utility function depends ultimately on his health state s,  the
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action he decides to take, and is conditional upon his attitude to information and 
takes the form:
u(E[s - 11 patient’s information preference]). (1)
There are two types of patient, monitors, i.e. information-loving, and blunters, i.e. 
information-averse ones. For monitors, the flow of high levels of information from 
the doctor to the patient lowers the anxiety level regarding future health, while it 
raises it for blunters.
We first consider the case of an information-averse patient. Similar to a risk-averse 
individual, who comparing utility to expected utility does not take a fair gamble 
(Kreps 1990) (Dassiou and Glycopantis 2007), an information averse patient prefers 
to know the expected state his health could be rather than knowing the probabilities 
with which he will be in a worse or better state. Or as Koszegi (2003) puts it he 
“dislikes bad news more than he likes good news”. Consequently, the utility 
function for the information-averse patient is (strictly) concave (Figure 6.2 (a)).
Knowing his expected health £[5 ] gives him greater utility, uB(E[s]), than the 
utility he would get if he expects to be in state s{ with probability p  and in state s2 
with probability 1 -  p  , which reduces his utility to E[uB(s)\ . Concavity means that 
this holds for any s , and s'2, where s e [s[,s2 ]).
For the information-loving monitor, the picture is the reverse. He prefers to know 
the probabilities with which his state of health will be better or worse than knowing 
the expected state. His utility function is convex throughout (Figure 6.2 (b)). 
Knowing the probabilities with which he could be in states s] and s2 gives him a 
utility of E[um (5 )] while knowing the expected state of health reduces his utility to 
uM (£[$]). A (strictly) convex utility function implies that this holds for any s , s'  
and s2, where s e X X  ].
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.2: Utility function for a blunter (a) and a monitor (b).
For the doctor’s utility function we make two assumptions. First, her utility 
increases as the patient’s health does, but she is information neutral to his prospects 
of health, i.e. her utility, uD, is linear. Second, she takes into account the effort she 
needs to put in every time she transfers information, as well as the negative 
atmosphere, i.e. anger a , and the worry w that are created if she does not pass on 
the full information to a monitor. Effort, anger and worry are all measured in 
(dis)utility terms.
The calculation of the payoffs of the doctor and the patient is done by taking into 
account their preferences about information, the strategies chosen by both players, 
the effort expended and the probable anger and worry caused. Doctor and patient 
consider the effect of their own actions, taking into account the choice of their 
opponent, with a view of maximizing their individual utilities. Therefore, the games 
we present are non-cooperative.
We now consider the three models in more detail.
6.3.3 Model 1: The patient is a blunter
In this game of perfect information and perfect recall the doctor knows she is 
dealing with an information-averse patient. A blunter is a patient whose anxiety 
increases with more information about his possible state of health.
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The extensive form of the game is illustrated through the tree in Figure 6.3. 
Although it is not necessary, it includes, for later comparisons, Nature, N , which 
has chosen at the beginning of the game the patient to be a blunter. The doctor,
Player 1, moves first and the patient, Player 2, can find himself at a node where the
doctor has played T , i.e. she has spent time and passed on all the information, or 
N T , i.e. she has withheld part of the information. The patient can then choose
whether to play A (adhere), or NA (not adhere).
Figure 6.3:
The strategies of the doctor are therefore { N T , T } .  The pure strategies of the 
patient are {(A ,NA),  (A , A),  (NA,  NA ), ( NA , A ) j ,  where, for example, ( A , N A ) 
means that if he finds himself at node 2 he will play A and if at 2’ he will play N A . 
Of course the players can also choose to mix their pure strategies.
The payoffs of each player depend on the strategies chosen by both players and are 
given by the vectors in the terminal nodes. The first element refers to Player 1 and 
the second is the payoff of Player 2.
If the doctor plays T , i.e. gives all the information to the patient, and the patient 
plays A , i.e. adheres, then the doctor has a payoff of E[uD(s)]~ £x, where £x is the 
effort she puts in to supply the information. The patient’s payoff is is[wB(s )] . If the 
doctor plays T , but the player plays NA,  i.e. he does not adhere, then the health 
outcome will be reduced by / given that the patient has not followed the doctor’s 
recommendations. The payoffs for the doctor will be uD( E [ s ] - l ) - £ x and for the 
patient uB(E[s ] - l ).
(£ [k d ($ )]-£ ,,£ [« „  (5 )])
(» D(£[i]), ms(£[5]))
(«0 (£[*]-/), k s (£[*]-/))
The doctor-patient game indicating the optimal path (Model 1).
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If the doctor plays NT  and the patient plays A they have payoffs uD(E[s]) and 
ub (E[s]) .  However, if the doctor plays N T  and the patient plays NA then their 
payoffs are uD(E[s] - l ) and uB(E[s] - l ) . That is both the patient and the doctor 
loose utility because the patient’s health outcome is reduced as he has not followed 
the doctor’s recommendations.
Backward induction is used to solve the game. The method requires starting from 
the end of the game and then working backwards, through the optimal decisions of 
the players, to the initial node. In our model it suffices to reach singleton 1 as 
Nature is not optimizing a payoff.
In the tree, the patient moves last having observed the action of the doctor. In the 
backward induction his decisions are considered first. Given that he is a blunter, if 
the doctor plays T , then he will play N A , i.e. he will decide not to follow her 
advice because uB(E[s -  /]) > E[uB (s )]. On the other hand, if the doctor has played 
N T , i.e. she has not spent much time and has not given all the information, then the 
patient will decide to play A because uB(E[s])>uB( E [ s ] - l ) . Hence, the patient 
will adhere to the doctor’s recommendations.
Following the optimal decisions of the patient, the tree folds up in the one presented 
in Figure 6.4. This now indicates the possibilities available to the doctor. 
Comparing her payoffs in the two alternative moves, she will decide to play NT  
and therefore not spend time with the patient.
The first game theoretical solution concept available is that of Nash Equilibrium. It 
is defined here as a pair of strategies such that given the strategy of one player the 
other cannot change and do better. There are two pure strategies Nash equilibria in 
Model 1: {N T ;(A ,NA)} and {N T ; ( A , A )}. Indeed, if  the doctor plays N T  the
N
B
( ud(E[s ]),  ub (E[s ) ))
Figure 6.4: Backward induction (Model 1).
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patient cannot play any other strategy because that will result in him reducing his 
outcomes. Likewise, if the patient plays ( A , N A )  or ( A , A )  and the doctor 
changes his strategy from NT  to NT  she will only be worse off 
because E[uD (5 )] -  £, < (£[*]).
The stronger solution concept of a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is the 
outcome of the backward induction. It requires a Nash equilibrium at every 
subgame. It safeguards the patient against the possibility that the doctor chooses her 
action by mistake or without observing the rationality principle of optimal 
decisions. In this game the SPE {N T ; (A , NA)}.
Model 1 shows that when the doctor knows with certainty that the patient prefers 
not to be aware in much detail about his condition and treatment, as this increases 
his anxiety, it is optimal for her not to spend much time and effort to provide all the 
information. This seems a quite obvious observation but will be crucial for the 
understanding of the general model discussed below. Also, the patient, having 
observed that the doctor has not given him a lot of information, decides that it is 
optimal for him to play strategy ( A , NA). Therefore, the optimal path of the game is 
NT - A shown in Figure 6.3. In other words, the doctor will spend no effort and the 
patient will adhere. It is precisely the fact that the patient is information averse 
which implies that he will follow, on the optimal path, the doctor’s instruction. He 
finds the fact that she has not spent much time and effort explaining the conditions 
of his health reassuring.
6.3.4 Model 2: The patient is a monitor
We now examine what happens when the patient has been chosen by nature to be a 
monitor, i.e. a person who likes information. Again, the structure and the payoffs of 
the game are common knowledge to the players.
The extensive form of the game is illustrated in Figure 6.5. As in Model 1, the 
doctor moves first by deciding whether to spend time with the patient ( T ) or not 
( N T ). Armed with the privilege of knowing what the doctor has played, the patient 
then decides whether to adhere ( A )  or not (NA).  As in Model 1, the pure strategies 
for the two players of the game are {N T , T } for the doctor and {(A , NA), ( A ,  A),
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( NA, NA ), ( NA,A  )} for the patient, where for example (A ,NA)  means that if he 
finds himself at node 2 he will play a and if at 2' he will play NA.  O f course the 
players can choose to mix their pure strategies. Again, the payoffs of each player 
depend on the strategies chosen by both players and are given by the vectors in the 
terminal nodes. The first element refers to Player 1 and the second to Player 2.
(E[uD( s ) ] - e 2, £ [ ^ 0 ) ] )
(uD( E [ s ] - l ) - £ 2, uM( E[s ] - l ))
( ( £ [ 5 ] ) - a ,  uM(£[5])- a - w )  
(uD( E [ s ] - l ) - a , u M( E [ s ] - l ) - a )  
Figure 6.5: The doctor-patient game indicating the optimal path (Model 2).
If the doctor plays T , i.e. gives all the information to the patient, and the patient 
plays A , i.e. adheres, then the doctor has a payoff of E[uD (5 )] -  e2 , given that 
supplying all the information requires effort. The patient’s payoff is E[uM(s)\. If 
the doctor plays T , and the player plays NA,  i.e. he does not adhere, then the health 
outcome will be reduced by / and the payoffs for the doctor will be 
uD( E [ s ] - l ) - £ 2 and for the patient uM( E [ s ] - l ) . That is both the doctor and the 
patient are worse off given that the patient has not followed the doctor’s 
recommendations and as a consequence his health has been reduced.
If the doctor plays NT  and the patient plays A , they have a payoff of uD (£[5 ]) -  a 
and uM (E[s]) -  a -  w respectively. That is due to the fact that the anger created 
because the patient does not get all the information reduces the utility of both 
players. In addition the patient’s worry reduces his payoff even further. On the other 
hand, if the doctor plays N T  and the patient plays NA then their payoffs are 
uD( E [ s ] - l ) - a  and uM( E [ s ] - l ) - a  respectively.
Again, backward induction gives the solution to the game. In the tree the player 
moves last having observed the action of the doctor. In the backward induction his 
actions are considered first. Given he is a monitor (M), if the doctor plays T then 
he will play A , he will follow her advice because: E[uM (5 )] > uM (£ [5 ] -  /). On the
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other hand, if  the doctor has played N T  then the patient will play NA,  because 
uM( E [ s ] - l ) - a  >u M( E [ s ] ) - a - w .  Hence the patient will non-adhere to the 
doctor’s recommendations.
Following the optimal decisions of the patient, the tree in Figure 6.5 folds up in the 
one presented in Figure 6.6. This now indicates the possibilities available to the 
doctor. Since E[uD (5 )] — e 2 > uD ( £ [ 5  - I ] ) - a  the doctor will decide to play T .
(E[uD( s ) ] - e 2 , E[um (5 )])
N
( uD — l) — a , u M (£ [5 ] - I ) - a )NT
Figure 6.6: Backward induction (Model 2).
There are two pure strategies Nash equilibria for this game, {T ;(A ,NA) j  and 
{T ; (A ,A) } .  Indeed, none of the players can change his/her strategies given the 
strategy that the other has chosen and do any better. The subgame perfect 
equilibrium is { T ;(A , NA)}.  This safeguards the patient against the possibility that 
the doctor is irrational or chooses her action by mistake.
Model 2 shows that when the doctor knows with certainty that the patient is an 
individual for whom more information reduces his anxiety, it is best for her to put 
effort into explaining in detail the prospects of his health. Again this appears to be 
an obvious conclusion. However, it will be crucial for the understanding of later 
model. Therefore, the optimal path of the game is T - A shown in Figure 6.5. In 
other words, the doctor will need to put effort in and the patient will adhere. It is 
precisely the fact that the patient is information loving which implies that he will 
follow, on the optimal path, the doctor’s instruction. He finds the fact that she has 
spent so much time and effort explaining the conditions of his health reassuring.
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6.3.5 Model 3: The doctor does not know the type of patient
We discuss here the third game, which is the most realistic representation of the 
doctor-patient interaction. In this model the doctor does not know with certainty the 
type of patient she is dealing with. The extensive-form of the game is presented 
through the tree in Figure 6.7.
E[ud {s) ] - £ 2 , E[um (s )])
NA
(uD( E [ s ] - l ) - e 2, uM( E [ s ] - l ))
(uD( E[ s ] ) - a , uM(E[s])~ a -  w)
NT
N NA
(uD( E [ s ] - l ) - a , uM( E [ s ] - l ) - a  )
(E[uD( s ) ] - £ l ,E[uB(s)])
NA
{uD( £ [ s ] uB( E[ s ] - l ))
(uD(E[s])f (£!>]))
NT
NA
( uD(E[s ] - l ), uB{E[s]- l ) )
Figure 6.7: Extensive form of doctor-patient game indicating the optimal paths if
doctor plays T (Model 3).
Nature ( N ) moves first, at time 0, and selects the type of patient. The doctor does 
not know the type of patient she is dealing with. This is represented in the game tree 
by the information set I  shown by the dotted closed curve which contains the two 
nodes. If the doctor finds herself in /  and wishes to play a pure strategy then it 
must be the same from both nodes. This is the significance of the information set /  . 
The game described is of complete but imperfect information and perfect recall.
In order for the doctor to be able to take an action, and thus for the optimal paths to 
be calculated, she attaches a probability q that the patient is a monitor and a 
probability 1 -  q that he is a blunter. As will be shown below she can apply the 
principle of insufficient reason, an idea based on bounded rationality and apply an
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equal probability to the two events or a more general distribution expressing his 
information and beliefs.
The doctor’s pure strategies are {NT , T }. Each pure strategy is played from both 
nodes in information set I. The information sets of the patient are singleton. His 
pure strategies are: { ( A , NA, NA, NA), (A ,A ,NA,NA),  (A ,NA,A ,NA),
(A ,NA,NA,A) ,  (A ,A ,A ,A) ,  (A ,NA,A ,A) ,  (A ,A ,NA,A) ,  (A ,A ,A ,NA),  
( N A , A , A , A ) ,  ( NA , NA , A ,A ) ,  ( N A , A , N A , A ) ,  ( N A , A , A , N A ) ,  
(NA,NA,NA,NA),  (NA,A,NA,NA) ,  (NA, NA,A ,NA) ,  ( NA, NA,NA, A) } ,  
where for example (A ,NA,NA,NA)  means that the patient plays A from node 2 
and 2"' and NA from nodes 2' and 2".
As in the previous models, the payoffs of each player depend on the strategies 
chosen by both players and are given by the vectors at the terminal nodes, with the 
first element referring to Player 1 and the second to Player 2.
Of course, the information set I  implies that the doctor has to take the same action 
from both nodes. However, going down a particular path from the initial node to a 
terminal one we have the same payoffs for the doctor and the patient as going down 
the corresponding path in Figure 6.3 if the patient is a blunter or Figure 6.5 if the 
patient is a monitor. Thus we obtain the payoffs and the terminal nodes of Figure 
6.7.
Again, backward induction is used to obtain the optimal paths of the game. The 
patient knows exactly the path which has been followed up to a node when it is his 
turn to decide. In particular he knows whether he is a blunter and the choice of the 
doctor.
If the patient is a monitor (M) and the doctor has given him the information he 
wants, i.e. she has played T , then the patient will play A since 
E[Uj (s) > Uj (£[s] - / )  as shown in Figure 6.2 (b). So, in this case the patient will 
adhere. However, if the doctor plays N T ,  i.e. she does not pass on all the 
information, and the player is a monitor, then he will get angry and will express his 
anger in his payoff. This reduces both the utility of the patient and the doctor by a . 
In addition to this, the constant w is used to express the patient’s worry if he
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accepts the treatment while he knows that the doctor has not passed him all the 
information he wanted. This brings the patient’s utility further down, in a way that it 
is assumed to imply: (E [ s ] - l ) - a  >u„ (E [ s ] ) - a - x v . In this case, therefore,
the patient will play NA,  i.e. he will not adhere to the doctor’s recommendations.
Let us now consider the case of a blunter (B). If the doctor plays T then as shown 
in Figure 6.2(a) the patient will play NA,  i.e. he will not adhere, because: 
Uj{E[s]- l )  > E[uj (s )]. On the other hand, if the doctor has played N T , i.e. she 
does not give all the information, then the patient will decide to play A because 
u BN{E[s])>uBN{E[s]- l ) .
Following the optimal decisions of the patient, the tree in Figure 6.7 folds up in the 
one in Figure 6.8. This shows the moves available for the doctor, along with the 
payoffs for every move for both the doctor and the patient.
^ [ u d { s ) ] - £ 2 , E [ u m { s) } )
M
(uD (£(>] — I) —a, uM (£[s] - I ) - a )NT
I
(uD(E[s] - /) -£ * ,, uB{E[s-l]))
( ud (E[s ] ) , ub (E[s ]))NT
D
Figure 6.8: Backward induction (Model 3).
As stated above, the dotted closed curve shows that the doctor does not know 
whether she is under node following choice M or B. She will attach probabilities, 
expressing her beliefs, q that the patient is a monitor and 1 -  q that the patient is a 
blunter. Furthermore the fact that the doctor’s utility is linear implies that 
«id ( £ M )  =  £ [ i i o 0 ) ] .
The solution of the game can be obtained by applying the principle of insufficient 
reasons (Luce and Raiffa 1957), which is based on the notion of bounded rationality 
(Simon 1957; Glycopantis and Muir 1994). As we shall see below the doctor can 
apply the principle of insufficient reason and give an equal probability to the two
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events of Nature choosing either a monitor or blunter or a more general distribution 
expressing his information and beliefs (Glycopantis and Muir 1995). If there is 
really no sufficient reason to suppose that the patient is of either type one or the 
other type, the doctor will assign equal probabilities for the patient to be a monitor 
or a blunter. We shall also consider the implications of the doctor believing, 
probably on the basis of information collected, that the patient is more probably of a 
particular type.
We now examine for which q , let us call it q *, the doctor is indifferent between 
playing T or N T . If the doctor plays NT  her payoff will be:
For the doctor to be indifferent between NT  and T , payoffs of the two actions 
must be equal, or in other words: U] = U2. Replacing U] and U2 with their 
equivalent from (2) and (3) that is:
q [ u D(E[s]-l)-a] + ( l - q ) u D(E[s])=q(E[uD(s)]-£2) + ( \ - q ) [ u D(E[s]- l ) -£l]. (4)
Ul = q [ u D (£|>] - 1) -  a] + (1 -  q) • uD (£[>]). (2)
If the doctor decides to play T her payoff will be:
U1 =q-(E[uD(s)}-£1) + ( \ - q ) [ u D( E [ s } - l ) - £ i}. (3)
The solution to the above equation, called q * is given below
(5)
2uD (is[.s]) -  2uD (£[$] - l )  + a + €l - e 2
We bring equation (5) to a more manageable form:
uD{E{s})-uD(E{s]-l) + £x X
(6)
uD (^[5]) -  uD (£[5] - l )  + £] +uD (£ ’[5 ]) -  uD (is[s] - l )  + a - £ 2 X  + Y
where:
X  = uD (is[s]) - uD (£[s] - l )  + ex >0 and
Y = uD(E[s])-uD(E[s]-l) + a - £ 2 >0 .
Calculations are omitted for the purpose o f clarity o f the results. Detailed solution to the equation is
given in Appendix C.l.
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We now want to examine what the doctor will do under bounded rationality. As 
mentioned above, under bounded rationality the doctor does not hold any 
information regarding the patient’s preferences, therefore adjusts equal probability
to the patient being a monitor or a blunter. In mathematical terms, q = .
Under bounded rationality, the doctor is indifferent between playing T or NT  
when q* = ^ .  Equivalently, we have:
X  1= — <=> -£, = - a  + £2 <=> £, + £2 = a . (7)
X  + Y 2
We rewrite the above condition (7) in order to interpret the above conclusions:
— ■(£ ,+£2 ) = — •(()+ fl). (8)
For q* = the left-hand side of the above equation (8) is the average disutility of
effort if the doctor plays T and the right-hand side is her average disutility if she 
plays N T . When this holds, the doctor is indifferent between Ux and U2 and 
therefore she is indifferent on whether to play T or N T .
We now examine under which conditions the doctor will play T or N T . Under 
bounded rationality, in the case of insufficient reason, i.e. when q = , the doctor
2 1will play NT  if Ul > U2 which is equivalent to £] + e2 > a . This implies q* > —.
Following the interpretation used above, this means that the doctor will not pass on 
all the information to the patient if the average disutility of effort of providing the 
information is greater than her average disutility if she does not. The patient will 
then play A , i.e. will adhere, if he is a blunter or N A , i.e. will not adhere, if he is a 
monitor. This is an assessment equilibrium as it is defined not only in terms of what 
the players do but also in terms of what they believe.
2 Calculations are omitted for the purpose of clarity of the results. Detailed solution to the equation is
given in Appendix C.3.
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On the other hand, under bounded rationality, the doctor will play T if Ux< U2 that
3 1is equivalent to e, + e2 < a . This implies q* < —. This means that the doctor will
pass on all the information to the patient if the average disutility of effort of doing 
so is lower than her average disutility if she does not. The patient will then play A , 
i.e. will adhere, if he is a monitor or NA,  i.e. will not adhere, if he is a blunter. 
Again this is an assessment equilibrium.
To sum up, under bounded rationality, i.e. when the doctor attaches probability
that the patient is a monitor or a blunter, the following three cases are possible:
■ The doctor will be indifferent as whether to play T or NT  when ex + e2 = a ,
■ The doctor will play NT  when e , + £2 > a ,
■ The doctor will play T when ex+ e2 < a .
We note that given the beliefs of the doctor, the optimal paths can be considered as 
describing a Nash equilibrium, since nobody can improve his payoff given the 
strategies of the other. However, since decisions are taken under the doctor’s beliefs 
concerning the nodes in /  it is more appropriate to use the concept of assessment 
equilibrium which takes into account the initial beliefs of the doctor. We cannot 
really talk about a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium because no updating of beliefs 
takes place based on Bayes rule.
For the case q* < the optimal paths are shown in Figure 6.7 through the black 
lines from the nodes in the information set to two terminal nodes.
From the above conclusions we derive that as ex and e2 go up, i.e. the effort the 
doctor needs to put in to pass on information increases, she will be willing to pay 
NT . On the other hand, when e , and e2 decrease then the doctor will play T . 
However, when a increases, i.e. anger is created when the patient is a monitor and 
the doctor does not pass on all the information to him, then the former is willing to 
play T . However, when a decreases then the doctor will play NT  .
3 Again, calculations are omitted. Detailed solution to the equation is given in Appendix C.4.
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These comparative statics results provide useful insights in understanding policy 
implications derived from the models. They will be discussed later in this chapter.
6.4 Limitations and directions for future research
This section discusses the limitations as well as possible extensions of the model 
presented above. The first point that should be made is that effort is rather a general 
concept that is used in the model as a way of demonstrating that the doctor cannot 
be expected to act as a perfect agent for the patient and maximise the patient’s 
utility function. Apart from having her own utility function, she is often constrained 
by her strength and desire to serve a number of patients and by organisational 
factors. Effort has been used here as a proxy for a set of factors, and in future 
research their particular effect could be the object of analysis. For example, one 
could consider separately the effect of the length of time that can be allocated to a 
patient, the working hours of a doctor or the administrative support to screen the 
patient.
Model 3 presented a realistic situation in which the doctor cannot tell the type of 
patient she is examining. On the other hand, the patient knows exactly his type and 
the doctor’s choice of action. An extension could be to analyse a model in which the 
patient will, of course, know his type but will not be able to tell with certainty what 
the doctor has played. In other words, in the extended model the patient will not be 
able to identify whether the doctor has told him the whole truth or not. For example, 
the length of consultation time will only be indicative but not decisive.
That would lead to a more involved game. It would create an extra two information 
sets with two nodes in each. Beliefs per type of patient would have to be attached to 
these nodes, pure strategies would be per information set, and there will be no 
subgames. The appropriate equilibrium concept would be that of perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium. The beliefs of the patient would be updated using Bayes rule. The 
analysis could reveal further aspects of the doctor-patient relationship.
An interesting point of conflict of interests of the two parties is the different way 
they value present and future outcomes. Doctors are more future-oriented and want 
to maximize the patient’s health outcome in the future and are less interested in the
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patient’s anticipatory feelings in the present. Their goal is to improve the patient’s 
health in the future rather than making a patient happier now.
On the other hand, the patients are more present oriented and they tend to discount 
the future. They put more weight on leading an easier life now rather than thinking 
of the consequences for their future health status. This is particularly true for life­
style behaviours such as smoking. In order to model this conflict one could build 
again on Caplin and Leahy’s Psychological Expected Utility theory (Caplin and 
Leahy 2001). There will be two periods 1, the present and 2, the future. The total 
utility is the sum of the utilities per period. The conflict of time-preferences could 
be modelled by allowing the doctor to put more weight on health outcomes in the 
future, while the patient would give a higher weight to the present.
We assumed in our models that every agent has one type of utility function that is 
concave, convex or linear. Of course, one could also consider more general utility 
functions such as a Friedman-Savage function to describe different attitudes to 
information concerning bad and good news. Our approach was designed to give an 
explanation of the features and findings of experimental studies.
The game theory model presented here was designed to capture the characteristic 
features and basic results of empirical findings. Certain results described in the 
model were major findings of the two empirical studies conducted for this thesis, 
both the European Social Survey and the survey conducted in the Centre for 
Hypertension in Athens.
For example, the questionnaire survey presented in Chapter 5 of the thesis found 
that patients who wanted more information and did not get it from the doctor were 
more likely to non-adhere to the prescribed medication. This is consistent with the 
results of the model. The analysis of the game showed that if the doctor has not 
passed on all the information then a patient who is a monitor will not adhere. A 
major predictor of non-adherence by a patient was if he felt that the doctor had not 
spent enough time with them.
Of course, more empirical testing of the models presented could be the object of 
future research. An ongoing effort to collect more data and information concerning 
the doctor-patient relationship could produce further findings which could be
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analysed by an adjustment and adaptation of the present theoretical model analysed 
here. A suggestion for a possible further investigation is presented in Appendix C of 
the thesis. It presents the outline of a questionnaire survey and the type of 
information that needs to be collected to test the models.
6.5 Discussion and policy implications
The models developed here give concrete insights to the doctors and the policy 
makers into understanding first how patients’ information preferences and beliefs 
affect their decisions and also how specific interventions may improve the doctor- 
patient relationship and help achieve adherence to recommendations. The policy 
implications derived from the models will be discussed with respect to the doctor, 
the patient and the health system. A more general discussion and policy 
implications are provided in Chapter 7, where both the empirical and theoretical 
findings are considered.
The models presented in this chapter capture the fact that patients vary in their 
preferences regarding how much information they need. Patients do not always 
want to know everything regarding their condition and future state (Morgan, 
Roufeil et al. 1998). Too much information increases the anxiety of blunters and, if 
provided, results in non-adherence to recommendations. On the other hand, 
information decreases the anxiety for the monitors and helps them adhere to what 
the doctor suggests.
Therefore, interventions aiming to educate patients and help them adhere to 
recommendations should be tailored to the patient’s specific needs. Providing all the 
information will not always give desirable results and in fact may lead to different 
therapy decisions from those the physicians might hope for (Siminoff and Fetting 
1991). Literature on tailored care has, indeed, shown that interventions focusing on 
the patient’s individual needs increase satisfaction with care and improve adherence 
rates (Kreuter, Farrell et al. 2000). Leaflets and information material should be 
given to those who seek information but not necessarily to those who do not.
The models also provide interesting and specific results regarding the doctor’s role 
and how it can be influenced to improve adherence. We consider financial
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incentives first by assuming that doctors can be rewarded for their effort in 
supplying information to the patient. We start at q* = in which the doctor is
indifferent between playing T or NT . Financial incentives to award effort imply 
that ex and e 2 are reduced as part of them has been bought out through money 
reward.
Model 3 showed that as £, and e2 decrease the doctor tends to play T , i.e. she will 
tend to pass on to the patient all the information. In other words, financial incentives 
that reward the doctor for her effort would have the result that she puts more effort 
into the consultation. This would increase adherence rates among monitors, i.e. 
information loving patients. However, if the patients are blunters this has the 
opposite effect. Therefore, the policy implication is that financial incentives of 
compensating the doctor for her effort are an effective method of improving 
adherence when patients are information loving.
It is interesting to see how doctors would behave under a different payment method 
system. Under Payment by Results schemes, doctors are paid not only on the basis 
of the number of patients they see but also by taking into account improvements 
they achieve in a patient’s health outcomes. Assuming that adherence improves 
health outcomes it is interesting to see what the model predicts regarding the 
doctor’s behaviour. In our model a constant P will be added to the payoff of the 
doctor when the patient plays A . The model implies that in expectations this 
payment itself will not directly change the decision of the doctor. Indirectly, though, 
it might reduce the disutility of the doctor from the effort resulting in a reduction of 
ex and £2 in which case we get the same results as with financial incentives. In 
terms of policy implications the models do not seem to confirm a direct effect of a 
Payment by Results scheme in improving adherence. It can only have an indirect 
effect if it is seen as an alternative way of rewarding effort.
Model 3 also showed that the doctor’s decision to put effort into the consultation 
also depends on a , i.e. the negative atmosphere created when a monitor realises 
that the doctor does not pass on all the information. The constant a can be 
perceived as the lack of trust developed during the consultation. If a decreases, i.e. 
an atmosphere of trust is created, the Model shows that the patient reaches the same
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decision; however, the doctor can move from the indifferent point to the possible 
e, + e2 > a . In this case the doctor will play NT  . In other words, in situations in 
which the consultation is characterised by trust the doctor can put in less effort, i.e. 
spend less time with the patient. As the model shows this is to the benefit of the 
blunter.
Next, the doctor’s training could show significant improvements in adherence rates. 
Doctors should be educated to understand patients’ different needs and be better 
able to detect them. Knowing the type of patient she is diagnosing gives the doctor 
the privilege to be able to play a game of complete information. In this case the 
implication of our analysis is that the doctor passes on to the patient the right 
amount of information and therefore, as shown in Models 1 and 2, he will adhere to 
the recommendations.
Health system related interventions could also provide very helpful insights in terms 
of improving adherence. The models imply, as shown above, that if the doctor 
knows the patient’s preferences then she plays the game with perfect information, 
therefore improves adherence rates. This is achieved from better trained 
administrative support to screen the patient before the consultation. The patient 
could be asked to complete a straightforward but appropriately designed 
questionnaire, while waiting to see their doctor, with the aim of the staff being able 
to identify information preferences.
For this purpose, a number of instruments have been validated and repeatedly been 
used to identify ‘monitoring’ and ‘bluntering’ preferences. The Miller Behavioral 
Style Scale (MBSS) is one of the most well known and frequently used instruments 
developed by Miller, who introduced the concept of ‘monitors’ and ‘blunters’ 
(Miller 1987). Completing this scale enables the doctors, especially when seeing 
patients for the first time, to have information regarding the type of patient they are 
about to meet and therefore pass on adequate information. Ideally, using the 
model’s terminology, the completion of the questionnaire will enable the doctor to 
play the game as predicted by Model 1 or 2, depending on the type of patient.
This simple intervention will lead to a situation where the patient’s needs for 
information are more likely to be understood by the doctor and that would increase
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satisfaction with the consultation and also the patient’s intention to follow 
recommendations. This is shown clearly by our models.
To sum up, a combination of institutional interventions and instruments to help the 
doctor and the patient, such as incentive schemes and tailored care, are appropriate 
for improving adherence rates among patients and this is predicted by our models.
6.6 Concluding remarks
The aim of this chapter has been to investigate whether a game theoretical approach 
that captures the patients’ preferences for information about their health and 
doctor’s possible inability, for various reasons, to understand these preferences may 
explain why patients fail to adhere to medical recommendations. The review of the 
literature identified a gap in this area as previous theoretical models failed to 
explain these conflicts in the doctor-patient relationship.
The game theoretical approach that was used here offers an interdependent decision 
analysis which explains the optimal decision for both players. In particular, it 
explains why the doctor may decide not to provide all the information to the patient 
and the patient may decide not to adhere to the recommendations.
More specifically, the chapter has presented an extensive form approach, expressed 
through game trees, that models the supply of information by a doctor to a patient 
when anxiety enters his utility function and she needs to put effort into supplying 
information. The models drew upon the Psychological Expected Utility introduced 
by Caplin and Leahy (2001).
The present models contribute to the literature in that the doctor takes into account 
not only the patient’s utility but also the effort required, as a proxy of a number of 
constraints, to supply information. Also, in our models the patient is given an active 
role and can decide, based on his payoff function, whether to accept the 
recommendation or not. In the first two models, the doctor knows the type of 
patient. In Model 3, which is more realistic, the doctor does not know with certainty 
the type of patient and she acts under various hypotheses of bounded rationality to 
resolve the issue of uncertainty (Simon 1957).
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The models were built under specific but reasonable assumptions and offer a 
complete resolution of the games, using comparative statistics analysis and giving 
economic interpretations. Their predictions are also reasonable. Models 1 and 2 
show that when the doctor knows with certainty the type of patient she will transfer 
adequate information and the patient will adhere. In Model 3 the situation is more 
complicated. The doctor does not know the type of patient and needs to decide how 
much information to pass on. She has to consider not only the patient’s utility but 
also the effort she needs to put into supplying the information.
Our analysis shows that, in deciding whether to fully inform the patient or not, the 
doctor will compare her average disutility of putting in effort with the average 
disutility of not doing so. The latter will stem from the anger of a monitor patient 
who realises that she is not being told the truth. This is an important marginal 
condition of the type that is encountered throughout economic theory.
Another result is that the patient will accept the doctor’s recommendation if she has 
successfully supplied the information he wants regarding his state of health. A 
monitor will be satisfied with full information and a blunter with less detailed 
explanation of his health prospects.
Model 3 successfully predicts that consultations where the doctor does not 
recognise the patient’s need and fails to pass on to the patient the right information 
may result in non-adhering to her recommendations. The analysis here is 
appropriate in situations where the patient visits the doctor for the first time to get 
diagnosis, and there is no prior information regarding the type of patient. This is 
often the case in acute care, where an urgent consultation is needed for a diagnosis 
and prescription. It can also refer to a first consultation for the treatment of a 
chronic condition. In this case the patient will at some point visit the doctor again 
possibly due to relapse or for continuing treatment.
It might then be possible for the doctor to deduce the patient’s type from the effort 
that she previously put in and his subsequent state of his health. Our analysis covers 
this case as well. Either Model 1 or Model 2 will now be appropriate to be applied 
for the next consultations. This may partially explain why visits to the doctor for 
longer periods may improve adherence among patients.
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In summary, a measure of success has been achieved in constructing models with 
realistic assumptions and reasonable predictions. A number of policy implications 
to increase adherence rates can be made. We have also pointed out the need for 
continuously updating the empirical evidence.
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CHAPTER 7
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
7.1 Introduction
This chapter brings together the empirical and theoretical findings of the thesis 
and discusses them in a broader policy context. The two empirical studies give 
interesting results on the important issue of non-adherence to medication and the 
doctor-patient relationship in Greece, a country where no previous systematic 
evidence on the topic exists. The game theory approach explains a substantial 
part of the empirical findings of this thesis and previous empirical work. It also 
provides more general theoretical insights into the doctor-patient interaction with 
implications that are discussed beyond the Greek setting.
Non-adherence to medication is widely recognised as a problem of great 
significance and concern as it leads to reduced health outcomes and increased 
health care costs (WHO 2003). Researchers and policy makers acknowledge that 
the doctor-patient relationship plays an important role in patients’ decisions to 
adhere to medical recommendations. Understanding this relationship will help 
with the design of appropriate policies to tackle the serious problem of non­
adherence.
The rest of the chapter is organised in the following way. Section 7.2 considers 
first the empirical findings of the thesis in an attempt to understand the issue of 
the doctor-patient relationship and its impact on non-adherence and within the 
broader Greek setting. It then discusses how the non-cooperative game theory 
approach explains the conflicts of the doctor-patient interaction during the 
consultation in general and the findings of the empirical chapter more 
specifically. Section 7.3 discusses the policy implications of the findings. Section 
7.4 gives directions for future research and Section 7.5 concludes the discussion.
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7.2 General Discussion of Findings
The review of the literature indicated a clear recent tendency to depart from the 
misconception that non-adherence is primarily a patient-driven problem. Early 
attempts in the area were trying to identify the characteristics of the typical non­
adherent patient, focusing on socioeconomic and demographic factors as well as 
disease and regimen related factors. During recent years researchers have been 
interested in a more in depth approach, by focusing on people’s beliefs and 
emotions (Home and Weinman 1999) and also investigating how the doctor can 
play a role in supporting these feelings (RPSGB 1997).
The thesis makes significant steps in this direction. Both of the empirical studies 
put great emphasis on understanding individuals’ emotions and perceptions. The 
findings of both studies confirm the importance of these perceptions, in particular 
with respect to the doctor-patient relationship. They show that these perceptions 
were the strongest predictors of patients’ decisions to adhere to the prescribed 
medication.
The theoretical chapter also acknowledges the importance of emotions in 
decision making and incorporates them into the utilities of both the doctor and 
the patient. Behavioural Economics provides invaluable help in achieving this 
and the models developed in our chapter are largely influenced by this upcoming 
field. By incorporating elements of Psychology, the models manage to describe 
the doctor-patient relationship in a more realistic way. The interaction of the 
decisions of the two parties explains why patients may fail to adhere to the 
doctors’ recommendations.
7.2.1 Discussion of empirical findings and health prospects in Greece 
On adherence
The analysis of the two empirical studies of the thesis indicated that individuals 
in Greece are distinctly adherent to the prescribed medications. The ESS study 
showed that the Greek sample was the second most adherent after the
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Portuguese, with only 7% reporting they did not take their medication as 
prescribed. Similarly, the patient survey among the hypertensive patients in 
Athens demonstrated that the majority of the patients take their prescribed 
medication.
Adherence to medication is very important in improving health outcomes and 
managing chronic conditions (Trueman 2000). Of course, patients’ engagement in 
their health care requires, apart from adherence to medication, an improved life 
style, smoking cessation, balanced diet and exercise. This is particularly true for 
conditions like hypertension, which was examined in this thesis, where a 
combination of medication taking, a low salt diet and moderate exercise is very 
important in achieving better outcomes (Izzo, Levy et al. 2000).
Despite the encouraging findings of the thesis that adherence rates to medication 
are high, there are other aspects of the public health profile of the population in 
Greece that require consideration. Smoking levels are particularly high. Greece has 
the highest frequency of smoking among European Union members with about 
40% of the adult population being daily smokers (Vardavas and Kafatos 2007). In 
the specific case of the patients in Athens that were examined in Chapter 5, about 
25% reported smoking every day or occasionally, despite being diagnosed with 
hypertension and other cardiovascular conditions.
Obesity is another major health issue in Greece. The problem is even more 
apparent among young children and adolescents, with about one out of three 
children in Greece being obese or overweight in 2000 (Obesity 2002). As the 
population departs from the traditional Mediterranean diet and exercises less, these 
trends have seen a dramatic increase over recent years (Kosti, Panagiotakos et al. 
2007).
These changes in the lifestyle of the Greek population may also explain the 
deterioration of general indicators such as mortality and morbidity rates and the 
increasing burden of cerebrovascular and heart diseases and cancers of the 
trachea and lung (WHO 2007). Consequences of life-style choices in health 
outcomes are often only seen in the long-term. For example, it has been argued
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that the impact of smoking on women’s life-expectancy is not very apparent yet, 
as most women started smoking in the late 1970s (Davaki and Mossialos 2006).
The paradox of high life expectancy in Greece despite the low health care 
expenditure and GDP that puzzled researchers a few decades ago (Newhouse 
1977) is very likely to disappear in the near future as it becomes evident that 
health outcomes deteriorate due to life-style choices. This indicates even more 
strongly the importance of an immediate and more holistic approach to 
improving health behaviours.
It is also worrying that the high adherence rates are not due to a clear health 
promotion and disease management programme that aims to tackle the issue. It 
was shown in this thesis that high adherence to medication among Greeks is 
based mainly on patients’ relation with their doctors. This could be a potentially 
unstable situation as we discuss below.
Therefore, despite the encouraging findings that Greeks are following 
medications as prescribed by their doctors, there are still a number of life-style 
choices that need to be tackled. The observed high adherence rates to medication 
imply that there is every prospect that health promotion and disease management 
programmes based on a strong doctor-patient relationship could result in an 
improvement in this situation.
On the doctor-patient relationship
The most significant determinant of Greek respondents’ decision to adhere was 
found to be their relationship with the doctors. The analysis of the ESS showed 
that they have a high opinion of their doctors, they respect their expertise and 
therefore trust them more than the rest of the Europeans do. Similarly, the survey 
among hypertensive patients in Greece confirmed trust in the doctor’s expertise 
and this mainly explained patients’ adherence to his recommendations.
The findings of both empirical studies indicate some seeds of paternalism in the 
doctor-patient relationship in Greece. However, this relationship could alter in
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the future as the new generations of both doctors and patients are expected to be 
different in terms of expectations, facilities and knowledge.
An example of these changes is expected to be seen in the information channels 
used by the patients. The doctor was the dominant source of information 
regarding hypertension and the medication in the analysis of our questionnaire 
study. The use of other sources was very limited. In particular, the use of the 
Internet to get information regarding hypertension was reported by only 2.8% of 
the respondents and by an even lower 1.5% regarding anti-hypertensive 
medication. However, it has been widely reported in other empirical studies, 
concerning other countries, that the Internet is a popular source of information 
among patients, affecting their decisions to adhere to medication (Home, 
Weinman et al. 2005).
In view of the evidence that the use of the Internet in Greece is increasing 
exponentially (OECD 2007), it is necessary to consider the possible implications. 
There is an ongoing debate on the influence that the Internet has on the doctor- 
patient relationship and we need to discuss both sides of the argument.
On the one hand, the use of online sources to get medical information can put the 
doctor-patient relationship in danger as it may challenge the doctor’s expertise 
and make patients lose trust in the doctor. Evidence from a qualitative study of 
households in the UK who used the Internet to get health information shows 
interesting results on how it affected their health beliefs and behaviours (Hardey 
2001). It demonstrated that it is the users of Internet information rather than 
medical authors or professional experts who decided what is accessed and how it 
is used. The study concludes that “the Internet forms the site of a new struggle 
over expertise in health that will transform the relationship between the health 
professions and their clients”.
On the other hand, other studies show that information seeking on the Internet 
does not indicate a desire to disrupt the existing balance of power, or roles, in the 
consultation. A survey by Stevenson et al (2007) in the UK demonstrates that 
patients “appear to see the Internet as an additional resource to support existing 
and valued relationships with their doctors". The authors conclude that the
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doctors therefore need not feel challenged or threatened when patients bring 
health information from the Internet to a consultation. They should see it as an 
attempt on the part of the patient to work with the doctor and respond positively.
There are consequently challenges coming up that may put pressure on the 
doctor-patient relationship in Greece. However, it is in the hands of health care 
providers to ensure these changes work for the benefit of both the doctor and the 
patient. The new generation of young doctors, a large number of whom have 
received training abroad, may be likely to understand the Internet more as an 
opportunity than a challenge. In discussion with their patients, doctors can 
identify users of the Internet and find ways in which this can be useful for their 
relationship. For example, doctors can be open in clarifying questions through 
emails between appointments in order to avoid having patients searching online 
for this information.
Another important issue that concerns our thesis regarding the doctor-patient 
relationship is doctors’ incentives. There is no clear evidence on the impact that 
different types of incentives have on patient non-adherence to medication. The 
evidence is indirect and comes from the literature on the impact of incentives on 
clinical outcomes. Still studies that focus on these aspects are limited. More 
evidence is required to associate doctors’ incentives with adherence to 
medication.
In Greece, as was discussed in Chapter 2, the system does not provide incentives 
to the doctors to improve the quality of health care (Davaki and Mossialos 2006). 
However, there may be less obvious, and difficult to identify, reasons for the 
doctors to prescribe, and ensure that the patients follow, the prescriptions. These 
may include informal payments and pressure from pharmaceutical companies 
that force doctors to prescribe more and ensure patient satisfaction, and 
consequently adherence to medication. More evidence is needed in this direction.
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On institutional factors
Analysis of the European sample demonstrated interesting results regarding the 
impact of the institutional factors on non-adherence. Evidence on this area is 
limited and our results offer useful insights. More specifically, the thesis showed 
that individuals who feel they have enough choice in selecting their doctor were 
less likely to non-adhere.
A possible explanation of the impact of more choice on adherence could be that 
when people feel they have control of their actions, they are more determined to 
fulfil their health goal and, therefore, they may adhere better to the 
recommendations. Perception of control is an important element in theoretical 
models explaining health behaviour, including the Theory of Reasoned Action 
and Planned Behaviour as well as the Self-Efficacy model described in section 
2.3.1.
On the other hand, choice of physician may be associated with better satisfaction 
with the consultation and the doctor, as was shown in a cross-sectional study by 
Schmittdiel et al. (1997) in the USA. The authors argue that the opportunity to 
select one’s personal physician influences satisfaction with consultation and the 
health care provider. Satisfaction consequently has been shown to affect 
adherence to medication. Therefore, more choice may lead to more satisfaction 
with physicians and consequently satisfaction may improve adherence to 
recommendations.
The analysis also showed that those individuals who prefer to see the same 
doctor for different health problems were also less likely to non-adhere to the 
prescribed medication. A possible explanation may be that when patients see the 
same doctor they develop more personalised relationship, they trust him more 
and therefore, are more likely to follow his recommendations.
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7.2.2 Theoretical insights
The thesis, apart from its empirical findings, contributes significantly to the 
theoretical discussion on the doctor-patient relationship. Chapter 6 used a non- 
cooperative game theory approach, in the form of a game tree, to capture the 
conflicts of the doctor-patient relationship and examine if this can explain 
patients’ behaviour. It is influenced by the upcoming field of Behavioural 
Economics, which offers useful tools incorporating psychological factors into the 
utilities of both parties. In particular, it extends previous behavioural economics 
models based on the Psychological Expected Utility (PEU) by challenging the 
assumption of perfect agency relationship that models have employed.
The models developed yield interesting results. When the doctor knows the type 
of patient she is diagnosing she will pass on the right information and the patient 
will adhere to her recommendations. On the other hand, if the doctor is not 
certain about the type of patient then she may pass on the wrong information and 
this will result in non-adherence.
This agrees with previous empirical evidence. Studies on patients’ preferences 
show that they vary with respect to how much information they want (Elkin, Kim 
et al. 2007). However, doctors often fail to understand patients’ preferences and 
needs for information and participation in the decision making process (Bruera, 
Willey et al. 2002). When the agendas of the two parties are not met, satisfaction 
with the consultation encounter is low and this results in patients not adhering to 
the medication (Britten, Stevenson et al. 2000).
The models also agree with the empirical findings of the thesis. The analysis of 
the questionnaire survey among the group of hypertensive patients in Greece 
showed that those individuals who wanted more information and did not have it 
were more likely to non-adhere.
The game theoretical approach gives interesting insights into the doctor-patient 
relationship and its impact on non-adherence. Doctors who successfully detect 
the type of patients they diagnose meet their needs and this results in better 
adherence to medical recommendations.
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All the above findings are discussed below within a broader policy context.
7.3 Policy Implications
As we discuss immediately below, the issue of non-adherence and its 
implications is of considerable importance. This highlights the need for urgent 
policy recommendations.
The impact of non-adherence in health care is very significant. WHO (2003) has 
reported that non-adherence to medication in long-term therapies, despite its 
variation by country and disease category, is a “worldwide” health problem of 
great magnitude. Adherence to medical recommendation is crucial in managing 
chronic conditions. The continuous ageing of the population and the consequent 
growing of the social and economic burden of chronic illnesses in developed 
countries urgently requires more attention to the problem of non-adherence.
Non-adherence to medication has also been shown to reduce health outcomes, 
due to relapses and rehospitalisation, and consequently leads to increased health 
care costs. In a study by Col et al. (1990), in the USA, non-adherence to 
recommendations accounted for 12% of the readmission of elderly people to 
hospitals due to relapses. Similarly, a meta-analysis by Sullivan et al. (1990) 
showed that 5.5% of hospital readmissions in the USA was due to non-adherence 
to recommendations.
The economic impact of non-adherence on health systems is also significant. The 
study by Sullivan et al. (1990) in the USA estimated the cost of readmissions to 
hospitals due to non-adherence to be 8.5 billion dollars on a national level. 
Therefore, improving adherence rates for chronic diseases through a number of 
effective policy interventions will have a positive return not only through 
primary prevention of risk factors but also avoidance of adverse health outcomes. 
As Haynes et al. (2002) point out “increasing the effectiveness of adherence 
interventions may have a far greater impact on the health of the population than 
any other improvement in specific medical treatments”.
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No simple interventions have been shown to improve adherence. The Cochrane 
Review (2002) examined a number of interventions, proposed by different 
studies, intending to increase adherence rates. Two main conclusions are 
interesting. First, it pointed out that the number of studies that showed some 
improvement in adherence rates is still very small and more research of high 
quality is needed. Second, the successful interventions were very complex and 
required more than one method to achieve good results.
Based on the findings of both the empirical and theoretical investigations of the 
thesis we discuss a number of general policy recommendations to tackle the issue 
of non-adherence to medication. The interventions are given with respect to the 
doctor, the patient and the health system, and are discussed beyond the Greek 
setting. Given the constraints on funds available for the National Health Service 
as well as for other public sector requirements, the statements below do not 
necessarily imply a call for an increase in health expenditure but more of an 
efficient allocation of existing funds.
Non-adherence is not a patient-driven problem only
The first step to successfully tackle the issue of non-adherence is to think of the 
patient as an individual who needs to be supported by the health care provider 
and the system, rather than be blamed for his decision to non-adhere. The health 
care environment in which patients receive care is an important factor that affects 
non-adherence.
The findings of the thesis confirmed that the patient’s decision was highly 
influenced by the doctor-patient relationship. The perceptions individuals hold 
regarding their doctors were the strongest determinants of their decision to 
adhere to prescribed medication. That was the result of both the analysis of the 
European Social Survey and the survey among hypertensive patients in Athens. 
Satisfaction with consultation, participation in the decision making process, and 
treating patients as equals were some of the aspects of the doctor-patient 
relationship that were shown to affect the decision to adhere to the prescribed 
medication.
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The analysis of the ESS population sample showed that, apart from the doctor- 
patient relationship, other institutional factors were also associated with the 
individuals’ decision to take the prescribed medication. More specifically, those 
individuals who felt they had enough choice in selecting their doctor and those 
who said they preferred the same doctor for different conditions were more likely 
to adhere to the medication. More choice of physicians or preference for the same 
doctor may be associated with higher satisfaction with the physician, which 
consequently affects adherence rates. Evidence on the impact of the system- 
related factors is limited and this thesis indicates the importance of it on non­
adherence.
On the other hand, the empirical studies of the thesis do not support the 
hypothesis that demographic and socioeconomic factors consistently predict non­
adherence. This is in agreement with the findings of the literature review (Lin, 
Von Korff et al. 1995; Brus, van de Laar et al. 1999) indicating that non-adherent 
patients should not be looked for within specific socioeconomic and demographic 
groups.
Similarly, the results did not confirm the idea that clinical characteristics were 
significant predictors of adherence among the hypertensive patients in Greece. 
Evidence in this area is contradictory, but it has been shown that the severity of 
the condition is not necessarily associated with adherence to the medical 
recommendations (Mann, Eliasson et al. 1992; Lin, Von Korff et al. 1995).
The WHO report on non-adherence (2003) urgently calls for more research 
emphasis to be given to the environment within which the issue of non-adherence 
is seen. This includes both the relationship with the health care provider as well 
as the health system. It argues that “patients need to be supported, not blamed”.
The above findings and suggestions have concrete policy implications. They 
require more research funds to establish the exact conditions under which the 
doctor-patient relationship unfolds. Policies that consider issues of choice of 
doctors should take into account that when people feel they have more options in 
choosing their practitioner they are more likely to be adherent to the prescribed 
recommendations.
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Similarly, people who prefer to see different doctors for different conditions were 
shown to be more adherent. This finding is in favour of the gate-keeping systems, 
where the GP or the family doctor can give advice on a number of different 
conditions.
Doctors ’ incentives: financial incentives do not always improve adherence
Empirical evidence on the impact that financial incentives to doctors have on 
health outcomes in general and non-adherence to medication more specifically is 
limited. A study by Chaix-Couturier et al. (2000) reviewing the related literature 
shows that financial incentives clearly affect doctors’ behaviour in many ways; 
they may help reduce the use of health care resources, improve compliance with 
guidelines and achieve health targets. However, they suggest that they may be 
better used in combination with other incentives in order to be more effective and 
they do not show how they affect patients’ adherence to medical 
recommendations.
The findings of this thesis show that financial incentives do not necessarily lead 
to better adherence rates. This was confirmed both empirically and theoretically. 
In particular, the empirical findings showed that in Greece, a country where the 
health system does not provide financial incentives to doctors to improve quality 
of care, adherence rates were very high. This was shown both from the analysis 
of the ESS and the questionnaire survey among hypertensive patients in Athens.
Our game theory model supports these results. As was more extensively 
discussed in Chapter 6, financial incentives, according to our models, are 
effective in improving adherence rates when patients are information-loving, yet 
they may not have similarly desirable results if patients are information-averse. A 
possible explanation could be that, as Chaix-Couturier et al. (2000) argue, 
motivating doctors with financial rewards increases the conflict of interests 
between the doctors and the patients, putting their relationship in danger.
The payment-by-results scheme, another type of financial incentive awarded to 
doctors when reaching certain targets, was also considered in the game theory
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chapter. Our models showed that the scheme does not necessarily improve 
adherence rates. An interesting case on this type of incentive is the 
implementation of the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) in the UK.1 The 
scheme was introduced in 2004 and it is, therefore, too early to investigate its 
impact on doctors’ behaviour and most importantly on patients’ health outcomes. 
However, a recent study by Campbell et al. (2007) gives some interesting 
preliminary results, using data from primary care in the UK before and after the 
implementation of the QOF. The study did not look at the direct effect that the 
scheme may have on patients’ decision to adhere but it found no strong evidence 
on the impact of the programme on clinical indicators. Therefore, no concrete 
policy implication can be deduced as yet from the payment-by-results scheme.
An overall conclusion from the above is that is that it must first be established 
what type of patients the doctors are treating before an improvement in adherence 
rates is expected through financial incentives to the doctors.
More comprehensive disease management programmes are needed
The increasing burden of chronic disease has forced policy makers to explore 
ways in which patients will be engaged in a programme that improves their 
health. However, one-sided interventions are neither useful nor cost-effective. A 
more comprehensive disease management approach is needed.
In Greece in particular, the findings of the thesis confirm this necessity. Results 
are encouraging as far as adherence to medication is concerned, but more can be 
done to secure better public health. Issues of obesity and smoking are 
deteriorating, causing fears for future consequences in health outcomes.
In view of the deterioration of health indicators in Greece, a great part of which is 
due to life-style choices and habits, there is an immediate need for public health 
programmes to tackle these serious issues. The programmes that aim to engage
1 The Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) was implemented in April 2004 as part o f  the new  
contracts for primary care services (GMS contracts) in the UK. It is an annual reward programme 
that awards achievement points for clinical and organizational indicators as well as patient 
experience and additional services (such as contraceptive services and child health). Its aim is to 
incentivise the delivery o f  quality care. (Deparment o f  Health 2004).
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people in healthier lifestyles can benefit from the good relationship that the 
Greeks currently have with their health care providers. The role of the doctor in 
Greece is vital in ensuring that the patients not only adhere to the prescribed 
medication but that they also change their behaviour by adopting healthier life­
styles.
Tailored care
The literature has extensively demonstrated that patients vary with respect to how 
much information they want (Elkin, Kim et al. 2007) and how involved they wish 
to be in the decision making process. It is now accepted that the degree of 
information seeking and involvement differs among patients.
The game theory model presented in Chapter 6 supports the argument that 
tailored care can improve adherence rates. When the doctor understands the 
specific needs and preferences of the patient regarding information and adjusts 
her recommendations better adherence rates are achieved. On the other hand, if 
she fails to pass on the required information, then the patient will not adhere. 
This latter finding was confirmed by the empirical study among the hypertensive 
patients in Athens.
Previous empirical evidence confirms the effectiveness of tailored care in 
patients’ decision to adhere. A study by Ownby (2005) in the USA finds that 
“individually tailoring information provided to patients has a greater impact on 
patient behaviour than providing generic information”. His study develops an 
interactive software application to enhance the tailored supply of information and 
pilot data show higher degrees of acceptability among users and an association 
with highly sustained levels of adherence.
The policy recommendation that follows is that health care should be tailored to 
the specific needs of the patient. Supplying a lot of information, both verbally 
and through leaflets and booklets, will be beneficial for information-loving 
patients but may bring unwanted results to those averse to it.
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Administrative support
To enhance tailored care, administrative support can be used to help doctors. 
There are a number of validated tools that enable doctors to detect patients’ needs 
and preferences. More specifically, Miller (1987) has developed the Miller 
Behavioural Style Scale (MBSS) to identify information preferences. This simple 
and straightforward questionnaire helps the doctors identify the type of patient 
they are diagnosing and therefore pass on the appropriate amount of information.
Evidence on the association of information and non-adherence is not consistently 
confirmed. More information, although important, does not necessarily improve 
adherence rates (Home, Weinman et al. 2005). A reasonable explanation is that 
patients do not always want to know all about their health as this may increase 
their anxiety about future outcomes (Elkin, Kim et al. 2007).
Our game theoretical model showed that when doctors treat their patients 
according to their needs better adherence rates are achieved. More administrative 
support should be directed toward enabling the doctor to identify the type of 
patient in order to meet their needs.
Health care professionals need to be trained to facilitate adherence
It has been shown clearly from both the empirical and theoretical findings of the 
thesis that the doctor has a significant role to play in supporting patients to 
improve adherence rates, yet health professionals do not get enough training on 
the issue and there is extensive literature arguing that doctors very often fail to 
identify non-adherent behaviours (DiMatteo and DiNicola 1982). This may be 
due to the fact that it was not until more recently that the importance of the 
doctor’s role in the patient’s decision was acknowledged.
In order to improve adherence, doctors need to receive more information on the 
issue. Medical training should educate doctors to understand the factors that 
affect non-adherence and possible ways and tools that can be used to identify 
them. The WHO (2003) argues that it is possible for health care providers to
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learn to assess the potential for non-adherence and predict it accurately. Further 
training is needed for doctors to become more aware of the issue and to ensure 
patients take their medication as prescribed, and this is a clear policy implication.
Multidisciplinary approach
There is also an implication of the analysis concerning research in the area which 
should be supported through funds allocated in this direction.
The doctor-patient relationship is a very complex one. To understand how the 
two parties behave requires a multidisciplinary approach. Traditional Economics 
sets a solid technical foundation in modelling this interaction and has been useful 
in explaining decisions. However, it often uses strong assumptions for 
developing these models and fails to capture individuals’ emotions and beliefs.
Behavioural Economics, combining Economics and Psychology, opens new 
ground in understanding human behaviour and decisions. Our game theory 
approach employs the PEU theory by Caplin and Leahy (2001), which allows 
utility to be based not only on health outcomes but also on beliefs about these 
outcomes. As Frank (2004) suggests, Behavioural Economics has concepts and 
analytical tools that fit well with the institutions of the health sector and Health 
Economics can benefit widely from their application. Concepts such as anxiety, 
included in the PEU theory used here, as well as trust, fear and regret are ideas 
that health economists have until now felt uncomfortable with.
These concepts are essential in understanding not only the doctor-patient 
interaction but also a wide range of health care issues. Therefore they would help 
health economists enormously in understanding complicated issues that 
traditional models cannot analyse fully. In the past, some attempts have been 
made to use psychological elements in health economic models and Behavioural 
Economics has touched upon issues such as physicians’ behaviour, health care 
demand and insurance, the failure of Medicare in the USA etc. However, the 
contributions of Behavioural Economics in Health Economics and Policy have 
been very limited. Working together, psychologists and economists can provide
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very useful insights into many aspects of health care. The non-cooperative game 
theory in this thesis, with the specific assumptions made, proceeds in this 
direction.
7.4 Further research
This thesis is part of the cumulative knowledge in the area. Its aim was to shed 
light on the doctor-patient relationship and the impact it has on patients’ decision 
to adhere to medical recommendations. It identified a number of interesting 
points with respect to non-adherence to medication and the doctor-patient 
relationship in Greece, a country where no previous evidence really exists. The 
complexity of the doctor-patient interaction requires constant research and 
investigation of the theoretical elements which explain it and continuous 
collection of relevant empirical evidence.
The analysis of the ESS put the issue of adherence in the country context and 
gave interesting results regarding not only the impact of doctors but also that of 
the health system in general. The availability of more large-scale datasets would 
enable researchers in the future to investigate on a population level the impact of 
the doctor-patient interaction on non-adherence.
From a methodological viewpoint a few more future directions are proposed. 
Existing theoretical models that describe the doctor-patient relationship are quite 
limited in explaining the conflicts that occur during the consultation. On the other 
hand, our game theoretic models aim to capture these conflicts and understand 
both doctors’ and patients’ decisions. Our general Model 3 could be further 
extended by also not permitting the patient to know what the doctor has played, 
i.e. whether she has given all the information or not. This would increase the 
degree of ignorance in our model and would result in a more involved game in 
which both parties have information sets with more than one node. This could be 
a direction for obtaining further interesting, but more complicated, results from 
the conflicts that occur in the consultation.
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The theoretical models presented in this thesis used the PEU theory to allow 
patients’ emotions to enter the utility function. Human behaviours are not always 
based on actual outcomes but also on what people believe about them. Our 
models included emotions in the doctor’s utility as well, but they mainly focused 
on understanding patients’ behaviour. Further emphasis could be put on 
understanding, more in depth, the emotions that affect the doctor’s utility as well. 
The field of Behavioural Economics is promising in that it provides very helpful 
tools to relax some of the strict technical economic assumptions, such as extreme 
rationality, by introducing elements of Psychology.
7.5 Conclusions
Non-adherence to medication is a worldwide health problem that needs serious 
consideration by health policy makers and health care providers. Following 
recommendations is of vital importance, especially in long-term therapies. Non­
adherence decreases the effectiveness of the medication and increases the 
probability of relapses and unplanned hospitalisation. This results in increased 
health care costs that could be avoided if patients adhered to medical 
recommendations. This indicates the importance of more action to tackle non­
adherence to medical advice and highlights the need for strong policy 
recommendations.
The thesis has confirmed, both at the empirical and the theoretical level, the 
importance of the doctor-patient relationship on patients’ decisions to follow 
recommendations. The population survey showed that, irrespective of any 
disease characteristics and consultation settings, the way patients perceive their 
relationship with their health care providers affects their decision to adhere to 
prescribed medication. This was clear both when the collected Greek data was 
considered but also, and even more strongly, confirmed in the European sample.
Analysis of the ESS showed that the Greek population thinks highly of their 
doctors and this partly explains why they are adhering to their recommendations. 
Similar results were shown in the questionnaire survey we conducted for the 
purpose of this thesis among hypertensive patients in Athens. The game
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theoretical model captured the conflict in the doctor-patient interaction. It was 
based on the assumption that doctors have their own utility functions and patients 
differ in their preferences regarding information. Doctors who fail to identify 
these preferences do not pass on the right information.
There are no gold-standard solutions to tackle non-adherence to medication. 
Interventions that have been shown to be effective use a combination of 
approaches. Non-adherence is a multidimensional problem and, as such, a more 
interdisciplinary approach is needed first, to understand, and then, tackle it.
More emphasis needs to be given to the doctors’ role in improving adherence. 
The doctor-patient relationship lies at the heart of medical practice and 
improving it increases patients’ satisfaction and results in better adherence. More 
than financial incentives, health care providers need to be trained to be able to 
detect non-adherent patients and make sure they follow their recommendations. 
Administrative support can enhance doctors’ ability to identify patients’ 
preferences and needs through simple interventions, like, for example, a simple 
questionnaire given to the patients before seeing the doctor.
The health system was also shown to impact on adherence. Patients who feel they 
have enough choice and prefer the same doctor for different conditions are more 
likely to adhere to medical recommendations. Governments need to take this into 
consideration when planning reforms.
Policy makers and researchers need to pay more attention to the importance of 
the issue of non-adherence, not only to medication but also to other health 
behaviours, and focus on the impact that the doctor has on it.
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CONCLUSIONS
This thesis looked at the issue of non-adherence to medication and the impact that 
the doctor-patient relationship has on patients’ decisions to follow 
recommendations. First it investigated the issue at a population level, looking at how 
the general perceptions that people in Greece and in Europe have about doctors 
influence their decision to adhere to prescribed medication. It then focused on a 
particular group of hypertensive patients in Greece to see how the specific 
relationship that they have with their doctor affects their decision to adhere to 
medication. Then it developed a game theory approach to explain how conflicts that 
occur during the consultation may lead the patient to depart from the doctor’s 
recommendations. Finally, it discussed the findings in the broader policy context. 
The purpose of this last chapter is briefly to summarise the thesis and wrap up our 
findings.
The impact of non-adherence to medication on health care is very significant, in 
particular among chronic conditions. It reduces health outcomes since patients who 
are not taking the medication as prescribed are more likely to relapses and 
deteriorate. This consequently leads to increased health care expenditure as relapses 
require more intense health care and possible rehospitalisation. In the light of the 
burden of chronic diseases continuously growing, and the constant pressure put upon 
health systems to reduce health care costs the necessity to tackle non-adherence is 
very apparent. It is therefore no surprise that the WHO (2003) described non­
adherence in chronic illnesses as “a worldwide problem of striking magnitude”. 
However, studies that look at the impact of the doctor-patient relationship on non­
adherence to medication are limited in scope and number. This thesis helps in this 
direction by exploring how which aspects of the doctor-patient relationship are 
important in determining patients’ decision to follow recommendations.
Chapter 2 reviewed the empirical studies that have been conducted in the area of 
non-adherence to identify determinants of patients’ decision to depart from the 
doctor’s recommendations. It was shown that the way the patients experience or
204
Chapter 8
perceive their relationship with their doctors affects their decision on whether to 
adhere to recommendations. From the point of view of the general population, the 
empirical studies revealed that there is a lack of conclusive evidence on the issue of 
non-adherence and the related doctor-patient relationship. The majority of the 
studies are conducted in specific disease groups and settings. Little is known about 
how people perceive their doctors in general and how this impacts on their decision 
to follow recommendations when given. Also, evidence from the empirical studies 
showed that the doctor-patient relationship is rather complex and is often 
characterised by conflicts. Differences in the patient’s needs and doctors’ failure to 
understand them may lead to unsatisfactory results such as non-adherence to 
medication.
Chapter 2 also reviewed the theories used to explain non-adherence, including the 
Health Belief Model, the Theory of Reasoned Action and Planned Behaviour, the 
Self-efficacy Model and the Stages of Change Model. Further, it reviewed the main 
models used to describe the doctor-patient relationship and how they explain non­
adherence. Four models were reviewed: paternalism, shared decision making, 
informed decision making and, from the field of Health Economics, the agency 
theory. By reviewing the theories interesting elements were shown to provide 
valuable insights for the thesis. However, another gap was identified; that is that the 
current models fail to capture the conflicts that the empirical evidence largely 
demonstrates that are present during the consultation. This indicated the need for a 
better theoretical understanding of the issue.
Elements from the empirical studies as well as seeds of the theories on non­
adherence and the doctor-patient relationship were the basis of our investigation in 
this thesis. The chapter closed with a general but brief description of the Greek 
health system, given the focus of the empirical studies of the thesis.
Having identified the limitations of the literature, Chapter 3 presented the conceptual 
framework of the thesis, stating the research hypotheses and questions. Three main 
hypotheses were developed. First, the country context within which the issue of non­
adherence and doctor-patient relationship is examined plays an important role in its 
understanding. Second, the views that a specific group of patients holds regarding
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their doctor affects their decision to non-adhere. Finally, patients’ preferences for 
information differ and the doctor’s inability to understand them may explain the lack 
of adherence to medical recommendations. Two empirical studies and a theoretical 
framework were analysed to address the above hypotheses. The empirical studies 
concerned Greece, a country where no previous systematic evidence exists. The 
theoretical framework was a game theory model to explain, under conditions of 
conflict, the supply of information during the consultation and how it impacts on 
patients’ decision to non-adhere.
Chapter 4 presented the first empirical study, which examined the issue of non­
adherence and the doctor-patient relationship at the population level. For that 
purpose, data from the European Social Survey were used to examine how the 
general population thinks of their doctors and the impact this has on their decision to 
non-adhere to prescribed medication. The statistical procedure followed for the 
analysis of the data was that of a regression model in the form of Heckman probit 
with sample selection. Findings showed that the Greek population is very adherent. 
The perception that Greeks have about their doctors were the most important 
predictors of this behaviour. More specifically, discussion with the doctors on their 
treatment and the opportunity to ask questions and believing that illnesses cannot be 
cured without a doctor’s advice were the main factors that impact on the patient’s 
decision. The findings indicate that the way people perceive the doctor-patient 
relationship is crucial in their decision to follow prescribed recommendations.
Other variables shown to affect the patients’ decision were institutional factors. 
Having greater choice and being able to see the same doctor for different conditions 
were both predictors of better adherence rates. On the other hand, demographic and 
socioeconomic factors did not have a systematically significant impact on patients’ 
decision to adhere.
Chapter 5 presented the second empirical study of the thesis, which is a 
questionnaire survey among hypertensive patient in Greek. The study was conducted 
in the Centre for the Treatment of Hypertension in the Hippocration General 
Hospital in Athens. Seven hundred and forty-three patients were interviewed on 
their beliefs about their doctor and also their attitudes towards medication and
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information preferences. A probit model was used to analyse the data. Results 
indicated that patients were very adherent to the medical recommendation. Their 
relationship with their doctor was the most important predictor of their decision to 
adhere. The study in Greece also revealed interesting results on patients’ preferences 
regarding information. They feel more informed about their condition and less about 
the medication to treat it. Lack of information on medication was a significant 
determinant of non-adherence. The doctor was the main source of information for 
the patients. Patients did not seem to look around for information and the use of 
other sources, such as the Internet, was very limited.
Both empirical studies, although with different econometric and statistical 
techniques appropriate to the respective samples, agree on the fact that patients in 
Greece are very adherent. They also agree that they have a good relationship with 
their doctors and this was one of the main predictors of their decision to adhere to 
their recommendations.
Chapter 6 was the theoretical part of the thesis. Current theoretical models that have 
been used to describe the doctor-patient relationship have been useful in explaining 
certain aspects of the interaction and its impact on non-adherence. However, they 
are not adequate to explain the conflicts of the consultation that the review of the 
empirical evidence identified. The game theory approach is an extension of previous 
models from the field of Behavioural Economics. These models, based on the 
Psychological Expected Utility, include beliefs and emotions on patients’ utility 
function and allow for patients to vary in their preferences regarding information on 
their health. They explain aspects of the doctor-patient interaction based on a perfect 
agency assumption.
The models developed in this thesis are constructed under reasonable assumptions 
based on the investigated empirical evidence. They relax the assumption of perfect 
agency on the basis of empirical findings. To capture this, they also introduce the 
notion of the doctor’s effort in the supply of information. The model showed that the 
conflicts occurring during the consultation may lead to non-adherence. The models 
indicated that when the doctor can predict the type of patient she is diagnosing, she 
will pass on the right information and the patient will adhere. However, when the
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doctor cannot tell with certainty the type of patient she may not pass on the right 
information, in which case the patient will not adhere. The predictions of our models 
are discussed within the policy context.
Chapter 7 summarised the findings of the thesis and discussed them in a broader 
policy context. The implications for policy have three dimensions, the doctor, the 
patient and the system. Patients need to be supported, not blamed. Both the 
empirical evidence and the theoretical model showed that the importance of the 
doctor’s role in helping the patient adhere is crucial. Tailored care that is treating 
patients in accordance to their specific needs seems to work better. Not all patients 
may have the same needs and preferences. In addition, doctors need to be trained 
more to tackle non-adherence. Doctor’s training should focus on understanding 
patient differences and treat them adequately. Improving certain aspects of the 
consultation, such as discussing more on the treatment with the patients, allowing 
time for them to ask questions and give enough information on the condition and 
mainly on the medication is very important in improving adherence. Financial 
incentives do not necessarily lead to better adherence outcomes, as was shown by 
both the empirical findings and the game theory model. Finally, the system can also 
help patients. Simple interventions, such as the completion of a quick questionnaire 
before the consultation to identify patients’ preferences can have successful results. 
It was also shown that more choice and specialisation of doctors promotes better 
adherence.
To sum up, the thesis has shown, both empirically and theoretically, that the doctor- 
patient relationship plays an important role in the latter’s decision to adhere to the 
prescribed recommendations. It is part of the cumulative knowledge in the area and 
could lead to further empirical and theoretical investigations.
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T a b le  A l:  C orrela tion  m atrix  o f  B E L IE F  v a r ia b le s  u sed  (E S S)
PPLCURE PPRLYDC PSMDCPR DSPLVPR DCKPTRT DCTREQL DCDISC PTNRLCP DCADMMS DCDFCWR
PPLCURE
1
PPRLYDC 0.1611 1
PSMDCPR 0.0295 0.0481 1
DSPLVPR -0.0425 -0.0133 0.1665 1
DCKPTRT -0.0118 0.0077 0.037 0.0449 1
DCTREQL 0.0541 -0.0022 -0.0249 -0.0692 -0.016 1
DCDISC 0.0784 0.0135 -0.0016 -0.0612 -0.0059 0.3977* 1
PTNRLCP 0.0099 0.0527 0.0033 0.0271 0.1249 -0.0707 -0.0251 1
d c a d m m s -0.0094 -0.0005 0.0106 -0.0068 0.0278 0.1446 0.1473 0.0017* 1
DCDFCWR 0.0043 0.0495 0.0439 0.0478 0.1266 -0.0927 -0.0525 0.2158 -0.0144 1
Table A2.1: Factor analysis for BELIEF Table A2.2: Factor analysis for BELIEF 
variables (ESS) variables with 4 factors
Eigenvalue Difference
Proportio
n
Cumulat
ive
Factor 1 0.71471 0.32733 1.06 1.06
Factor2 0.38738 0.19631 0.5745 1.6345
Factor3 0.19107 0.0207 0.2834 1.9179
Factor4 0.17037 0.21474 0.2527 2.1705
Factor5 -0.04436 0.02871 -0.0658 2.1047
Factor6 -0.07308 0.06466 -0.1084 1.9964
Factor7 -0.13773 0.00274 -0.2043 1.7921
Facto r8 -0.14047 0.02269 -0.2083 1.5838
Factor9 -0.16316 0.06728 -0.242 1.3418
FactorlO -0.23045 -0.3418 1
LR test: independent vs. saturated chi2(45)=1.4e+04 
Prob chi2<0.001
Factorl Factor2 Factor3 Factor4
PPLCURE 0.1029 0.1326 -0.2623 0.0998
PPRLYDC 0.0011 0.1776 -0.2456 0.1
PSMDCPR -0.07 0.1455 0.083 0.2684
DSPLVPR -0.1545 0.0978 0.1726 0.216
DCKPTRT -0.0936 0.2499 0.0942 -0.068
DCTREQL 0.5314 0.0938 0.0507 -0.0061
DCDISC 0.5109 0.1583 0.0375 -0.0026
PTNRLCP -0.1697 0.3148 -0.0033 -0.1359
DCADMMS 0.2221 0.1109 0.1107 -0.0119
DCDFCWR -0.2125 0.3159 0.0127 -0.0921
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Table A2.3: Factor analysis for BELIEF Table A2.4: Factor analysis for
variables with 3 factors BELIEF variables with 2 factors
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness
PPLCURE 0.1029 0.1326 -0.2623 0.903
PPRLYDC 0.0011 0.1776 -0.2456 0.9081
PSMDCPR -0.07 0.1455 0.083 0.967
DSPLVPR -0.1545 0.0978 0.1726 0.9368
DCKPTRT -0.0936 0.2499 0.0942 0.9199
DCTREQL 0.5314 0.0938 0.0507 0.7063
DCDISC 0.5109 0.1583 0.0375 0.7125
PTNRLCP -0.1697 0.3148 -0.0033 0.8721
DCADMMS 0.2221 0.1109 0.1107 0.9261
DCDFCWR -0.2125 0.3159 0.0127 0.8549
Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness
PPLCURE 0.1029 0.1326 0.9718
PPRLYDC 0.0011 0.1776 0.9684
PSMDCPR -0.07 0.1455 0.9739
DSPLVPR -0.1545 0.0978 0.9666
DCKPTRT -0.0936 0.2499 0.9288
DCTREQL 0.5314 0.0938 0.7088
DCDISC 0.5109 0.1583 0.7139
PTNRLCP -0.1697 0.3148 0.8721
DCADMMS 0.2221 0.1109 0.9384
DCDFCWR -0.2125 0.3159 0.8551
Table A2.5: Factor analysis for BELIEF 
variables with 1 factor
Factor 1 Uniqueness
PPLCURE 0.1029 0.9894
PPRLYDC 0.0011 1
PSM DCPR -0.07 0.9951
DSPLVPR -0.1545 0.9761
DCKPTRT -0.0936 0.9912
DCTREQL 0.5314 0.7177
DCDISC 0.5109 0.739
PTNRLCP -0.1697 0.9712
DCADMMS 0.2221 0.9507
DCDFCW R -0.2125 0.9549
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Table A3.1: Selection model for Model III / Greece
Stand.
coefficient Error z p>|z| 95% C.I.
Socio-demographic factors
age (years) 0.0002 0.00016 1.36 0.173 -0.000097 0.00054
age squared (years) -0.0124 0.0165 -0.76 0.45 -0.0449 0.01994
sex (0=male l=fem ale) -0.2083 0.0942 -2.21 0.027 -0.3930 -0.0236
married (0=not married l=married) 0.0551 0.1071 0.51 0.607 -0.1548 0.2651
education (0=primary education)
Secondary -0.0515 0.1329 -0.39 0.698 -0.312 0.2089
Tertiary 0.1463 0.1759 0.83 0.406 -0.198 0.4911
Urban -0.251 0.1100 -2.28 0.023 -0.4668 -0.0352
feeling about household's income (0=living
comfortable)
coping at present income -0.236 0.1725 -1.37 0.17 -0.5749 0.1016
difficult on present income -0.1514 0.1817 -0.83 0.405 -0.5076 0.2048
very difficult on present income -0.1236 0.2123 -0.58 0.56 -0.5399 0.2925
Health status
health status (0=good)
fair 0.3290 0.1623 2.03 0.043 0.0109 0.6472
bad -0.1885 0.3431 -0.55 0.583 -0.8610 0.4839
disability (0=no. 1 =yes) 0.4366 0.2322 1.88 0.06 -0.0185 0.8917
Health system
choice regarding GP (0=not enough. l=enough
choice) 0.0039 0.1002 0.04 0.969 -0.1925 0.2004
prefer same doctor (0=not same or indifferent.
l=sam e doctor) -0.0919 0.0990 -0.93 0.354 -0.2861 0.1022
Worried o f side effects (0=no & to some
extent l=yes) 0.2404 0.1113 2.16 0.031 0.0221 0.4588
Doctor-patient relationship (believe...)
. . .  people can cure themselves * -0.2100 0.1210 -1.74 0.083 -0.4473 0.0271
.. .people rely too much on doctors * 0.0372 0.0986 0.38 0.706 -0.1560 0.2304
... when people sure doctor should prescribe * -0.0330 0.1143 -0.29 0.772 -0.2572 0.1910
... disappointed leaving without prescription * -0.1509 0.1882 -0.8 0.423 -0.5198 0.2179
.. .doctors keep the whole truth ** -0.3306 0.1072 -3.08 0.002 -0.5408 -0.1203
.. ..doctors treat patients as equals ** 0.2106 0.1021 2.06 0.039 0.0104 0.4109
.. .doctors discuss before they decide ** 0.1635 0.0987 1.66 0.098 -0.0299 0.3569
.. .patients are reluctant to ask questions ** 0.0034 0.1249 0.03 0.978 -0.2413 0.2483
.. .doctors admit their mistakes ** 0.0677 0.1735 0.39 0.696 -0.2723 0.4078
.. .doctors use words difficult to understand ** 0.2533 0.1149 2.2 0.028 0.0279 0.4787
Interview time -0.0119 0.0042 -2.82 0.005 -0.0202 -0.0036
constant 2.4457 0.5027 4.87 0.000 1.4604 3.4310
athrho 1.4367 0.6580 2.18 0.029 0.1469 2.7264
rho 0.8930 0.1332 0.14589 0.99146
Wald test o f  indep. Eqns. (rho=0): ch i2(l)=4.77 Prob>chi2=0.0290
* 0=not agree. l=agree
** 0=no & to some extent. l=yes
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Table A3.2: Selection models for ESS-24
Model I Model II Model in
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Effects Effects Effects
Socio-demographic factors
age (years) -0.000049 0.000011 0.000015
age squared (years) 0.0104** -0.00027 -0.00085
sex (0=male l=fem ale) -0.1617*** -0.0977*** -0.856**
married (0=not married l=married) 0.0041 0.0308 0.0520
education (0=primary education)
secondary -0.0595 -0.1380 -0.1534
tertiary -0.0528 -0.1528 -0.1613
urban 0.1056 0.08626 0.0498
feeling about household's income (0=living comfortable)
coping at present income -0.1062 -0.1015 -0.0678
difficult on present income -0.4334* _ 3464*** -0.2816*
very difficult on present income -0.5729*** -0.4694*** -0.4187***
Interview time -0.0021 -0.0019* -0.0021*
Health status
health status (Osgood)
fan- -0.0206 -0.0144
bad 0.1626 0.0292
disability (0=no. l=yes) 0.2414** 0.2739***
Health system
choice regarding GP (0=not enough. l=enough choice) 0.1748 0.1582
prefer same doctor (0=not same or indifferent. l=sam e doctor) 0.2737*** 0.2279***
Worried o f side effects (0=no & to some extend. l=yes) 0.1556** 0.0993
Doctor-patient relationship (I believe...)
..people can cure themselves (0=not agree. l=agree) -0.0457
..people rely too much on doctors (0= not agree. l=agree) -0.0298
..if people sure o f medicine doctor should prescribe( 0=not agree.
l=agree) 0.0316
..feel disappointed when leave without prescription (0=not agree.
l=agree) -0.0025
..doctors keep the whole truth (0=no. l=yes) -0.0483*
..doctors treat patients as equals (0=no. l=yes) 0.0065
..doctors discuss treatment before they decide (0=no. l=yes) 0.0949**
..patients are reluctant to ask questions (0=no. l=yes) -0.0299
..doctors admit their mistakes (0=no. l=yes) 0.0511
..doctors use words patients find difficult to understand (0=no.
l=yes) -0.0252
Log pseudolikelihood -20813.14 -16989.44 -13361.01
athrho 1.1263145* .90835712* 2.941546
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
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Table A4.1: Interaction Effects (age*discuss with doctor)
Stand.
coefficient Error p>M 95% C.I.
Socio-demographic factors
age (years) 0.000031 0.0002 0.8510 -0.0003 0.0004
age squared (years) -0.0186 0.0173 0.2830 -0.0524 0.0153
sex (0=male l=female) 0.1900 0.1061 0.0730 -0.0179 0.3979
married (0=not married l=married) 0.0781 0.1136 0.4920 -0.1445 0.3007
education (0=primary education)
secondary 0.0406 0.1383 0.7690 -0.2305 0.3117
tertiary -0.1541 0.2204 0.4840 -0.5861 0.2779
urban -0.1910 0.1134 0.0920 -0.4133 0.0313
feeling about household's income (0=living
comfortable)
coping at present income -0.0085 0.1840 0.9630 -0.3691 0.3521
difficult on present income -0.0425 0.1864 0.8200 -0.4079 0.3230
very difficult on
present income 0.0373 0.2098 0.8590 -0.3740 0.4486
Health status
health status (0=good)
fair 0.3450 0.1756 0.0490 0.0008 0.6893
bad 0.1965 0.3239 0.5440 -0.4384 0.8314
disability (0=no. l=yes) 0.0125 0.1945 0.9490 -0.3687 0.3938
Health system
choice regarding GP (0=not enough. l=enough
choice) -0.1280 0.1098 0.2440 -0.3433 0.0872
prefer same doctor (0=not same or indifferent.
l=same doctor) -0.0561 0.1095 0.6090 -0.2707 0.1586
Worried o f  side effects (0=no & to some
extend. l=yes) -0.1236 0.1116 0.2680 -0.3424 0.0952
Doctor-patient relationship
believe people can cure themselves * 0.2386 0.1324 0.0710 -0.0209 0.4980
believe people rely too much on doctors * 0.0357 0.1055 0.7350 -0.1710 0.2425
believe when people sure of medicine doctor
should prescribe * 0.2080 0.1207 0.0850 -0.0286 0.4446
feel disappointed when leave without
prescription * 0.1996 0.1809 0.2700 -0.1550 0.5542
believe doctors keep the whole truth ** -0.1132 0.1284 0.3780 -0.3649 0.1385
believe doctors treat patients as equals ** 0.1588 0.1125 0.1580 -0.0616 0.3792
believe doctors discuss treatment before they
decide ** -0.1910 0.2957 0.5180 -0.7706 0.3886
believe patients are reluctant to ask questions
** 0.2716 0.1246 0.0290 0.0273 0.5159
believe doctors admit their mistakes ** 0.1132 0.1769 0.5220 -0.2335 0.4598
believe doctors use words patients fmd
difficult to understand ** 0.1465 0.1101 0.1830 -0.0693 0.3622
Interaction effect (age*discuss with doctor) -0.0009 0.0059 0.8790 -0.0126 0.0108
constant -1.0468 0.4946 0.0340 -2.0162 -0.0774
athrho 1.2108 0.5499 0.280 0.1330 2.2886
rho 0.8369 0.1647 0.1322 0.9796
Wald test of indep. Eqns. (rho=0): chi2(l)=4.85 Prob>chi2=0.0277
* 0=not agree. l=agree
** 0=no & to some extend. l=yes
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Table A4.2: Interaction Effects (age*doctors treat patients as equals)
Stand.
coefficient Error p>|z| 95% C.I.
Socio-demographic factors
age (years) 0.000032 0.0002 0.8440 -0.0003 0.0004
age squared (years) -0.0188 0.0166 0.2600 -0.0514 0.0139
sex (0=male l=female) 0.1901 0.1055 0.0720 -0.0167 0.3970
married (0=not married 1 =married) 0.0784 0.1141 0.4920 -0.1452 0.3019
education (0=primary education)
secondary 0.0405 0.1379 0.7690 -0.2298 0.3107
tertiary -0.1546 0.2203 0.4830 -0.5864 0.2772
urban -0.1910 0.1137 0.0930 -0.4137 0.0318
feeling about household's income (0=living comfortable)
coping at present income -0.0055 0.1836 0.9760 -0.3653 0.3543
difficult on present income -0.0390 0.1852 0.8330 -0.4019 0.3239
very difficult on present income 0.0414 0.2077 0.8420 -0.3657 0.4485
Health status
health status (0=good)
fair 0.3442 0.1748 0.0490 0.0015 0.6868
bad 0.1945 0.3223 0.5460 -0.4372 0.8263
disability (0=no. l=yes) 0.0130 0.1943 0.9470 -0.3678 0.3938
Health system
choice regarding GP (0=not enough. l=enough choice) -0.1299 0.1094 0.2350 -0.3444 0.0846
prefer same doctor (0=not same or indifferent. l=same doctor) -0.0564 0.1096 0.6070 -0.2713 0.1585
Worried o f  side effects (0=no & to some extend. l=yes) -0.1248 0.1126 0.2680 -0.3456 0.0959
Doctor-patient relationship
believe people can cure themselves * 0.2387 0.1323 0.0710 -0.0206 0.4981
believe people rely too much on doctors * 0.0345 0.1056 0.7440 -0.1724 0.2415
believe when people sure of medicine doctor should prescribe * 0.2079 0.1207 0.0850 -0.0287 0.4445
feel disappointed when leave without prescription * 0.1975 0.1801 0.2730 -0.1554 0.5504
believe doctors keep the whole truth ** -0.1140 0.1286 0.3750 -0.3660 0.1380
believe doctors treat patients as equals ** 0.1980 0.2824 0.4830 -0.3554 0.7514
believe doctors discuss treatment before they decide ** -0.2352 0.1089 0.0310 -0.4486 -0.0219
believe patients are reluctant to ask questions ** 0.2708 0.1248 0.0300 0.0262 0.5153
believe doctors admit their mistakes ** 0.1140 0.1771 0.5200 -0.2332 0.4612
believe doctors use words patients find difficult to understand
** 0.1470 0.1100 0.1810 -0.0686 0.3626
Interaction effect (age*doctors treat patients as equals) -0.0009 0.0056 0.8770 -0.0119 0.0101
constant -1.0398 0.4782 0.0300 -1.9771 -0.1026
athrho 1.4356 0.6864 0.0360 0.0903 2.7808
rho 0.8928 0.1393 0.0900 0.9923
Wald test o f indep. Eqns. (rho=0): chi2(l )=4.37 Prob>chi2=0.0365
* 0=not agree. l=agree
** 0=no & to some extend. 1 =yes
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Table A4.3: Interaction Effects (secondary education*doctors discuss)
coefficient Stand. Error p>|z| 95% C.I.
Socio-demographic factors
age (years) 0.000025 0.0002 0.8820 -0.0003 0.0004
age squared (years) -0.0183 0.0168 0.2770 -0.0513 0.0147
sex (0=male l=female) 0.1916 0.1063 0.0720 -0.0168 0.4000
married (0=not married l=married) 0.0761 0.1145 0.5060 -0.1483 0.3005
education (0=primary education)
secondary -0.0435 0.1731 0.8020 -0.3828 0.2959
tertiary -0.1598 0.2250 0.4780 -0.6007 0.2811
urban -0.1892 0.1134 0.0950 -0.4114 0.0330
feeling about household's income (0=living comfortable)
coping at present income -0.0058 0.1847 0.9750 -0.3677 0.3561
difficult on present income -0.0369 0.1866 0.8430 -0.4026 0.3287
very difficult on present income 0.0442 0.2078 0.8320 -0.3632 0.4515
Health status
health status (0=good)
fair 0.3475 0.1759 0.0480 0.0027 0.6924
bad 0.1977 0.3264 0.5450 -0.4419 0.8374
disability (0=no. l=yes) 0.0109 0.1957 0.9550 -0.3726 0.3944
Health system
choice regarding GP (0=not enough, l=enough choice) -0.1288 0.1103 0.2430 -0.3451 0.0875
prefer same doctor (0=not same or indifferent. 1 =same doctor) -0.0532 0.1099 0.6290 -0.2687 0.1623
Worried o f side effects (0=no & to some extend. l=yes) -0.1231 0.1130 0.2760 -0.3446 0.0983
Doctor-patient relationship
believe people can cure themselves * 0.2346 0.1329 0.0770 -0.0258 0.4950
believe people rely too much on doctors * 0.0371 0.1053 0.7250 -0.1693 0.2434
believe when people sure of medicine doctor should prescribe
* 0.2023 0.1214 0.0960 -0.0356 0.4401
feel disappointed when leave without prescription * 0.1965 0.1813 0.2790 -0.1589 0.5519
believe doctors keep the whole truth ** -0.1152 0.1294 0.3730 -0.3688 0.1384
believe doctors treat patients as equals ** 0.1548 0.1127 0.1700 -0.0662 0.3757
believe doctors discuss treatment before they decide ** -0.3460 0.1719 0.0440 -0.6829 0.0092
believe patients are reluctant to ask questions ** 0.2778 0.1244 0.0260 0.0340 0.5217
believe doctors admit their mistakes ** 0.1183 0.1778 0.5060 -0.2301 0.4667
believe doctors use words patients find difficult to understand
** 0.1385 0.1112 0.2130 -0.0794 0.3565
Interaction effect (secondary education*doctors discuss) 0.1917 0.2194 0.3820 -0.2383 0.6218
constant -0.9927 0.4735 0.0360 -1.9208 0.0646
athrho 1.5571 0.6584 0.0180 0.2666 2.8476
rho 0.9149 0.1072 0.2605 0.9933
Wald test of indep. Eqns. (rho=0): chi2(l)=5.59 Prob>chi2=0.0180
* 0=not agree. l=agree
** 0=no & to some extend. 1 =yes
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Table A4.4: Interaction Effects (tertiary education*doctors discuss)
coefficient Stand. Error z 95% C.I.
Socio-demographic factors
age (years) 0.000029 0.0002 0.1800 -0.0003 0.0004
age squared (years) -0.0190 0.0167 -1.1400 -0.0516 0.0137
sex (0=male l=female) 0.1926 0.1060 1.8200 -0.0152 0.4003
married (0=not married l=married) 0.0793 0.1144 0.6900 -0.1450 0.3035
education (0=primary education)
secondary 0.0387 0.1377 0.2800 -0.2311 0.3086
tertiary -0.3054 0.2374 -1.2900 -0.7707 0.1599
urban -0.1908 0.1131 -1.6900 -0.4124 0.0309
feeling about household's income (0=living comfortable)
coping at present income -0.0187 0.1821 -0.1000 -0.3757 0.3383
difficult on present income -0.0540 0.1845 -0.2900 -0.4156 0.3075
very difficult on present income 0.0305 0.2075 0.1500 -0.3761 0.4371
Health status
health status (0=good)
fair 0.3421 0.1752 1.9500 -0.0014 0.6855
bad 0.1929 0.3246 0.5900 -0.4433 0.8291
disability (0=no. l=yes) 0.0156 0.1944 0.0800 -0.3653 0.3966
Health system
choice regarding GP (0=not enough. l=enough choice) -0.1354 0.1101 -1.2300 -0.3511 0.0804
prefer same doctor (0=not same or indifferent. l=same
doctor) -0.0594 0.1094 -0.5400 -0.2739 0.1551
Worried o f  side effects (0=no & to some extend. l=yes) -0.1185 0.1117 -1.0600 -0.3374 0.1003
Doctor-patient relationship
believe people can cure themselves * 0.2369 0.1323 1.7900 -0.0223 0.4962
believe people rely too much on doctors * 0.0363 0.1056 0.3400 -0.1706 0.2432
believe when people sure of medicine doctor should
prescribe * 0.2103 0.1207 1.7400 -0.0262 0.4469
feel disappointed when leave without prescription * 0.1964 0.1797 1.0900 -0.1558 0.5486
believe doctors keep the whole truth ** -0.1157 0.1280 -0.9000 -0.3666 0.1353
believe doctors treat patients as equals ** 0.1618 0.1123 1.4400 -0.0583 0.3819
believe doctors discuss treatment before they decide ** -0.2692 0.1117 -2.4100 -0.4882 0.0503
believe patients are reluctant to ask questions ** 0.2710 0.1254 2.1600 0.0252 0.5169
believe doctors admit their mistakes ** 0.1147 0.1770 0.6500 -0.2323 0.4617
believe doctors use words patients find difficult to
understand ** 0.1563 0.1100 1.4200 -0.0593 0.3719
Interaction effect (tertiary education*doctors discuss) 0.3446 0.3368 1.0200 -0.3155 1.0047
constant -0.9970 0.4719 -2.1100 -1.9218 0.0721
athrho 1.4537 0.6772 2.1500 0.1264 2.7810
rho 0.8964 0.1330 0.1257 0.9923
Wald testofindep. Eqns. (rho=0): chi2(l)=4.61 Prob>chi2=0.0318
* 0=not agree. l=agree
** 0=no & to some extend. l=yes
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Table A4.5: Interaction Effects (secondary education*doctors treat patients as 
equals)
coefficient Stand. Error p>|z| 95% C.I.
Socio-demographic factors
age (years) 0.000035 0.0002 0.8330 -0.0003 0.0004
age squared (years) -0.0194 0.0166 0.2430 -0.0519 0.0132
sex (0=male l=female) 0.1873 0.1065 0.0790 -0.0215 0.3961
married (0=not married l=married) 0.0785 0.1145 0.4930 -0.1459 0.3029
education (0=primary education)
secondary -0.0345 0.1624 0.8320 -0.3528 0.2839
tertiary -0.1529 0.2205 0.4880 -0.5851 0.2793
urban
feeling about household's income (0=living 
comfortable)
-0.1878 0.1127 0.0960 -0.4088 0.0332
coping at present income 
difficult on present 
income
very difficult on 
present income
-0.0041
-0.0390
0.0417
0.1833
0.1854
0.2073
0.9820
0.8330
0.8410
-0.3634
-0.4023
-0.3646
0.3551
0.3244
0.4479
Health status
health status (0=good)
fair 0.3408 0.1753 0.0520 -0.0029 0.6844
bad 0.1818 0.3225 0.5730 -0.4504 0.8139
disability (0=no. l=yes) 0.0159 0.1943 0.9350 -0.3650 0.3967
Health system 
choice regarding GP (0=not 
enough. l=enough choice) 
prefer same doctor (0=not same or 
indifferent. 1 =same doctor)
Worried o f  side effects (0=no & to some 
extend. l=yes)
-0.1307
-0.0561
-0.1260
0.1098
0.1097
0.1128
0.2340
0.6090
0.2640
-0.3459
-0.2712
-0.3470
0.0845
0.1589
0.0950
Doctor-patient relationship
believe people can cure themselves * 0.2339 0.1324 0.0770 -0.0257 0.4934
believe people rely too much on doctors * 
believe when people sure of medicine 
doctor should prescribe * 
feel disappointed when leave without 
prescription *
0.0335
0.2013
0.1950
0.1056
0.1210
0.1797
0.7510
0.0960
0.2780
-0.1736
-0.0359
-0.1573
0.2405
0.4384
0.5473
believe doctors keep the whole truth ** -0.1128 0.1290 0.3820 -0.3657 0.1401
believe doctors treat patients as equals ** 
believe doctors discuss treatment before 
they decide **
believe patients are reluctant to ask 
questions **
0.0693
-0.2376
0.2759
0.1642
0.1089
0.1253
0.6730
0.0290
0.0280
-0.2525
-0.4510
0.0302
0.3911
-0.0242
0.5216
believe doctors admit their mistakes ** 
believe doctors use words patients find 
difficult to understand **
Interaction effects (secondary 
education*doctors treat patients as equal)
0.1201
0.1461
0.1529
0.1774
0.1102
0.2048
0.4980
0.1850
0.4550
-0.2276
-0.0699
-0.2486
0.4678
0.3622
0.5544
constant -0.9690 0.4738 0.0410 -1.8976 -0.0404
athrho 1.5954 0.6682 0.0170 0.2858 2.9049
rho 0.9210 0.1014 0.2783 0.9940
Wald test of indep. Eqns. (rho=0): chi2(l)=5.7 Prob>chi2=0.0170
* 0=not agree. l=agree
** 0=no & to some extend. l=yes
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Table A4.6: Interaction Effects (tertiary education*doctors treat patients as 
equals)
coefficient Stand. Error p>|z| 95% C.I.
Socio-demographic factors
age (years) 0.000035 0.0002 0.8300 -0.0003 0.0004
age squared (years) -0.0195 0.0166 0.2420 -0.0521 0.0132
sex(0=male l=female) 0.1835 0.1054 0.0820 -0.0230 0.3900
married (0=not married l=married) 0.0772 0.1145 0.5000 -0.1471 0.3016
education (0=primary education)
secondary 0.0374 0.1373 0.7860 -0.2317 0.3064
tertiary -0.0414 0.2578 0.8720 -0.5466 0.4638
Urban -0.1881 0.1129 0.0960 -0.4095 0.0332
feeling about household's income (0=living
comfortable)
coping at present income -0.0138 0.1854 0.9410 -0.3773 0.3497
difficult on present income -0.0483 0.1866 0.7960 -0.4140 0.3174
very difficult on present
income 0.0341 0.2084 0.8700 -0.3743 0.4425
Health status
health status (0=good)
fair 0.3416 0.1750 0.0510 -0.0013 0.6846
bad 0.1956 0.3249 0.5470 -0.4412 0.8324
disability (0=no. l=yes) 0.0165 0.1945 0.9330 -0.3648 0.3977
Health system
choice regarding GP (0=not enough. l=enough
choice) -0.1292 0.1103 0.2410 -0.3453 0.0869
prefer same doctor (0=not same or indifferent.
l=same doctor) -0.0537 0.1092 0.6230 -0.2678 0.1604
Worried o f  side effects (0=no & to some extend.
l=yes) -0.1271 0.1126 0.2590 -0.3477 0.0936
Doctor-patient relationship
believe people can cure themselves * 0.2402 0.1325 0.0700 -0.0195 0.4999
believe people rely too much on doctors * 0.0337 0.1056 0.7490 -0.1732 0.2407
believe when people sure of medicine doctor should
prescribe * 0.2061 0.1201 0.0860 -0.0293 0.4414
feel disappointed when leave without prescription * 0.1911 0.1793 0.2870 -0.1603 0.5424
believe doctors keep the whole truth ** -0.1074 0.1272 0.3980 -0.3567 0.1419
believe doctors treat patients as equals ** 0.1822 0.1166 0.1180 -0.0463 0.4108
believe doctors discuss treatment before they decide -
** -0.2383 0.1089 0.0290 -0.4518 0.0248
believe patients are reluctant to ask questions ** 0.2685 0.1249 0.0320 0.0237 0.5134
believe doctors admit their mistakes ** 0.1147 0.1774 0.5180 -0.2330 0.4625
believe doctors use words patients find difficult to
understand ** 0.1462 0.1098 0.1830 -0.0690 0.3615
Interaction effect (tertiary education*doctors treat
patients as equal) -0.2608 0.3436 0.4480 -0.9343 0.4126
constant -1.0131 0.4701 0.0310 -1.9345 0.0918
athrho 1.4832 0.8652 0.0860 -0.2126 3.1790
rho 0.9020674 0.1612 -0.2095 0.9965
Wald test of indep. Eqns. (rho=0): chi2( I )=2.94 Prob>chi2=0.0865
*0=not agree. l=agree
** 0=no & to some extend. l=yes
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Table A4.7: Interaction Effects (age*doctors use difficult words)
coefficient Stand. Error p>|z| 95% C.I.
Socio-demographic factors
age (years) 0.000028 0.0002 0.8640 -0.0003 0.0003
age squared (years) -0.0192 0.0167 0.2500 -0.0519 0.0135
sex (0=male l=female) 0.1884 0.1061 0.0760 -0.0194 0.3963
married (0=not married l=married) 0.0764 0.1139 0.5020 -0.1468 0.2996
education (0=primary education)
secondary 0.0426 0.1380 0.7570 -0.2278 0.3130
tertiary -0.1534 0.2206 0.4870 -0.5858 0.2790
urban -0.1917 0.1136 0.0920 -0.4144 0.0310
feeling about household's income (0=living comfortable)
coping at present income -0.0060 0.1842 0.9740 -0.3670 0.3550
difficult on present income -0.0402 0.1863 0.8290 -0.4054 0.3250
very difficult on present
income 0.0387 0.2075 0.8520 -0.3680 0.4453
Health status
health status (0=good)
fair 0.3447 0.1752 0.0490 0.0013 0.6880
bad 0.1925 0.3214 0.5490 -0.4373 0.8224
disability (0=no. l=yes) 0.0119 0.1941 0.9510 -0.3686 0.3923
Health system
choice regarding GP (0=not enough. l=enough choice) -0.1292 0.1101 0.2410 -0.3451 0.0866
prefer same doctor (0=not same or indifferent. l=same
doctor) -0.0555 0.1096 0.6130 -0.2703 0.1594
Worried o f  side effects (0=no & to some extend. l=yes) -0.1259 0.1122 0.2620 -0.3457 0.0939
Doctor-patient relationship
believe people can cure themselves * 0.2389 0.1324 0.0710 -0.0206 0.4984
believe people rely too much on doctors * 0.0356 0.1053 0.7350 -0.1708 0.2421
believe when people sure of medicine doctor should
prescribe * 0.2079 0.1205 0.0850 -0.0283 0.4441
feel disappointed when leave without prescription * 0.1999 0.1805 0.2680 -0.1538 0.5536
believe doctors keep the whole truth ** -0.1148 0.1286 0.3720 -0.3669 0.1373
believe doctors treat patients as equals ** 0.1576 0.1125 0.1610 -0.0629 0.3780
believe doctors discuss treatment before they decide ** -0.2352 0.1089 0.0310 -0.4486 -0.0218
believe patients are reluctant to ask questions ** 0.2708 0.1246 0.0300 0.0265 0.5151
believe doctors admit their mistakes ** 0.1122 0.1776 0.5270 -0.2358 0.4603
believe doctors use words patients find difficult to
understand ** 0.0691 0.3093 0.8230 -0.5370 0.6753
Interaction effect (age*doctors use difficult words) 0.0016 0.0062 0.7920 -0.0104 0.0137
constant -1.0075 0.4793 0.0360 -1.9470 -0.0680
athrho 1.5899 1.0517 0.1310 -0.4713 3.6512
rho 0.9201 0.1613 -0.4393 0.9987
Wald test of indep. Eqns. (rho=0): chi2(l)=2.29 Prob>chi2=0.1306
* 0=not agree. l=agree
** 0=no & to some extend. l=yes
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Table A4.8: Interaction Effects (secondary education*doctors use difficult words)
coefficient Stand. Error p>|z| 95% C.I.
Socio-demographic factors
age (years) 0.0000 0.0002 0.8610 -0.0003 0.0004
age squared (years) -0.0187 0.0166 0.2590 -0.0512 0.0138
sex (0=male l=female) 0.1837 0.1058 0.0830 -0.0237 0.3911
married (0=not married l=married) 0.0744 0.1143 0.5150 -0.1497 0.2984
education (0=primary education)
secondary 0.0877 0.1634 0.5910 -0.2324 0.4079
tertiary -0.1452 0.2224 0.5140 -0.5811 0.2908
urban -0.1919 0.1140 0.0920 -0.4153 0.0315
feeling about household's income (0=living comfortable)
coping at present income -0.0074 0.1841 0.9680 -0.3683 0.3535
difficult on present income -0.0412 0.1863 0.8250 -0.4063 0.3239
very difficult on present income 0.0337 0.2085 0.8720 -0.3750 0.4424
Health status
health status (0=good)
fair 0.3427 0.1749 0.0500 -0.0001 0.6854
bad 0.1900 0.3232 0.5560 -0.4434 0.8234
disability (0=no. l=yes) 0.0085 0.1937 0.9650 -0.3711 0.3880
Health system
choice regarding GP (0=not enough. l=enough choice) -0.1288 0.1101 0.2420 -0.3446 0.0870
prefer same doctor (0=not same or indifferent. l=same
doctor) -0.0520 0.1099 0.6360 -0.2673 0.1633
Worried o f  side effects (0=no & to some extend. l=yes) -0.1250 0.1125 0.2670 -0.3455 0.0956
Doctor-patient relationship
believe people can cure themselves * 0.2394 0.1323 0.0700 -0.0199 0.4987
believe people rely too much on doctors * 0.0361 0.1055 0.7330 -0.1708 0.2429
believe when people sure of medicine doctor should
prescribe * 0.2087 0.1204 0.0830 -0.0273 0.4447
feel disappointed when leave without prescription * 0.1912 0.1820 0.2930 -0.1654 0.5479
believe doctors keep the whole truth ** -0.1136 0.1289 0.3780 -0.3663 0.1391
believe doctors treat patients as equals ** 0.1564 0.1123 0.1640 -0.0637 0.3764
believe doctors discuss treatment before they decide ** -0.2315 0.1096 0.0350 -0.4463 0.0167
believe patients are reluctant to ask questions ** 0.2747 0.1254 0.0280 0.0290 0.5204
believe doctors admit their mistakes ** 0.1097 0.1789 0.5400 -0.2409 0.4603
believe doctors use words patients find difficult to
understand ** 0.2183 0.1600 0.1720 -0.0953 0.5320
Interaction effect (secondary education*doctors use
difficult words) -0.1377 0.2219 0.5350 -0.5726 0.2971
constant -1.0568 0.4754 0.0260 -1.9886 0.1250
athrho 1.4827 0.7489 0.0480 0.0149 2.9506
rho 0.9020 0.1396 0.0149 0.9945
Wald test of indep. Eqns. (rho=0): chi2(l)=3.92 Prob>chi2==0.0477
* 0=not agree. l=agree
** 0=no & to some extend. l=yes
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Table A4.9: Interaction Effects (health* people can cure themselves)
coefficient
Stand.
Error p>|z| 95% C.I.
Socio-demographic factors
age (years) -0.00009 0.000038 0.018 -0.00016 -0.000015
age squared (years) 0.0022 0.0042 0.59 -0.0060 0.0106
sex (0=male 1 =female) 0.0830 0.0377 0.028 0.0091 0.1570
married (0=not married l=married) -0.0939 0.0294 0.001 -0.1518 -0.0361
education (0=primary education)
secondary 0.0511 0.0506 0.313 -0.0481 0.1504
tertiary 0.0821 0.0567 0.148 -0.0291 0.1934
urban 0.0482 0.0278 0.083 -0.0062 0.1027
feeling about household's income (0=living comfortable)
coping at present income -0.0430 0.0229 0.057 -0.0886 0.0013
difficult on present income 0.0403 0.0190 0.034 0.0030 0.0776
very difficult on present income 0.0053 0.0606 0.93 -0.1136 0.1242
Health status
health status (0=good)
fair -0.1123 0.0407 0.006 -0.1921 -0.0324
bad -0.1993 0.0613 0.001 -0.3196 -0.0791
disability (0=no. l=yes) 0.0825 0.0446 0.065 -0.0050 0.1701
Health system
choice regarding GP (0=not enough. l=enough choice) 
prefer same doctor (0=not same or indifferent. l=same 
doctor)
-0.1266
-0.1221
0.0330
0.0854
<0.001
0.153
-0.1915
-0.2896
-0.0618
0.0454
Worried o f  side effects (0=no & to some extend. l=yes) 0.0363 0.0542 0.503 -0.0699 0.1427
Doctor-patient relationship
believe people can cure themselves * -0.0408 0.0926 0.66 -0.2223 0.1407
believe people rely too much on doctors * 
believe when people sure of medicine doctor should 
prescribe *
0.0915
0.1291
0.0259
0.0191
<0.001
<0.001
0.0406
0.0916
0.1424
0.1667
feel disappointed when leave without prescription * 0.1627 0.0360 <0.001 0.0921 0.2333
believe doctors keep the whole truth ** 0.1007 0.0431 0.02 0.0160 0.1853
believe doctors treat patients as equals ** -0.1665 0.0218 <0.001 -0.2094 -0.1237
believe doctors discuss treatment before they decide ** -0.1215 0.0448 0.007 -0.2095 -0.0335
believe patients are reluctant to ask questions ** 0.0565 0.0227 0.013 0.0119 0.1010
believe doctors admit their mistakes ** 
believe doctors use words patients find difficult to 
understand **
Interaction effect (health*believepeople can cure 
themselves)
0.0024
0.0201
0.1312
0.0732
0.0177
0.0455
0.973
0.256
0.004
-0.1410
-0.0146
0.0419
0.1459
0.0550
0.2205
constant -0.59817 0.1255 <0.001 -0.8442 -0.3520
athrho 0.3197 0.1170 0.006 0.09024 0.5492
rho 0.309 0.1058 0.09000 0.4999
Wald test of indep. Eqns. (rho=0): chi2=7.46 Prob>chi2=0.0063
* 0=not agree. l=agree
** 0=no & to some extend. l=yes
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Table A4.10: Interaction Effects (health* people rely too much)
coefficient
Stand.
Error p>|z| 95% C.I.
Socio-demographic factors
age (years) -0.0001 0.0000 0.0180 -0.00016 0.000015
age squared (years) 0.0021 0.0041 0.6160 -0.0060 0.0102
sex (0=male 1 =female) 0.0822 0.0376 0.0290 0.0086 0.1559
married (0=not married l=married) -0.0931 0.0291 0.0010 -0.1502 -0.0361
education (0=primary education)
secondary 0.0531 0.0505 0.2930 -0.0459 0.1521
tertiary 0.0851 0.0570 0.1350 -0.0266 0.1968
urban 0.0480 0.0279 0.0850 -0.0066 0.1027
feeling about household's income (0=living comfortable)
coping at present income -0.0426 0.0236 0.0720 -0.0889 0.0037
difficult on present income 0.0411 0.0189 0.0300 0.0040 0.0782
very difficult on present income 0.0048 0.0590 0.9350 -0.1109 0.1205
Health status
health status (0=good)
fair -0.0065 0.0674 0.9230 -0.1385 0.1255
bad -0.0947 0.0510 0.0630 -0.1947 0.0052
disability (0=no. l=yes) 0.0828 0.0452 0.0670 -0.0059 0.1714
Health system
choice regarding GP (0=not enough. l=enough choice) -0.1263 0.0331 <0.001 -0.1911 -0.0615
prefer same doctor (0=not same or indifferent. l=same
doctor) -0.1222 0.0858 0.1550 -0.2904 0.0460
Worried o f side effects (0=no & to some extend. l=yes) 0.0363 0.0547 0.5070 -0.0709 0.1436
Doctor-patient relationship
believe people can cure themselves * 0.0196 0.0793 0.8050 -0.1357 0.1749
believe people rely too much on doctors * 0.0878 0.0421 0.0370 0.0053 0.1703
believe when people sure of medicine doctor should
prescribe * 0.1298 0.0192 <0.001 0.0922 0.1675
feel disappointed when leave without prescription * 0.1646 0.0361 <0.001 0.0938 0.2354
believe doctors keep the whole truth ** 0.1007 0.0425 0.0180 0.0174 0.1840
believe doctors treat patients as equals ** -0.1667 0.0216 <0.001 -0.2090 -0.1244
believe doctors discuss treatment before they decide ** -0.1215 0.0442 0.0060 -0.2080 -0.0349
believe patients are reluctant to ask questions ** 0.0570 0.0227 0.0120 0.0125 0.1015
believe doctors admit their mistakes ** 0.0019 0.0731 0.9790 -0.1414 0.1453
believe doctors use words patients find difficult to
understand ** 0.0197 0.0177 0.2650 -0.0150 0.0545
Interaction effect (health*believepeople rely too much) 0.0054 0.0819 0.9480 -0.1551 0.1658
constant -0.6462 0.1213 <0.001 -0.8840 -0.4084
athrho 0.3197 0.1170 0.006 0.09024 0.5492
rho 0.309 0.1058 0.09000 0.4999
Wald test of indep. Eqns. (rho=0): chi2(l)=7.46 Prob>chi2=0.0063
* 0=not agree. 1 =agree
** 0=no & to some extend. l=yes
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Table A 4.ll: Interaction Effects (health*treat patients as equals)
coefficient
Stand.
Error p>|z| 95% C.I.
Socio-demographic factors
age (years) -0.00008 0.000038 0.0210 -0.00016 -0.00001
age squared (years) 0.0021 0.0043 0.6250 -0.0063 0.0104
sex (0=male l=female) 0.0823 0.0372 0.0270 0.0094 0.1551
married (0=not married l=married) -0.0931 0.0293 0.0010 -0.1505 -0.0358
education (0=primary education)
secondary 0.0531 0.0504 0.2910 -0.0456 0.1519
tertiaiy 0.0852 0.0572 0.1370 -0.0270 0.1974
urban 0.0480 0.0280 0.0860 -0.0068 0.1029
feeling about household's income (0=living comfortable)
coping at present income -0.0426 0.0234 0.0680 -0.0885 0.0032
difficult on present income 0.0411 0.0188 0.0290 0.0042 0.0781
very difficult on present income 0.0050 0.0588 0.9320 -0.1102 0.1203
Health status
health status (0=good)
fair -0.0063 0.0400 0.8760 -0.0847 0.0722
bad -0.0947 0.0392 0.0160 -0.1715 -0.0179
disability (0=no. l=yes) 0.0827 0.0451 0.0670 -0.0056 0.1710
Health system
choice regarding GP (0=not enough. l=enough choice) -0.1264 0.0332 <0.001 -0.1916 -0.0613
prefer same doctor (0=not same or indifferent. l=same
doctor) -0.1222 0.0860 0.1550 -0.2908 0.0464
Worried o f  side effects (0=no & to some extend. l=yes) 0.0363 0.0544 0.5040 -0.0703 0.1430
Doctor-patient relationship
believe people can cure themselves * 0.0195 0.0788 0.8040 -0.1349 0.1740
believe people rely too much on doctors * 0.0900 0.0260 0.0010 0.0390 0.1410
believe when people sure of medicine doctor should
prescribe * 0.1298 0.0192 <0.001 0.0921 0.1675
feel disappointed when leave without prescription * 0.1646 0.0363 <0.001 0.0934 0.2358
believe doctors keep the whole truth ** 0.1007 0.0425 0.0180 0.0174 0.1840
believe doctors treat patients as equals ** -0.1698 0.0266 <0.001 -0.2220 -0.1176
believe doctors discuss treatment before they decide ** -0.1214 0.0448 0.0070 -0.2091 -0.0336
believe patients are reluctant to ask questions ** 0.0569 0.0227 0.0120 0.0124 0.1015
believe doctors admit their mistakes ** 0.0019 0.0735 0.9800 -0.1422 0.1459
believe doctors use words patients find difficult to
understand ** 0.0198 0.0179 0.2670 -0.0152 0.0548
Interaction effect (health*believe doctors treat as equals) 0.0080 0.0406 0.8440 -0.0715 0.0875
constant -0.6461 0.1229 <0.001 -0.8871 -0.4052
athrho 0.3110 0.1152 0.0070 0.0852 0.5367
rho 0.3013 0.1047 0.0850 0.4905
Wald test of indep. Eqns. (rho=0): chi2(l)=7.29 Prob>chi2=0.0069
* 0=not agree. l=agree
** 0=no & to some extend. l=yes
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Table A4.12: Interaction Effects (health*doctors discuss)
coefficient
Stand.
Error p>|z| 95% C.L
Socio-demographic factors
age (years) -0.000089 0.00003 0.019 -0.00016 -0.00001
age squared (years) 0.0021 0.0042 0.6140 -0.0061 0.0104
sex (0=male l=female) 0.0833 0.0367 0.0230 0.0115 0.1552
married (0=not married l=married) -0.0933 0.0296 0.0020 -0.1513 -0.0353
education (0=primary education)
secondary 0.0527 0.0500 0.2920 -0.0453 0.1507
tertiary 0.0840 0.0564 0.1360 -0.0266 0.1946
urban 0.0482 0.0282 0.0880 -0.0072 0.1035
feeling about household's income (0=living comfortable)
coping at present income -0.0421 0.0234 0.0720 -0.0880 0.0038
difficult on present income 0.0416 0.0184 0.0240 0.0056 0.0776
very difficult on present income 0.0073 0.0598 0.9020 -0.1099 0.1246
Health status
health status (0=good)
fair -0.0513 0.0360 0.1550 -0.1220 0.0193
bad -0.1362 0.0266 <0.001 -0.1883 -0.0841
disability (0=no. l=yes) 0.0799 0.0439 0.0690 -0.0062 0.1660
Health system
choice regarding GP (0=not enough. 1 =enough choice) 
prefer same doctor (0=not same or indifferent. l=same 
doctor)
-0.1266
-0.1226
0.0335
0.0862
<0.001
0.1550
-0.1922
-0.2915
-0.0610
0.0464
Worried o f  side effects (0=no & to some extend. l=yes) 0.0371 0.0530 0.4840 -0.0668 0.1410
Doctor-patient relationship
believe people can cure themselves * 0.0194 0.0787 0.8060 -0.1349 0.1737
believe people rely too much on doctors * 
believe when people sure of medicine doctor should 
prescribe *
0.0883
0.1301
0.0262
0.0195
0.0010
<0.001
0.0369
0.0919
0.1396
0.1682
feel disappointed when leave without prescription * 0.1644 0.0363 <0.001 0.0932 0.2356
believe doctors keep the whole truth ** 0.1015 0.0426 0.0170 0.0181 0.1850
believe doctors treat patients as equals ** -0.1649 0.0213 <0.001 -0.2066 -0.1232
believe doctors discuss treatment before they decide ** -0.1694 0.0235 <0.001 -0.2155 -0.1232
believe patients are reluctant to ask questions ** 0.0553 0.0218 0.0110 0.0126 0.0979
believe doctors admit their mistakes ** 
believe doctors use words patients find difficult to 
understand **
0.0004
0.0207
0.0739
0.0174
0.9960
0.2330
-0.1445
-0.0134
0.1453
0.0549
Interaction effect (health*believe doctors discuss) 0.1169 0.0991 0.2380 -0.0774 0.3111
constant -0.6236 0.1130 <0.001 -0.8450 -0.4021
athrho 0.3119 0.1251 0.0130 0.0668 0.5570
rho 0.3022 0.1136 0.0667 0.5058
Wald test of indep. Eqns. (rho=0): chi2(l)=6.22 Prob>chi2:=0.0126
* 0=not agree. l=agree
** 0=no & to some extend. l=yes
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APPENDIX B
B.l The questionnaire (English version)
Section 1: Clinical characteristics
Q1.01 H ow  is your health in general? W ould you say it i s . ..
1 2 3 4 5 9
Very Good Good Fair Bad Very bad (DA)
Q1.02 A re you  hampered in your daily activities in any w ay  by any longstanding illness, or 
disability, infirm ity or m ental health problem ? If yes, is that a lot or to som e extent?
1
Yes, a lot Yes, to some 
extend
3
No
9
(DA)
Q1.03 D o you  sm oke or did you ever sm oke?
1 2 3 4 5 9
Smoke Smoke Do not Do not Never (DA)
daily occasionally smoke, smoke, used smoked
used to to smoke
smoke occasionally
daily
Section 2: Information Channels
Q2.01 Please indicate whether you use the following sources to get information regarding 
b lood  pressure:
Family/Friends
D octor
□
□
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Pharmacist □
Nurse □
Other patients with high blood pressure □
The m edia (T V , R adio, N ew spaper) □
Internet □
M agazines on  health issues and nutrition □
Other (please specify)...........................................................................  □
(DA) □
Q2.02 Please indicate whether you use the following sources to get information regarding 
m edication f o r  b lood  pressure:
Family/Friends □
D octor □
Pharmacist □
N urse □
Other patients with high blood pressure □
The m edia (T V , R adio, N ew spaper) □
Internet □
M agazines on health issues and nutrition □
Other (please specify)...........................................................................  □
(DA) □
Now, please indicate whether the following statements apply to you:
1 2 9
Yes No (DA)
Q 2.03 I am w ell inform ed about b lood  pressure. □
Q2.041 am well informed about the medication I take for blood pressure. □
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Section 3: Beliefs vs. Actual facts
Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with each o f the following statements, using the
scale below:
1 2 3 4 5 9
Agree Agree Neither agree Disagree Disagree (DA)
strongly nor disagree strongly
Q 3.01a  High blood pressure can be treated without medication. □
Q3.02a P eop le w ho u se m edication regulate their b lood  pressure. □
Q 3 .03a  Medication for blood pressure has many side effects for those who use it. □
Q3.04a P eop le w ho take b lood  pressure m edication b ecom e addicted to it due to its □
long-term  use.
Q 3 .05a  People with high blood pressure are dependent on their medication for life. □
Now, please indicate whether the following statements apply to you:
1 2 9
Yes No (DA)
Q 3 .0 1 b  In the past, I have been successful in treating my blood pressure without the □
use of medication.
Q3.02b I have regulated m y b lood  pressure thanks to the m edication  I have b een  □
taking.
Q 3 .0 3 b  I have personally experienced side effects due to the use of the prescribed □
medication.
Q3.04b I fee l I have b ecom e addicted to m y m edication  for b lood  pressure as a result □  
o f  long-term  use.
Q 3 .05b  I will always be dependent on my medication for blood pressure. □
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Section 4: Doctor-patient relationship
Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each o f the following statements, using the 
scale below:
1 2 3 4 5 8 9
Agree Agree Neither Disagree Disagree (DK) (DA)
strongly agree nor strongly
disagree
Q 4.01  Most illnesses cure themselves without having to go to a doctor. □
Q4.02 Peop le rely too m uch on their doctors rather than th em selves to keep healthy. □
Q 4.03  When people are sure about what medicine they need, their doctor should just 
prescribe it for them.
□
Q4.04 It is best to  fo llow  doctors’ orders. □
Q 4.05  I generally feel a bit disappointed when I leave a doctor’s surgery without a 
prescription.
□
Using the scale below, please indicate how often you think the following applies to doctors in 
general:
1 2 3 4 5 8 9
Never Some o f About half Most o f the Always or (DK) (DA)
or the time o f the time time almost
almost always
never
Q4.06 D octors keep the w h o le  truth from  their patients. □
Q 4 .07  Before doctors decide on a treatment, they discuss it with their patient. □
Q4.08 Patients are reluctant to ask their doctor all the questions th ey ’d like to ask. □
Q 4 .09  Doctors are willing to admit their mistakes to their patients. □
Q4.10 D octors u se words or phrases that their patients find d ifficu lt to understand. □
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The following questions refer to the la st tim e you  consu lted  y o u r  doctor f o r  blood pressure.
Please indicate whether the following statements apply to you:
1 2 9
Yes No (DA)
The last time I visited my doctor....
Q 4 .1 1 .. .the doctor did not have much time for me. □
Q4.12 ....I discussed everything regarding my condition with the doctor. □
Q 4.13  .. .1 discussed everything regarding the prescribed medication with the doctor. □
□
□
□
□
Section 5: Measurement of non-adherence
People often have difficulty taking their pills for one reason or another....
Q 5.01 Do you ever forget to take your medicine?
1 2  9
Yes No (DA)
Q 5.02  Are you careless at times about taking your medicine?
1 2  9
Yes No (DA)
Q 5.03  When you feel better do you sometimes stop taking your medicine?
1 2  9
Yes No (DA)
Q 4.14  .. .the doctor explained to m e everything I needed  to know about b lood  
pressure.
Q 4 .15  ... .the doctor explained to me everything I needed to know about the 
prescribed medication.
Q 4 .1 6  .. .the doctor explained to m e the m edication’s side effects and h ow  to deal 
w ith  them.
Q 4 .1 7  . . .I  was generally satisfied with the outcome of the visit.
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Q 5.04  Som etim es i f  you  feel w orse w hen you take the m edicine, do you  stop taking it?
1 2 9
Yes No (DA)
Section 6: Risk
Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each o f the following statements, using the
scale below:
1 2 3 4 5 6
Agree Agree Neither agree Disagree Disagree (DK)
strongly nor disagree strongly
Q6.01 Untreated high-blood pressure can lead to:
□ ...strokes. □
□ ....heart attack. □
□ ...heart failure. □
□ ...kidney failure. □
Q6.02 Which is more important risk factor (tick the answer):
□ The “top” (systolic) blood pressure. □
□ The “bottom” (diastolic) blood pressure. □
□ They are equally important. □
□ (DK) □
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Section 7: Demographic questions For statistical purposes, we would like to ask 
you...
Q7.01 In what year were you bom?
Q7.02 What is the highest level of education you have completed? (please circle)
1. Never been to school
2. Primary School
3. Junior High School
4. High School
5. Technical School
6. Technical College
7. University
8. Post-Graduate studies
9. (DA)
Q7.03 What is your marital status?
Single Married D ivorced  W idow  
1 2  3 4
Q7.04 Do you have children?
1
Yes
Q7.05 Are you currently living alone?
1 2  9
Yes No (DA)
Q7.06 Which of the following descriptions comes closest to how you feel about your 
household’s income nowadays?
Living comfortably on present income 1
Coping on present income 2
Find it difficult on present income 3
Finding it very difficult on present income 4
(DK) 8
(DA) 9
2
No
9
(DA)
(D A )
9
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B.2 The questionnaire (Greek version)
Q1.01 TsviKd 7td)<; elvai r| oyela oaq; @a A-syaxe on stvai...
1 2 3 4 5 8
[JoXu kola?] Kaltj Mszpia Kaxr\ TIoXv KGKY\ (AT)
Q1.02 Etk; Ka0r||i£ptve<; oaq 5paaxr|pt6xr|x£<; oovavxaxe efjjcoSia s^atxiaq Ka7roiaq ypoviaq
ao0ev£ia<; f\ aSovaplaq, ava7ir|pia<; f| Ka7ioioo Tcpopifipaioq v|/oyiKr|(; oyelaq; Av vai, 7roXx) f| ae
k6l7coio Pa0po;
1 2 3 8
Nai, noXv Nai, as DXi (AT)
KQJZOIO
fiaOpo
Q1.03 Ka7rvi^ 8T8 f| Ka7cvi^ ax8 7tots;
1 2 3 4 5 6
Kanyi^co Kanvifa Aev K(mviC,(o, AeV KOL7UVlCcO, Asv s/co (AT)
KaOrjpspiva nepimaaiaKd Kdnvi^a azo KanwiCa KOLTZVlOEl now
napsXOov izspioraGioxa
Q2.01 TIeize pag oag napctxolcb noisg and rig napaKazco nr\ytg xp^cfiponowiw yia va naipvszs 
nXtjpopopisg (txezikol ps zr/v ntsatj:
OiKoyeveta/Oftoi □
T iaxpo<; □
OappaK07ioio^ □
NoooKopoq □
AAloi acGevelq jne meori □
MME (TV, Pa5io, EcprjpepiSa) □
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Internet □
nepioSnca pe Gspaxa Dyeiaq Kai 8iaxpo<pr|<; (n.x- Vita, Forma k.x .A ,.) □
AA,Ao (mpaKaXxb avaq>£pexe).............................................. □
Q2.02 Uske pag noisg and rig napaKazco nr\ytg xprjwponoisks yia va 
a/jniKa pe xa (pd.ppa.Ka yia rrjv nisatj;
naipveze nXrjpocpopieg
O iK o y e v e ia /O ilo i □
T laxpoq □
O appaK 07coiog □
NoaoKopoq □
AXXxn aoGevei; ps 7ti£crr| □
MME (TV, Pa8io, EcprjpepiSa) □
Internet □
IlapioSiKa pe Gapaxa vyeiaq Kai 8iaxpocpf|<; (ti.x* Vita, Forma k .x A . ) □
AlXo (7iapaKaXxb avatpepexa)............................................................... □
Tcbpa neks pov, aag napaxaXcb, av 01 napaKazco (ppaasig laxvovv yia aag: 
1 2 
Nai Dxi
6
m
Q2.03 Eipai KaX,a Evxipepcopavo^ri o^ExiKa p£ xriv 7ri£ar|. □
Q2.04 Elpai K a X a  e v r ip s p c o p e v o ^ T ]  o% £xiK a pe x a  cpappaica nox> 7taipvco yia xr|v 7uecr|. □
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napaxalcb neixe pov av avpcpcoveixe r/ Sicupcovehe pe icaOe pia and xig napaicaxcD npoxaoeig:
1 2 3 4 5 6
Zvpzpcovcb ZvppcDvcb (Ovxe Aiacpcovcb Aicupoovcb (AT)
anoXvxa ovpcpcovcb aitoXma
ovre
Siazpoovcb)
Q3.01a H 7rlsor| p7iopsl va avxipsxo)7iioxsi ycDplc; (pappaKa. □
Q3.02a Oi av0pco7roi 7ioo xppGipo7i:oiodv (pappara poGpl^oov rr|v 7iisof| xooq. □
Q3.03a Ta (pappaKa yia xr|v 7usor| e^ovv noXkeq Tiapsvspyeisq yia aoxodq nox> xa □
Xpr|aipo7ioioi3v.
Q3.04a Oi dv0pco7ioi 7too Tialpvoov (pappara yia xriv 7ri£ar| eGl^ovxai os aoxa s^aixlaq □  
xti<; paKpoypoviaq
Q3.05a Oi dv0pco7ioi pe vvpriX.fi 7ulsor| s^apxwvxai a7io xa (pappaKa xooq 5ia (31oo. □
Tcbpa Tiehe pov oag napaicaXcb av oi napoKaxco (ppaoeig laxvovv yia eoag:
1 2 6
Nai DXi (AT)
Q3.01b Eyco 7tpoo7ia0f|osi ps STiixuyla oxo 7iaps^0ov va avxipsxco7riaco xr|v 7risor| □
Xtoplq xt) XP1!07! (pappaKcov.
Q3.02b E^ o) pi)0plosi x p v  7ilsor| poi) yapr\ o x a  (p a p p a K a  7too xp^ cnpo7i:oicG. □
Q3.03b E%(o o/r| 18io<^ a 7iapaxr|pfiasi Tcapsvspysisq and xr| xpr|ar| xcov cpappaKcov yia □ 
xt|v 7ilsori 7ioi) poo sxei ypaipsi o yiaxpoc; poo.
Q3.04b Ni60o) 6xi e%co sGioxel oxa (p a p p a K a  y i a  x p v  7risori s^aixiaq xrjq p a K p o y p o v ia q  □  
XPWIS-
Q3.05b 0a slpai 7iavxa s^apxripsvoq a7io xa (pappaKa yia xrr|v 7risor|. □
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Tcbpa 6a aag napanaXovaa va pov neixe ndao avpcpcoveixe r\ Siacpcoveixe pe KaOe pia and rig 
napaKazco anox/ieig, xpfiaiponoicbvxag zrjv andXovdrj xXipaxa:
1 2  3 4
Ivpcpcovcb Ivpcpcovcb (Ovre Aiacpcovcb
anoXvza avpcpcovcb
ovxe 
Siacpcovcb)
Q4.01 Oi 7repioaoT£pe<; aa0£V£i£<; 0£pa7i£i)ovxai and povsc; xoui;, va xpetd^sxai □ 
va nag as yiaxpo.
Q4.02 Oi dv0po)7ioi paai^ovxai 7toX.x> TCspiacoxspo an' oxi npenei axoix; yiaxpoix; xoix;, □  
m p a axoix; saDxodq xoix; yia va psivouv uyiex;.
Q4.03 Oxav oi dv0pco7ioi sivai Pspaioi yia xo rcoio (pappaxo xpeid^ovxai, o yiaxpoq □
xoix; 7ips7isi anXa Kai povo va xoix; xo ypacpsi a£ auvxayp.
Q4.04 Elvai KaXuxepo va aKoXoi)0£i Kavsic; xk;  o5pyie<; xcov yiaxpcbv. □
Q4.05 TsviKa, aia0avopai Kd7icog a7ioyox|X£i)pdvoq/ri oxav (psdyco ano xov yiaxpo □
Xcopiq ai)vxayf|.
neixe pov aag napaKaXcb ndao ovyya vopi^exe oxi xa napaxaxco la/vovv yia xovg yiaxpovg yevina, 
Xprjaiponoicbvxag xrjv anoXovOrj xXipaxa:
1 2  3 4
noxerf Kdnoieg Tigpiaeg Tig
axeSov cpopeg cpopeg nepiaaoxepeg
noxe cpopeg
Q4.06 Oi yiaxpoi 5s X£vs oArj xpv aXf|0sia axoix; acOsvsic; xoix;. □
Q4.07 npiv oi yiaxpoi a7io(paaiaoi)v pia 0£pa7i£la, xpv ao^pxodv p£ xov aa0svp xoix;. □
Q4.08 Oi ac0svsi; 5iaxd£ovv va pcoxpaoov xoix; yiaxpovq xoix; yia oX,a oaa 0a p0sX,av □  
va xoix; pcoxpaoov.
Q4.09 Oi yiaxpoi sivai 7cpo0opoi va 7iapa8£xxodv xa Xd0p xoix; axoix; aa0£V£i<; xoix;. □
Q4.10 Oi yiaxpoi xppaiporanoijv Xi^ six; p cppaaeu; 7100 oi aaOevsic; xoo<; □
SoaKoX^dovxai va KaxaXapoov.
5 6
n&vxa rj (AT)
axeSov ndvxa
5 6
Aiacpcovcb (AT)
anoXvza
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Oi napaxaxco epcoxrjaeig C,r\xovv xrj yvcbprj aag a/siuca pe xo(ovg) yiaxpd(ovg) nov aag 
napaxoXovOei yia xrjv niearj aag. IJapaKaXcb neixe pov ndao avpcpcoveixe pe xaOepia and xig 
TxapaKaxco izpoxaaeig, Xptjaiponoicbvxag xtjv axoXovOrj xXipaxa:
1 2 6
Nai DXi (AT)
Kaxa xr| SiapKeia xr|<; xekemaiaq e7riaKevpf|<; pov axo yiaxpo....
Q4.11 .... o yiaxpoq 5ev eiye nokv xpovo va aayo^riGei pa£p pov. □
Q4.12 .... avCrjxqaa oXa xa Oepaxa oxsxuca pe xrjv meai) pov pe xo yiaxpo. □
Q4.13 .... av^ T|XT|oa oka xa Gepaxa ayexiKa pe xa (pappaKa tcov  pov eypaipe o □
yiaxpog.
Q4.14 .... o yiaxpoq pov e£,f|yr|ae oka oaa 7ipe7tei va e^pco axexuca pe xr|v 7riear|. □
Q4.15 ....o yiaxpoq pov e f^jyr|ae oka oaa 7ipe7tei va ^spw a%exiKa pe xa (pappaKayia □ 
xpv 7riear|.
Q4.16 .. .o yiaxpo<; pov piA,r|ae yia xu; 7tapevepyeie<; xcov (pappaKcov Kai iz&>q va xu; □ 
avxipexco7iiaco.
Q4.17 .. .yeviKa epeiva evyapiaxripevo^r\ pe xo ajroxekeopa xpq e7tiaKeipr|<;. □
IJoXXoi dvOpconoi ov/va SvaxoXevovxai va naipvovv xa (pappaxa xovg yia Siacpopovg Xoyovg. 
Eaeig...
Q5.01 ...^exvaxe rcoxe va raxpexe xa (pappaKa aaq;
Nai DXi (AA)
Q5.02 ...eiaxe pepiKeq (popeq apeA,f|c; axr| f^|\pr] xcov (pappaKcov;
Nai 0Xi (A4)
Q5.03 ...oxav voicbGexe KaAvxepa axapaxaxe pepiKe<; cpopeg va rcalpvexe xa (pappaKa;
Nai 0Xi (AA)
Q5.04 ...av pepiKeq cpopeq voubaexe yeipoxepa oxav Tialpvexe xa (pappaKa, xa axapaxaxe;
Nai 0Xi (AA)
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Tcbpa da aag KapaxaXovaa va pov nshe ndao avpcpcoveixe ij Siacpcoveixe pe k&6s pia and rig 
izapaxaxco anoif/eig, yprjoiponoicbvxag xrjv axoXovOrj xXipaxa:
1 2  3 4
Ivpcpcovcb Ivpcpcovcb (Ovxe Aiacpcovcb 
anoXvxa ovpcpcovcb
ovxe
Siacpcovcb)
5
Aiacpcovcb
anoXvxa
6
(AT)
Q6.01 H n\j/r|X,f| 7ui£or|, av 8ev avxi|i£xco7uiax£i, p7cop£i va o8r|yf|a£i oe:
□ ... £yK£(pa^ lKO £7t£lo65lO. □
□ .... epcppaypa xov pvoxapSiov. □
□ .. .Kap8iaKT| av£7tapK£ia. □
□ ... V£CppiKT| aV£7tdpK£ia. □
Q6.02 rioia a7iOT£X,£i 7uio aripavxiico rcapayovxa KivSnvou:
□ H «fj£ydX.T|» (auaxoA.iicr|) 7ci£ar|. □
□ H «fiiKpf|» (SiaoxoA,iKf|) 7ci£ot|. □
□ Eivai xo 18io oripavxiKsq. □
□ (AO □
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ria K a 0 a p a  a x a x ia x iK o b q  X o y o v q  0 a  r|0etax va p o v  7relxe ...
Q7.01 Iloia xpovia y8wr|0r|KaT8;
Q7.02 F Io io  e l v a i  t o  a v c b x e p o  emTteSo O7too5o)v rcoo e^eie o^ oK A rjp cb aei;
a. 'Ecoc; a7io(poixoi AppoTiKob
b. A7t6(poixoi 3xa^ioD ropvaaloo
c. A7i6(poiToi Aoxeloo f] 6xa^ioo Pupvaaioo
d. ATiocpoixoi IEK/ T8% v ik 6 v  Eyo^cbv
e. nxnxiobxoi TEI
f. nxoxioi3%oi AEI
g- Kaxoxoi Mexa7UTi)xiaKcbv xlxJioov
Q7. 03 F lo ia  e i v a i  r| o iK o y e v e ia ia i  a a q  K a x a a x a a r i;
Ayapo^r) 'Eyyapo^ri Aia^eoypevo< r^| Xf|po<^a (AA)
Q7.04 E ^ e x e  m i 8 i a ;
Nai Op (AA)
Q7.05 Mevexe povoq/r)?
Nai DXi (AA)
Q7.06 f l o i a  arco xi<; T tapaK axco T iepiypacpeq  ^ p a i a ^ e i  r c e p ia a o x e p o  a x t |v  e u c o v a  71:00 s ^ e x e  y i a  x o  
a r ip e p iv o  e i a o S p p a  t o o  v o iK o ic o p io b  a a q ;
Me xo appepivo eiaoSrjpa t o o  voiKoicupiob (fivq avexa 1
Me xo appepivo eiaoSppa xa Kaxacpepveis 2
Me xo aripepivo eiao8r|pa xa Pya^eiq 7iepa SbaKoArx 3
Me xo appepivo eiao5r|pa xa Pya^eiq 7iepa noTco 8baKoA,a 4
(A.r.) 8
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Table Bl.l Factor analysis for d-p relationship factors (Greek survey)
Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor 1 0.69729 0.4465 13.655 13.655
Factor2 0.2508 0.14533 0.4911 18.566
Factor3 0.10547 0.07653 0.2065 20.631
Factor4 0.02894 0.03147 0.0567 21.198
Factor5 -0.00254 0.06456 -0.005 21.148
Factor6 -0.06709 0.01314 -0.1314 19.834
Factor7 -0.08023 0.09917 -0.1571 18.263
Factor 8 -0.1794 0.06316 -0.3513 1.475
Factor9 -0.24256 -0.475 1
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(36) = 144.64 
Prob chi2 <0.001
Table B1.2: Factor analysis for d-p relationship factors with 4 factors
Factorl Factor2 Factor3 Factor4
Uniquenes
s
people can cure themselves -0.0522 0.1193 0.1705 0.0733 0.9486
people rely too much on doctors -0.1777 0.1282 -0.098 0.0783 0.9363
if people sure of medicine doctor 
should prescribe -0.2739 0.2785 0.0366 -0.0376 0.8451
its best to follow doctor's advice 0.0447 0.1104 -0.1297 0.0966 0.9597
feel disappointed when leave 
without prescription -0.2953 -0.2579 0.0215 -0.0589 0.8424
doctors keep the whole truth 0.3911 0.1681 0.0679 0.0034 0.8142
patients are reluctant to ask 
questions 0.4547 0.1379 -0.048 -0.0468 0.7704
doctors admit their mistakes 0.1761 0.0641 0.1691 0.0322 0.9352
doctors use words patients find 
difficult to understand 0.3288 0.1117 -0.117 0.0001 0.8657
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Table B2.1: Interaction effect (age*doctors use difficult words)
Coef. Std. Err. P>t 95% C.I.
Demographic and socioeconomic factors 
sex (0=male l=female) -0.0272 0.1533 0.859 -0.3286 0.2740
age (years) -0.0102 0.0072 0.161 -0.0245 0.0040
education (0=primary education)
secondary -0.2423 0.2024 0.232 -0.6401 0.1555
tertiary -0.1292 0.2194 0.556 -0.5605 0.3019
feeling about household's income (0=living 
comfortable)
coping at present income -0.0494 0.1785 0.782 -0.4004 0.3014
difficult on present income 0.2318 0.2212 0.295 -0.2029 0.6665
very difficult on present income -0.0565 0.3014 0.851 -0.6488 0.5358
Health status
health (0=(very good)
fair -0.0527 0.1831 0.774 -0.4126 0.3072
bad -0.0688 0.2824 0.807 -0.6239 0.4861
hampered in daily activity (0=no l=yes) 0.1919 0.1710 0.262 -0.1442 0.5280
Doctor-patient relationship
believe illnesses cure themselves without visiting a 
doctor * 0.0832 0.2178 0.703 -0.3448 0.5112
believe people rely too much on doctors * 0.0144 0.1519 0.925 -0.2841 0.3129
believe when people sure o f medicine doctor should 
prescribe * -0.1537 0.1522 0.313 -0.4529 0.1454
believe it's best to follow doctor's advice * -1.4547 0.5283 0.006 -2.4930 -0.4164
feel disappointed when leave without prescription * 0.0374 0.2465 0.879 -0.4471 0.5220
believe doctors keep the whole truth ** 0.2932 0.1645 0.075 -0.0300 0.6166
believe doctors discuss treatment before they decide 
** 0.0412 0.1489 0.782 -0.2514 0.3340
believe patients are reluctant to ask questions ** 0.0895 0.1523 0.557 -0.2097 0.3889
believe doctors admit their mistakes ** 0.0763 0.1992 0.702 -0.3151 0.4678
believe doctors use words patients find difficult to 
understand ** 2.1058 0.7460 0.005 0.6397 3.5719
Interaction effect (age*doctors use difficult words) -0.0312 0.0121 0.011 -0.0552 -0.0073
cons 1.3169 0.7587 0.083 -0.1741 2.8080
* 0=not agree. l=agree
** 0=no & to some extend. l=yes
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Table B2.2: Interaction effect (tertiary education*doctors use difficult words)
Coef. Std. Err. P>t 95% C.I.
Demographic and socioeconomic factors
sex (0=male l=female) -0.0534 0.1509 0.724 -0.3500 0.2431
age (years) -0.0185 0.0059 0.002 -0.0303 -0.0068
education (0=primary education)
secondary -0.1856 0.1992 0.352 -0.5772 0.2060
tertiary 0.0694 0.2434 0.775 -0.4089 0.5479
feeling about household's income (0=living 
comfortable)
coping at present income -0.0009 0.1825 0.996 -0.3597 0.3578
difficult on present income 0.2974 0.2244 0.186 -0.1437 0.7385
very difficult on present income 0.0190 0.2961 0.949 -0.5629 0.6011
Health status
health (0=(very good)
fair -0.0671 0.1848 0.717 -0.4303 0.2960
bad -0.1856 0.2837 0.513 -0.7433 0.3719
hampered in daily activity (0=no l=yes) 0.2588 0.1723 0.134 -0.0798 0.5974
Doctor-patient relationship
believe illnesses cure themselves without 
visiting a doctor * 0.0811 0.2188 0.711 -0.3489 0.5111
believe people rely too much on doctors * 0.0291 0.1574 0.853 -0.2802 0.3386
believe when people sure o f medicine 
doctor should prescribe * -0.1769 0.1485 0.234 -0.4688 0.1148
believe it's best to follow doctor's advice * -1.5036 0.4724 0.002 -2.4321 -0.5751
feel disappointed when leave without 
prescription * -0.0182 0.2402 0.939 -0.4903 0.4537
believe doctors keep the whole truth ** 0.3278 0.1616 0.043 0.0101 0.6455
believe doctors discuss treatment before 
they decide ** 0.0260 0.1505 0.863 -0.2698 0.3219
believe patients are reluctant to ask 
questions ** 0.1017 0.1534 0.508 -0.1998 0.4033
believe doctors admit their mistakes ** 0.0412 0.1975 0.835 -0.3470 0.4294
believe doctors use words patients find 
difficult to understand ** 0.4265 0.1792 0.018 0.0743 0.7787
Interaction effect (tertiary 
education*doctors use difficult words) -0.4585 0.3316 0.168 -1.1103 0.1932
cons 1.7091 0.6557 0.009 0.4205 2.9977
* 0=not agree. 1 =agree
** 0=no & to some extend. l=yes
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APPENDIX C 
(Calculations for Model 3) 
C.l The indifference point, q * .
The doctor will be indifferent in playing NT  or T when u , = u 2. Replacing the payoffs 
this is equivalent to the following equations:
q ■ [uD ( £ [ s ] - l ) - a ]  +  ( l - q ) - u D ( £ |> ] )  =  q  • (E[uD (5 )] -  £  2) +  (1 -  q)  • [uD (£ ]> ] — /)  — £*,], 
q-uD( E [ s ] - l ) - q - a + u D(E[s] ) -q-uD(£ls]) =  q-E[uD( s ) ] - q - £ 2 +uD( E [ s ] - l ) - £ ] - q  uD( E [ s ] - l ) + q - £,,  
q • [uD (is |> ] - l ) - a - u D ( £ ’[5 ]) -  E[ud (5)] + £ 2 + u D ( £ [ s ]  ~ 0 ~ £ \] = u d  ~ 0 ~ ud “  0  “  €\-
Recall that the doctor’s utility function is linear therefore E[uD (5)] =  uD (£ '[5 ]) . This results to:
^ uD (£[■?]) -  uD (£[>] - l )  + €]
2uD (J£’[^ ]) -  2uD (£[.?] - 1) + a + £{ —e2
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C.2 The functions Ux and U2.
(a) Case 1: uD ( £ [ 5] - / ) - £ ,  >uD ( £ [ 5]) - e 2 or e 2 >ex+l.
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(b) Case 2: uD (£[.?]-/) — el < uD(E[s])~ e2 or e2 < ex + /.
C.3 Case 1: The doctor will play NT when U{ >U2.
Replacing the payoffs this is equivalent to the following equations:
q • [uD (£ [5 ]  -  /)  -  a] + (1 -  q) • uD (E[s]) > q • (E[uD (5)] -  £ 2) +  (1 -  q) • [uD (E[s] - 1) -  £, ] ,  
q uD(Tls]- l ) -q  a+uD(E[s])-q uD(E[s])>q E[uD(s)]-q-£2 +uD(E[s]-l)-£x - q u D(T\s]-l )+q -£x, 
q ■ [uD(£ [ * ] - l ) - a - u D( £ [ 5 ] ) - E[uD(5)] + £2 +  uD( £ [ 5 ] - / ) - £ , ] >  uD( £ [ 5 ] - / ) - uD(£ [5 ]  
q ■ [uD( £ [5] - l ) - a - u D( £ [5] ) - E[uD(5)] +  £2 +  uD( £ [ 5 ] - / ) - £ x] > uD( £ [ 5] - l ) - u D(£ [5 ]
Recall that the doctor’s utility function is linear therefore £[^^(5 )] = md(£[5']) . This results to:
Up (£|>]) ~ uD (£[5 ] - l )  + el 
2 uD ( £ [ 5]) -  2 uD ( £ [ 5] - l )  + a + £l - e  2
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Or:
Xq < -------- , where:
X  + Y
X  = uD (£[.?]) -  uD (£[5 ] — l) + £j >0 and
Y = uD (-£'[5]) -  uD (£[5] -  /) + a -  e2 >0 .
Under bounded rationality q -  ^  therefore:
— < ——— <=> X  + Y < 2X  <=> X  >Y  <=> £x > a - £ 2 <=>
2 X + Y  1 2
— (£x + £ 2) > ~ ( a  + 0 ) .
C.4 Case 2: The doctor will play T when Ux <U2.
Replacing the payoffs this is equivalent to following equations:
q ■ [uD ( £ [ 5] -  /)  -  a] + (1 -  q) ■ uD ( £ [ 5]) <  q ■ (E[uD(s)] - £ 2) + { \ - q ) -  [uD ( £ [ 5] -  /)  -  £x ] ,  
q ■ uD(E[s]—l)—q a+uD(E[s])-q■ uD(E[s] ) <q-E[uD(s)]-q-£2 +uD(E[s] - l ) -£x - q-uD(E[s]-l )+q • £x, 
q • [uD ( £ [ 5] - l ) - a - u D ( £ [ 5]) -  E [ u d  (5)] + £2+uD ( £ [ 5] - / ) -  £x ] <  uD ( £ [ 5] - 1)-  uD ( £ [ 5] - l ) - £ x, 
q • [uD( £ [ 5] - l ) - a - u D( £ [ 5]) - E [ u d (5)] + £2 + uD( £ [ 5] - / ) - £ , ] <  wD( £ [ 5] - l ) - u D( £ [ 5] - / )  - £x .
Recall that the doctor’s utility function is linear therefore E[uD (5)] =  uD ( £ [ 5 ] ) . That results to:
 ^ uD (£[>]) -  uD (£!>] -  0 + e x
2 u d  ( £ [ 5 ] )  -  2 u d  (£ [ .? ]  — l )  +  a +  £ x - £ 2
Or:
Xq >-------- , where:
X  + Y
X - u D(£[5 ] ) - uD(£[s]- l )  + £x > 0 and
Y = uD (£[5]) -  uD (£[5 ] - l )  + a - £ 2 > 0.
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Under bounded rationality q = ^  therefore:
— < — ——  <=> X  + Y <  2 X  <=> X > Y  <=> £ , > a - £ 2 <=>
2 x + y  1 2
— (fj + £2) > —(a + 0 ) .
C.5 Proposed empirical testing
We propose here a way of a possible further empirical testing of the theoretical model presented in 
this Chapter 6 of the thesis.
A questionnaire study could be used to examine patient’s preferences for information and their 
doctors’ perception of these preferences. Patients will complete a questionnaire before and after 
consultation with doctors. The doctors will complete at the beginning of the study and after each 
consultation with the participant patients. Before consultation, patients will be asked about 
preferences for information seeking. Doctors will be asked to estimate the patients’ preferred level 
of information seeking after the consultation with the patient. Each patient’s preference will then be 
compared with the doctor’s estimate of the patient’s preference to identify disconnections. After the 
consultation, the patient will be asked for overall satisfaction with the consultation and his/her 
intention to adhere to medical recommendations.
The pre-consultation questionnaire to be given to the patients will ask patient’s preference for 
information seeking. A number of instruments has been validated and repeatedly been used to 
identify ‘monitoring’ and ‘bluntering’ preferences. The Miller Behavioral Style Scale (henceforth 
MBSS) is one of the most well known and most frequently used instruments developed by Miller, 
who introduced the concept of ‘monitors’ and ‘blunters’ (Miller, 1987). This scale asks the 
individual to imagine four stress-evoking scenes that are similar to context to the hospital situation 
(i.e. “Imagine that you are afraid of flying and have to go somewhere by plane”). Each of these 
statements is followed by eight alternatives that represent ways of coping with the situation. Four of 
these alternatives are of an information-seeking variety (i.e. “I would read and reread the safety 
instruction booklet”) and four are of information-avoiding variety (i.e. “I would watch the in-flight
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film even if I had seen it before”). The scale has been used in many studies and has been proven to 
have good predictive and discriminant validity (Miller et al., 1989).
Two scores are derived from the MBSS: a) the total monitoring score, which is the sum of 
monitoring options endorsed across the four situations (higher scores equals more monitoring) and 
b) the total blunting score, which is obtained by summing the number of blunting options (higher 
scores indicates more blunting). A single score can be computed by subtracting the total number of 
‘blunting’ items endorsed from the total ‘monitoring’ items endorsed.
Questions regarding patient’s age, sex and educational qualifications will also be included to test 
whether demographic characteristics are associated with information preferences.
The post-consultation questionnaire will ask patients about satisfaction with consultation and the 
information they have received, satisfaction with doctors and intention to adhere to the medication 
prescribed by the doctor. Satisfaction with the doctor can be assessed using the Medical Interview 
Satisfaction Scale that has been validated in previous studies.
Doctors will be given a questionnaire asking them a number of questions including, their perception 
of the patient’s preference regarding information, their level of satisfaction with the consultation 
and the quality of their relationship with the patient.
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